5 research outputs found

    Combined (identity-based) public key schemes

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    Consider a scenario in which parties use a public key encryption scheme and a signature scheme with a single public key/private key pair---so the private key sk is used for both signing and decrypting. Such a simultaneous use of a key is in general considered poor cryptographic practice, but from an efficiency point of view looks attractive. We offer security notions to analyze such violations of key separation. For both the identity- and the non-identity-based setting, we show that---although being insecure in general---for schemes of interest the resulting combined (identity-based) public key scheme can offer strong security guarantees

    Strong Forward Security in Identity-Based Signcryption

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    Due to the possibility of key exposure, forward security in encryption and signing has been well studied, especially in the identity-based setting where an entity\u27s public key is that entity\u27s name. From an efficiency point of view, one would like to use the signcryption primitive and have the best of both worlds. However, strong forward security, where the adversary cannot signcrypt in sender\u27s name nor designcrypt in receiver\u27s name for past time periods even if it has the secrets of both, requires periodic updating of the secret keys of the users. This is an improvement over signcryption schemes that only protect against designcrypting in the past. In this paper, we propose the first ever strong forward secure identity-based signcryption scheme which has public ciphertext verifiability and a third-party verification protocol

    On the Joint Security of Encryption and Signature, Revisited

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    Abstract. We revisit the topic of joint security for combined public key schemes, wherein a single keypair is used for both encryption and signature primitives in a secure manner. While breaking the principle of key separation, such schemes have attractive properties and are sometimes used in practice. We give a general construction for a combined public key scheme having joint security that uses IBE as a component and that works in the standard model. We provide a more efficient direct construction, also in the standard model. We then consider the problem of how to build signcryption schemes from jointly secure combined public key schemes. We provide a construction that uses any such scheme to produce a triple of schemes – signature, encryption, and signcryption – that are jointly secure in an appropriate and strong security model.

    Attribute-Based Signcryption : Signer Privacy, Strong Unforgeability and IND-CCA2 Security in Adaptive-Predicates Attack

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    An Attribute-Based Signcryption (ABSC) is a natural extension of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) and Attribute-Based Signature (ABS), where we have the message confidentiality and authenticity together. Since the signer privacy is captured in security of ABS, it is quite natural to expect that the signer privacy will also be preserved in ABSC. In this paper, first we propose an ABSC scheme which is \textit{weak existential unforgeable, IND-CCA2} secure in \textit{adaptive-predicates} attack and achieves \textit{signer privacy}. Secondly, by applying strongly unforgeable one-time signature (OTS), the above scheme is lifted to an ABSC scheme to attain \textit{strong existential unforgeability} in \textit{adaptive-predicates} model. Both the ABSC schemes are constructed on common setup, i.e the public parameters and key are same for both the encryption and signature modules. Our first construction is in the flavor of CtE&S\mathcal{C}{t}\mathcal{E}\&\mathcal{S} paradigm, except one extra component that will be computed using both signature components and ciphertext components. The second proposed construction follows a new paradigm (extension of CtE&S\mathcal{C}{t}\mathcal{E}\&\mathcal{S}), we call it ``Commit then Encrypt and Sign then Sign (CtE&StS\mathcal{C}{t}\mathcal{E}\&\mathcal{S}{t}\mathcal{S}). The last signature is done using a strong OTS scheme. Since the non-repudiation is achieved by CtE&S\mathcal{C}{t}\mathcal{E}\&\mathcal{S} paradigm, our systems also achieve the same
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