6,202 research outputs found
Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content
In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive
processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, Ārepresentation-levelĀ rules; they
are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of
the brainĀs neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation
of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the
excitement surrounding the connectionist revolution in cognitive science, it has largely gone
unnoticed that connectionism adds to the traditional focus on computational processes, a new
focus Ā one on the vehicles of mental representation, on the entities that carry content through the
mind. Indeed, if Horgan and TiensonĀs dynamical characterisation of connectionism is on the
right track, then so intimate is the relationship between computational processes and
representational vehicles, that connectionist cognitive science is committed to a resemblance
theory of mental content
A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience
When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as
many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either
consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or
it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of
these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may
be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because
of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the
explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the
other, by the classical computational theory of mind ā the theory that takes human cognition to be a species
of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a
reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the
experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies ā so critical, in fact, itās no longer
reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been
adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in
cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and
connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory
of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It
takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit
representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some
common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways
Information Processing, Computation and Cognition
Computation and information processing are among the most fundamental notions in cognitive science. They are also among the most imprecisely discussed. Many cognitive scientists take it for granted that cognition involves computation, information processing, or both ā although others disagree vehemently. Yet different cognitive scientists use ācomputationā and āinformation processingā to mean different things, sometimes without realizing that they do. In addition, computation and information processing are surrounded by several myths; first and foremost, that they are the same thing. In this paper, we address this unsatisfactory state of affairs by presenting a general and theory-neutral account of computation and information processing. We also apply our framework by analyzing the relations between computation and information processing on one hand and classicism and connectionism/computational neuroscience on the other. We defend the relevance to cognitive science of both computation, at least in a generic sense, and information processing, in three important senses of the term. Our account advances several foundational debates in cognitive science by untangling some of their conceptual knots in a theory-neutral way. By leveling the playing field, we pave the way for the future resolution of the debatesā empirical aspects
The Mode of Computing
The Turing Machine is the paradigmatic case of computing machines, but there
are others, such as Artificial Neural Networks, Table Computing,
Relational-Indeterminate Computing and diverse forms of analogical computing,
each of which based on a particular underlying intuition of the phenomenon of
computing. This variety can be captured in terms of system levels,
re-interpreting and generalizing Newell's hierarchy, which includes the
knowledge level at the top and the symbol level immediately below it. In this
re-interpretation the knowledge level consists of human knowledge and the
symbol level is generalized into a new level that here is called The Mode of
Computing. Natural computing performed by the brains of humans and non-human
animals with a developed enough neural system should be understood in terms of
a hierarchy of system levels too. By analogy from standard computing machinery
there must be a system level above the neural circuitry levels and directly
below the knowledge level that is named here The mode of Natural Computing. A
central question for Cognition is the characterization of this mode. The Mode
of Computing provides a novel perspective on the phenomena of computing,
interpreting, the representational and non-representational views of cognition,
and consciousness.Comment: 35 pages, 8 figure
Connectionist Inference Models
The performance of symbolic inference tasks has long been a challenge to connectionists. In this paper, we present an extended survey of this area. Existing connectionist inference systems are reviewed, with particular reference to how they perform variable binding and rule-based reasoning, and whether they involve distributed or localist representations. The benefits and disadvantages of different representations and systems are outlined, and conclusions drawn regarding the capabilities of connectionist inference systems when compared with symbolic inference systems or when used for cognitive modeling
A Survey of Brain Inspired Technologies for Engineering
Cognitive engineering is a multi-disciplinary field and hence it is difficult
to find a review article consolidating the leading developments in the field.
The in-credible pace at which technology is advancing pushes the boundaries of
what is achievable in cognitive engineering. There are also differing
approaches to cognitive engineering brought about from the multi-disciplinary
nature of the field and the vastness of possible applications. Thus research
communities require more frequent reviews to keep up to date with the latest
trends. In this paper we shall dis-cuss some of the approaches to cognitive
engineering holistically to clarify the reasoning behind the different
approaches and to highlight their strengths and weaknesses. We shall then show
how developments from seemingly disjointed views could be integrated to achieve
the same goal of creating cognitive machines. By reviewing the major
contributions in the different fields and showing the potential for a combined
approach, this work intends to assist the research community in devising more
unified methods and techniques for developing cognitive machines
Modelling individual variability in cognitive development
Investigating variability in reasoning tasks can provide insights into key issues in the study of cognitive development. These include the mechanisms that underlie developmental transitions, and the distinction between individual differences and developmental disorders. We explored the mechanistic basis of variability in two connectionist models of cognitive development, a model of the Piagetian balance scale task (McClelland, 1989) and a model of the Piagetian conservation task (Shultz, 1998). For the balance scale task, we began with a simple feed-forward connectionist model and training patterns based on McClelland (1989). We investigated computational parameters, problem encodings, and training environments that contributed to variability in development, both across groups and within individuals. We report on the parameters that affect the complexity of reasoning and the nature of āruleā transitions exhibited by networks learning to reason about balance scale problems. For the conservation task, we took the task structure and problem encoding of Shultz (1998) as our base model. We examined the computational parameters, problem encodings, and training environments that contributed to variability in development, in particular examining the parameters that affected the emergence of abstraction. We relate the findings to existing cognitive theories on the causes of individual differences in development
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