Imperfect-Recall Abstractions with Bounds in Games

Imperfect-recall abstraction has emerged as the leading paradigm for practical large-scale equilibrium computation in incomplete-information games. However, imperfect-recall abstractions are poorly understood, and only weak algorithm-specific guarantees on solution quality are known. In this paper, we show the first general, algorithm-agnostic, solution quality guarantees for Nash equilibria and approximate self-trembling equilibria computed in imperfect-recall abstractions, when implemented in the original (perfect-recall) game. Our results are for a class of games that generalizes the only previously known class of imperfect-recall abstractions where any results had been obtained. Further, our analysis is tighter in two ways, each of which can lead to an exponential reduction in the solution quality error bound. We then show that for extensive-form games that satisfy certain properties, the problem of computing a bound-minimizing abstraction for a single level of the game reduces to a clustering problem, where the increase in our bound is the distance function. This reduction leads to the first imperfect-recall abstraction algorithm with solution quality bounds. We proceed to show a divide in the class of abstraction problems. If payoffs are at the same scale at all information sets considered for abstraction, the input forms a metric space. Conversely, if this condition is not satisfied, we show that the input does not form a metric space. Finally, we use these results to experimentally investigate the quality of our bound for single-level abstraction

Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey

A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference

Mapping the Curricular Structure and Contents of Network Science Courses

As network science has matured as an established field of research, there are already a number of courses on this topic developed and offered at various higher education institutions, often at postgraduate levels. In those courses, instructors adopted different approaches with different focus areas and curricular designs. We collected information about 30 existing network science courses from various online sources, and analyzed the contents of their syllabi or course schedules. The topics and their curricular sequences were extracted from the course syllabi/schedules and represented as a directed weighted graph, which we call the topic network. Community detection in the topic network revealed seven topic clusters, which matched reasonably with the concept list previously generated by students and educators through the Network Literacy initiative. The minimum spanning tree of the topic network revealed typical flows of curricular contents, starting with examples of networks, moving onto random networks and small-world networks, then branching off to various subtopics from there. These results illustrate the current state of consensus formation (including variations and disagreements) among the network science community on what should be taught about networks and how, which may also be informative for K--12 education and informal education.Comment: 17 pages, 11 figures, 2 tables; to appear in Cramer, C. et al. (eds.), Network Science in Education -- Tools and Techniques for Transforming Teaching and Learning (Springer, 2017, in press

Ordered Preference Elicitation Strategies for Supporting Multi-Objective Decision Making

In multi-objective decision planning and learning, much attention is paid to producing optimal solution sets that contain an optimal policy for every possible user preference profile. We argue that the step that follows, i.e, determining which policy to execute by maximising the user's intrinsic utility function over this (possibly infinite) set, is under-studied. This paper aims to fill this gap. We build on previous work on Gaussian processes and pairwise comparisons for preference modelling, extend it to the multi-objective decision support scenario, and propose new ordered preference elicitation strategies based on ranking and clustering. Our main contribution is an in-depth evaluation of these strategies using computer and human-based experiments. We show that our proposed elicitation strategies outperform the currently used pairwise methods, and found that users prefer ranking most. Our experiments further show that utilising monotonicity information in GPs by using a linear prior mean at the start and virtual comparisons to the nadir and ideal points, increases performance. We demonstrate our decision support framework in a real-world study on traffic regulation, conducted with the city of Amsterdam.Comment: AAMAS 2018, Source code at https://github.com/lmzintgraf/gp_pref_elici