Evolutionary Stability in Common Pool Resources.

The Tragedy of the Commons refers to the dissipation of a common- pool ressource when any appropriator has free access to it. Under the behavior of absolute payoff maximisation, the common-pool resource game leads to a Nash equilibrium in which the resource is overexploited. However, some empirical studies show that the overutilization is even larger than the Nash equilibrium predicts. We account for these results in an evolutionary framework. Under an imitation-experimentation dynamics, the long run stable behavior implies a larger exploitation of the resource than in the classical Nash equilibrium.common-pool resource, imitation behavior, evolutionary stable strategy, evolutionary games.

Poverty and the Environment: Exploring the Relationship between Household Incomes, Private Assets, and Natural Assets

Using purpose-collected survey data from 537 households in 60 different villages of the Jhabua district of India, this paper investigates the extent to which rural households depend on common-pool natural resources for their daily livelihood. Previous studies have found that resource dependence— defined as the fraction of total income derived from common-pool resources—strongly decreases with income. Our study finds a more complex relationship. First, for the subsample of households that use positive amounts of resources, we find that dependence follows a U-shaped relationship with income, declining at first but then increasing. Second, we find that the probability of being in the subsample of common-pool resource users follows an inverse U-shaped relationship with income: the poorest and richest households are less likely to collect resources than those with intermediate incomes. Resource use by the rich is therefore bimodal: either very high or—for the very richest households—zero. Third, we find that resource dependence increases at all income levels with an increase in the level of common-pool biomass availability. The combination of these results suggests that the quality of natural resources matters to a larger share of the rural population than had been previously believed; common-pool resources contribute a significant fraction of the income not just of the desperately poor, but also of the relatively rich.

An Intergenerational Common Pool Resource Experiment

intergenerational common pool resources;growth and altruism;free-riding intentions

Modelling the effect of learning and evolving rules on the use of common-pool resources

The extend to which common-pool resources are used and managed sustainably depends highly on incentives. Incentives influence the behaviour of individuals with respect to natural resource management and are determined by institutional arrangements comprising of formal and informal rules and markets. Changes in institutional arrangements will affect individual incentives and will therefore have an impact on resource use. In order to model the connections between institutional arrangements and the sustainable use of common-pool resources we must take into consideration the behaviour of individuals. Game-theoretical models appear to be an adequate modelling technique with which to assess the behaviour of individuals as well as the development of institutions with regards to common-pool resource regimes. The implementation of a game-theoretical framework in the form of an agent-based model appears to be a particularly appropriate tool with which to assess common-pool resource use regimes as such models enable the behaviour of different agents to be modelled as strategies. Traditionally with agent-based models, the strategies that agents pursue are given, with their expression endogenously determined by the set of rules which govern their behaviour. In this paper I focus on the implementation of mechanisms that also allow for rules to adapt endogenously. Such an approach will be applied to common-pool resource use in order to analyse the effect of rule changes.Institutional arrangements, agent-based modelling, learning, evolving rules

The Economics of Commonly Owned Groundwater When User Demand Is Perfectly Inelastic

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the common-pool resource dilemma in extracting nonrenewable groundwater resources when water demand is perfectly inelastic. It complements the existing theory of groundwater use, which assumes away the possibility of demand perfect inelasticity. Under perfectly inelastic water demand, the common-pool resource dilemma is by-passed if groundwater users are equally productive in water use. If they are not, a new type of inefficiency can arise due to the lack of a rationing mechanism on the basis of productivity. Our analysis suggests that groundwater management research should pay more attention to water demand elasticity and productivity heterogeneity.common-pool resources, groundwater extraction, groundwater management, groundwater use, irrigation water demand, optimal control, pumping externality, water demand elasticity, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network

A local public-good game played on directed networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by one-way flows of hydrological influence between cities of a river basin that may shape the level of their contribution to the conservation of wetlands. It is shown that in many (but not all) directed networks, there exists an equilibrium, sometimes socially desirable, in which some stakeholders exert maximal effort and the others free ride. It is also shown that more directed links are not always better. Finally, the model is applied to the conservation of wetlands in the Gironde estuary (France).Common-pool Resource, Digraph, Cycle, Independent Set, Empirical Example

Common property resource and private capital accumulation with random jump

In [6], Long and Katayama presented a model of exploitation of a common property resource, when agents can also invest in private and productive capital. They considered the case where the resource extracted from a common pool is non-renewable. In this paper, we try to extend their result to the case where the common pool is under uncertainty in the sense that it could have a sudden increase or decrease in the process of extraction and moreover we shall calculate the exhaustion probability.common property resource, private capital accumulation, pure jump process, exhaustion probability, HJB (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman) equation

The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management

This paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.Cooperation, Social Norm, Ostracism, Common Pool Resource, Evolutionary Game Theory, Replicator Equation, Agent-based Simulation, Coupled Socio-resource Dynamics