Cognitive Computation sans Representation

The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds that cognitive processes are essentially computational, and hence computation provides the scientific key to explaining mentality. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) holds that representational content is the key feature in distinguishing mental from non-mental systems. I argue that there is a deep incompatibility between these two theoretical frameworks, and that the acceptance of CTM provides strong grounds for rejecting RTM. The focal point of the incompatibility is the fact that representational content is extrinsic to formal procedures as such, and the intended interpretation of syntax makes no difference to the execution of an algorithm. So the unique 'content' postulated by RTM is superfluous to the formal procedures of CTM. And once these procedures are implemented in a physical mechanism, it is exclusively the causal properties of the physical mechanism that are responsible for all aspects of the system's behaviour. So once again, postulated content is rendered superfluous. To the extent that semantic content may appear to play a role in behaviour, it must be syntactically encoded within the system, and just as in a standard computational artefact, so too with the human mind/brain - it's pure syntax all the way down to the level of physical implementation. Hence 'content' is at most a convenient meta-level gloss, projected from the outside by human theorists, which itself can play no role in cognitive processing

Information Processing, Computation and Cognition

Computation and information processing are among the most fundamental notions in cognitive science. They are also among the most imprecisely discussed. Many cognitive scientists take it for granted that cognition involves computation, information processing, or both – although others disagree vehemently. Yet different cognitive scientists use ‘computation’ and ‘information processing’ to mean different things, sometimes without realizing that they do. In addition, computation and information processing are surrounded by several myths; first and foremost, that they are the same thing. In this paper, we address this unsatisfactory state of affairs by presenting a general and theory-neutral account of computation and information processing. We also apply our framework by analyzing the relations between computation and information processing on one hand and classicism and connectionism/computational neuroscience on the other. We defend the relevance to cognitive science of both computation, at least in a generic sense, and information processing, in three important senses of the term. Our account advances several foundational debates in cognitive science by untangling some of their conceptual knots in a theory-neutral way. By leveling the playing field, we pave the way for the future resolution of the debates’ empirical aspects

The Resilience of Computationalism

Computationalism—the view that cognition is computation—has always been controversial. It faces two types of objection. According to insufficiency objections, computation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X. According to objections from neural realization, cognitive processes are realized by neural processes, but neural processes have feature Y and having Y is incompatible with being (or realizing) computations. In this paper, I explain why computationalism has survived these objections. Insufficiency objections are at best partial: for all they establish, computation may be sufficient for cognitive phenomena other than X, may be part of the explanation for X, or both. Objections from neural realization are based either on a false contrast between feature Y and computation or on an account of computation that is too vague to yield the desired conclusion. To adjudicate the dispute between computationalism and its foes, I will conclude that we need a better account of computation

The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation in Its Place

The mainstream view in cognitive science is that computation lies at the basis of and explains cognition. Our analysis reveals that there is no compelling evidence or argument for thinking that brains compute. It makes the case for inverting the explanatory order proposed by the computational basis of cognition thesis. We give reasons to reverse the polarity of standard thinking on this topic, and ask how it is possible that computation, natural and artificial, might be based on cognition and not the other way around

Modeling Life as Cognitive Info-Computation

This article presents a naturalist approach to cognition understood as a network of info-computational, autopoietic processes in living systems. It provides a conceptual framework for the unified view of cognition as evolved from the simplest to the most complex organisms, based on new empirical and theoretical results. It addresses three fundamental questions: what cognition is, how cognition works and what cognition does at different levels of complexity of living organisms. By explicating the info-computational character of cognition, its evolution, agent-dependency and generative mechanisms we can better understand its life-sustaining and life-propagating role. The info-computational approach contributes to rethinking cognition as a process of natural computation in living beings that can be applied for cognitive computation in artificial systems.Comment: Manuscript submitted to Computability in Europe CiE 201

Computation vs. Information Processing: Why Their Difference Matters to Cognitive Science

Since the cognitive revolution, it’s become commonplace that cognition involves both computation and information processing. Is this one claim or two? Is computation the same as information processing? The two terms are often used interchangeably, but this usage masks important differences. In this paper, we distinguish information processing from computation and examine some of their mutual relations, shedding light on the role each can play in a theory of cognition. We recommend that theorists of cognition be explicit and careful in choosing\ud notions of computation and information and connecting them together. Much confusion can be avoided by doing so

Nature as a Network of Morphological Infocomputational Processes for Cognitive Agents

This paper presents a view of nature as a network of infocomputational agents organized in a dynamical hierarchy of levels. It provides a framework for unification of currently disparate understandings of natural, formal, technical, behavioral and social phenomena based on information as a structure, differences in one system that cause the differences in another system, and computation as its dynamics, i.e. physical process of morphological change in the informational structure. We address some of the frequent misunderstandings regarding the natural/morphological computational models and their relationships to physical systems, especially cognitive systems such as living beings. Natural morphological infocomputation as a conceptual framework necessitates generalization of models of computation beyond the traditional Turing machine model presenting symbol manipulation, and requires agent-based concurrent resource-sensitive models of computation in order to be able to cover the whole range of phenomena from physics to cognition. The central role of agency, particularly material vs. cognitive agency is highlighted

Self-generated neural activity : models and perspective

Poster presentation: The brain is autonomously active and this self-sustained neural activity is in general modulated, but not driven, by the sensory input data stream [1,2]. Traditionally one has regarded this eigendynamics as resulting from inter-modular recurrent neural activity [3]. Understanding the basic modules for cognitive computation is, in this view, the primary focus of research and the overall neural dynamics would be determined by the the topology of the intermodular pathways. Here we examine an alternative point of view, asking whether certain aspects of the neural eigendynamics have a central functional role for overall cognitive computation [4,5]. Transiently stable neural activity is regularly observed on the cognitive time-scale of 80–100 ms, with indications that neural competition [6] plays an important role in the selection of the transiently stable neural ensembles [7], also denoted winning coalitions [8]. We report on a theory approach which implements these two principles, transient-state dynamics and neural competition, in terms of an associative neural network with clique encoding [9]. A cognitive system [10] with a non-trivial internal eigendynamics has two seemingly contrasting tasks to fulfill. The internal processes need to be regular and not chaotic on one side, but sensitive to the afferent sensory stimuli on the other side. We show, that these two contrasting demands can be reconciled within our approach based on competitive transient-state dynamics, when allowing the sensory stimuli to modulate the competition for the next winning coalition. By testing the system with the bars problem, we find an emerging cognitive capability. Only based on the two basic architectural principles, neural competition and transient-state dynamics, with no explicit algorithmic encoding, the system performs on its own a non-linear independent component analysis of input data stream. The system has rudimentary biological features. All learning is local Hebbian-style, unsupervised and online. It exhibits an ever-ongoing eigendynamics and at no time is the state or the value of synaptic strengths reset or the system restarted; there is no separation between training and performance. We believe that this kind of approach – cognitive computation with autonomously active neural networks – to be an emerging field, relevant both for system neuroscience and synthetic cognitive systems