The domain of authority

If the commands of authority are peremptory and content-independent directives, it is a great puzzle why any rational autonomous agent should accept them as morally binding, as Robert Paul Wolff and others have argued. I analyse the peremptory and content-independent quality of authoritative directives and argue that all earthly authorities operate within a specified domain. I investigate three candidates for the role of universally applicable boundary conditions–morality, harm to self, and absurdity. I conclude that commands are authoritative only when intra vires, i.e. issued within the proper domain of the authority. Wolff's challenge is not met, hut it is shown to be less forbidding

Hypothetical Justifications

A basic conviction in moral non-cognitivism is: only hypothetical norms may be justified. Hartmut Kliemt argues for a moderate variant: there are only hypothetical justifications of norms whether the norms are hypothetical or categorical in kind. In this paper the concept of 'hypothetical justification' is analyzed. It is argued that hypothetical justifications are not of the kind that we should look for in normative ethics.non-cognitivism, hypothetical norms, hypothetical justification

Right's Complex Relation to Ethics in Kant: the limits of Independentism

The recent literature on the relation in Kant between duties of right and duties of virtue is dominated by a debate on whether duties of right can be derived from duties of virtue. According to one important argument, there is a tension or even a paradox in Kant between various claims concerning juridical norms, a paradox which can best be solved by assuming an “Independentist” position, that is, the view that the Universal Principle of Right is independent from the Categorical Imperative and, hence, that duties of right are normatively independent from duties of virtue. My claim in this paper is that the paradox which supports the independentist reading affects Kant’s claims only when the focus is on the subjective validity of duties. Once the focus is changed to objective validity, with which Kant is actually concerned, the paradox is dissolved and the Universal Principle of Right can appear as normatively dependent on the Categorical Imperative. In other words, in this paper, I argue that the scope of the paradox of juridical norms is confined to a specific focus and independentism (the view that duties of right are independent from duties of virtue) is confined in a similar way. Hence, the complexity of Kant’s account makes it possible for him to accommodate both independentist and dependentist views of the relation between right and virtue

Making Sense of Categorical Imperatives

Naturalism, as Binmore understands the term, is characterized by a scientific stance on moral behavior. Binmore claims that a naturalistic account of morality necessarily goes with the conviction “that only hypothetical imperatives make any sense”. In this paper it is argued that this claim is mistaken. First, as Hume’s theory of promising shows, naturalism in the sense of Binmore is very well compatible with acknowledging the importance of categorical imperatives in moral practice. Moreover, second, if Binmore’s own theory of moral practice and its evolution is correct, then the actual moral practice does—and in fact must—incorporate norms, which have the form of a categorical imperative. Categorical imperatives are part of social reality and, therefore, any moral theory that adequately reflects moral practice must also include categorical imperative

Imperatives, Normativity, and the Law

In this article Professor Silverman sets out to resolve the problem of legal normativity. Professor Silverman argues that legal scholars have been prevented from transcending the limited conception of law engendered by a key dogma of nineteenth century jurisprudence: the dogma that laws are a species of commands, orders, or imperatives. As a result, even as we enter the twenty-first century, legal scholars have yet to articulate a legal architectonic that properly situates the normative commitments of a society within a post-modern legal system. An adequate theory of law must offer an account of the normativity of law: an account of how the law guides and directs human behavior

Imperatives, Normativity, and the Law

In this article Professor Silverman sets out to resolve the problem of legal normativity. Professor Silverman argues that legal scholars have been prevented from transcending the limited conception of law engendered by a key dogma of nineteenth century jurisprudence: the dogma that laws are a species of commands, orders, or imperatives. As a result, even as we enter the twenty-first century, legal scholars have yet to articulate a legal architectonic that properly situates the normative commitments of a society within a post-modern legal system. An adequate theory of law must offer an account of the normativity of law: an account of how the law guides and directs human behavior

Hypothetical Justifications

A basic conviction in moral non-cognitivism is: only hypothetical norms may be justified. Hartmut Kliemt argues for a moderate variant: there are only hypothetical justifications of norms whether the norms are hypothetical or categorical in kind. In this paper the con- cept of ‘hypothetical justification’ is analyzed. It is argued that hypothetical justifications are not of the kind that we should look for in normative ethics

Kant’s Categorical Imperative as a Base for Philosophy of Social Studies Moral Education in Nigeria

Kant’s philosophy has in it some bases of moral actions which he outlines as categorical imperatives. This philosophical base advocates for moral duties for duty sake and not for exterior motives. Many moral problems have been identified in Nigerian society as ensuing from actions or behaviours arising from exterior motives as the bases for actions. Testing Kant’s moral principle against the moral requirements in the context of Social Studies Education, it has been found out that Kant’s moral imperative if adopted in Social Studies Education as a philosophical base will enhance effectiveness of Social Studies as a discipline aimed at producing morally positive citizens in Nigeria. From the above study, some recommendations were made

The Universalizability Criterion of Reason and the Final Value of Knowledge: A Response to Pritchard’s Analysis of the Value of Knowledge

Kant’s account of reason – both the practical account and the theoretical account – can give help in addressing the long-standing problems in epistemology of understanding what knowledge is and why it is distinctly valuable. In this paper, I address these particular epistemic concerns in three main parts: 1) I give an overview of Kant’s account of practical reason and argue for the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason; 2) I present an analysis of knowledge from Kant’s account of (practical and theoretical) reason and suggest some intellectual counterparts to some of the key concepts in Kant’s ethical theory that line up with his account of theoretical reason; 3) I address four major challenges regarding the value of knowledge and present one promising approach to these challenges offered by Duncan Pritchard. I argue that Pritchard’s account fails to adequately address the four key challenges, then apply my Kantian analysis of knowledge to the problems to show how it is superior in addressing them. The positive account I offer here is unique in its explicit relying on duty and the Kantian universalizability criterion of reason