Competitive Spectrum Management with Incomplete Information

This paper studies an interference interaction (game) between selfish and independent wireless communication systems in the same frequency band. Each system (player) has incomplete information about the other player's channel conditions. A trivial Nash equilibrium point in this game is where players mutually full spread (FS) their transmit spectrum and interfere with each other. This point may lead to poor spectrum utilization from a global network point of view and even for each user individually. In this paper, we provide a closed form expression for a non pure-FS epsilon-Nash equilibrium point; i.e., an equilibrium point where players choose FDM for some channel realizations and FS for the others. We show that operating in this non pure-FS epsilon-Nash equilibrium point increases each user's throughput and therefore improves the spectrum utilization, and demonstrate that this performance gain can be substantial. Finally, important insights are provided into the behaviour of selfish and rational wireless users as a function of the channel parameters such as fading probabilities, the interference-to-signal ratio