The benefit of a 1-bit jump-start, and the necessity of stochastic encoding, in jamming channels

We consider the problem of communicating a message $m$ in the presence of a malicious jamming adversary (Calvin), who can erase an arbitrary set of up to $pn$ bits, out of $n$ transmitted bits $(x_1,\ldots,x_n)$. The capacity of such a channel when Calvin is exactly causal, i.e. Calvin's decision of whether or not to erase bit $x_i$ depends on his observations $(x_1,\ldots,x_i)$ was recently characterized to be $1-2p$. In this work we show two (perhaps) surprising phenomena. Firstly, we demonstrate via a novel code construction that if Calvin is delayed by even a single bit, i.e. Calvin's decision of whether or not to erase bit $x_i$ depends only on $(x_1,\ldots,x_{i-1})$ (and is independent of the "current bit" $x_i$) then the capacity increases to $1-p$ when the encoder is allowed to be stochastic. Secondly, we show via a novel jamming strategy for Calvin that, in the single-bit-delay setting, if the encoding is deterministic (i.e. the transmitted codeword is a deterministic function of the message $m$) then no rate asymptotically larger than $1-2p$ is possible with vanishing probability of error, hence stochastic encoding (using private randomness at the encoder) is essential to achieve the capacity of $1-p$ against a one-bit-delayed Calvin.Comment: 21 pages, 4 figures, extended draft of submission to ISIT 201

Upper Bounds on the Capacity of Binary Channels with Causal Adversaries

In this work we consider the communication of information in the presence of a causal adversarial jammer. In the setting under study, a sender wishes to communicate a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword $(x_1,...,x_n)$ bit-by-bit over a communication channel. The sender and the receiver do not share common randomness. The adversarial jammer can view the transmitted bits $x_i$ one at a time, and can change up to a $p$-fraction of them. However, the decisions of the jammer must be made in a causal manner. Namely, for each bit $x_i$ the jammer's decision on whether to corrupt it or not must depend only on $x_j$ for $j \leq i$. This is in contrast to the "classical" adversarial jamming situations in which the jammer has no knowledge of $(x_1,...,x_n)$, or knows $(x_1,...,x_n)$ completely. In this work, we present upper bounds (that hold under both the average and maximal probability of error criteria) on the capacity which hold for both deterministic and stochastic encoding schemes.Comment: To appear in the IEEE Transactions on Information Theory; shortened version appeared at ISIT 201

Coding against a Limited-view Adversary: The Effect of Causality and Feedback

We consider the problem of communication over a multi-path network in the presence of a causal adversary. The limited-view causal adversary is able to eavesdrop on a subset of links and also jam on a potentially overlapping subset of links based on the current and past information. To ensure that the communication takes place reliably and secretly, resilient network codes with necessary redundancy are needed. We study two adversarial models - additive and overwrite jamming and we optionally assume passive feedback from decoder to encoder, i.e., the encoder sees everything that the decoder sees. The problem assumes transmissions are in the large alphabet regime. For both jamming models, we find the capacity under four scenarios - reliability without feedback, reliability and secrecy without feedback, reliability with passive feedback, reliability and secrecy with passive feedback. We observe that, in comparison to the non-causal setting, the capacity with a causal adversary is strictly increased for a wide variety of parameter settings and present our intuition through several examples.Comment: 15 page

The Capacity of Online (Causal) qq-ary Error-Erasure Channels

In the $q$-ary online (or "causal") channel coding model, a sender wishes to communicate a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword $\mathbf{x} =(x_1,\ldots,x_n) \in \{0,1,\ldots,q-1\}^n$ symbol by symbol via a channel limited to at most $pn$ errors and/or $p^{*} n$ erasures. The channel is "online" in the sense that at the $i$th step of communication the channel decides whether to corrupt the $i$th symbol or not based on its view so far, i.e., its decision depends only on the transmitted symbols $(x_1,\ldots,x_i)$. This is in contrast to the classical adversarial channel in which the corruption is chosen by a channel that has a full knowledge on the sent codeword $\mathbf{x}$. In this work we study the capacity of $q$-ary online channels for a combined corruption model, in which the channel may impose at most $pn$ {\em errors} and at most $p^{*} n$ {\em erasures} on the transmitted codeword. The online channel (in both the error and erasure case) has seen a number of recent studies which present both upper and lower bounds on its capacity. In this work, we give a full characterization of the capacity as a function of $q,p$, and $p^{*}$.Comment: This is a new version of the binary case, which can be found at arXiv:1412.637

A characterization of the capacity of online (causal) binary channels

In the binary online (or "causal") channel coding model, a sender wishes to communicate a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword $\mathbf{x} =(x_1,\ldots,x_n) \in \{0,1\}^n$ bit by bit via a channel limited to at most $pn$ corruptions. The channel is "online" in the sense that at the $i$th step of communication the channel decides whether to corrupt the $i$th bit or not based on its view so far, i.e., its decision depends only on the transmitted bits $(x_1,\ldots,x_i)$. This is in contrast to the classical adversarial channel in which the error is chosen by a channel that has a full knowledge on the sent codeword $\mathbf{x}$. In this work we study the capacity of binary online channels for two corruption models: the {\em bit-flip} model in which the channel may flip at most $pn$ of the bits of the transmitted codeword, and the {\em erasure} model in which the channel may erase at most $pn$ bits of the transmitted codeword. Specifically, for both error models we give a full characterization of the capacity as a function of $p$. The online channel (in both the bit-flip and erasure case) has seen a number of recent studies which present both upper and lower bounds on its capacity. In this work, we present and analyze a coding scheme that improves on the previously suggested lower bounds and matches the previously suggested upper bounds thus implying a tight characterization

Codes Against Online Adversaries: Large Alphabets

In this paper, we consider the communication of information in the presence of an online adversarial jammer. In the setting under study, a sender wishes to communicate a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword x = (x(1), ... , x(n)) symbol-by-symbol over a communication channel. The adversarial jammer can view the transmitted symbols x(i) one at a time and can change up to a p-fraction of them. However, for each symbol x(i), the jammer's decision on whether to corrupt it or not (and on how to change it) must depend only on x(j) for j <= i. This is in contrast to the "classical" adversarial jammer which may base its decisions on its complete knowledge of x. More generally, for a delay parameter delta is an element of (0, 1), we study the scenario in which the jammer's decision on the corruption of x(i) must depend solely on x(j) for j <= i - delta n. In this study, the transmitted symbols are assumed to be over a sufficiently large field F. The sender and receiver do not share resources such as common randomness (though the sender is allowed to use stochastic encoding). We present a tight characterization of the amount of information one can transmit in both the 0-delay and, more generally, the delta-delay online setting. We show that for 0-delay adversaries, the achievable rate asymptotically equals that of the classical adversarial model. For positive values of delta, we consider two types of jamming: additive and overwrite. We also extend our results to a jam-or-listen online model, where the online adversary can either jam a symbol or eavesdrop on it. We present computationally efficient achievability schemes even against computationally unrestricted jammers