3 research outputs found
Computational Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibrium in Large Games
We prove that finding an epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a succinctly
representable game with many players is PPAD-hard for constant epsilon. Our
proof uses succinct games, i.e. games whose payoff function is represented by a
circuit. Our techniques build on a recent query complexity lower bound by
Babichenko.Comment: New version includes an addendum about subsequent work on the open
problems propose
Query Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria
We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in
games with a large number of players . Our main result states that for
-player binary-action games and for constant , the query
complexity of an -well-supported Nash equilibrium is exponential
in . One of the consequences of this result is an exponential lower bound on
the rate of convergence of adaptive dynamics to approxiamte Nash equilibrium