1 research outputs found
Secure Analysis of Dynamic Networks under Pinning Attacks against Synchronization
In this paper, we first consider a pinning node selection and control gain
co-design problem for complex networks. A necessary and sufficient condition
for the synchronization of the pinning controlled networks at a homogeneous
state is provided. A quantitative model is built to describe the pinning costs
and to formulate the pinning node selection and control gain design problem for
different scenarios into the corresponding optimization problems. Algorithms to
solve these problems efficiently are presented. Based on the developed results,
we take the existence of a malicious attacker into consideration and a resource
allocation model for the defender and the malicious attacker is described. We
set up a leader-follower Stackelberg game framework to study the behaviour of
both sides and the equilibrium of this security game is investigated. Numerical
examples and simulations are presented to demonstrate the main results