COMPETITIVE PRICING IN SOCIALLY NETWORKED ECONOMIES

In the context of a socially networked economy, this paper demonstrates an Edgeworth equivalence between the set of competitive allocations and the core. Each participant in the economy may have multiple links with other participants and the equilibrium network may be as large as the entire set of participants. A clique is a group of people who are all connected with each other. Large cliques, possibly as large as the entire population, are permitted ; this is important since we wish to include in our analysis large, world-wide organizations such as workers in multi-national firms and members of world-wide environmental organizations, for example, as well as small cliques, such as two person partnerships. A special case of our model is equivalent to a club economy where clubs may be large and individuals may belong to multiple clubs. The features of our model that cliques within a networked economy may be as large as the entire population and individuals may belong to multiple cliques thus allow us to extend the extant decentralisation literature on competitive pricing in economies with clubs and multiple memberships (where club sizes are uniformly bounded, independent of the size of the economy).social networks ; competitive pricing ; cliques ; clubs ; Edgeworth equivalence ; core

Cliques, clubs and clans

Die Analyse sozialer Beziehungen braucht adäquate Konzepte zur Bestimmung sozialer Gruppen. Neben theoretischen Bestimmungen unterschiedlicher Gruppentypen, geht es dem Autor in erster Linie um die Operationalisierbarkeit der Gruppenkonzeptionen für die empirischen Untersuchungen des sozialen Netzwerks. Zur Analyse der unterschiedlichen Außen- und Innenbeziehungen von Gruppen werden Graph-theoretische Cluster- Konzepte verwandt. Die unterschiedlichen Cluster-Konzepte zur Analyse von Clubs, Cliquen und Clans werden vorgestellt, und ihre Beziehung untereinander wird untersucht. (BG

Cliques, clubs and clans

Die Analyse sozialer Beziehungen braucht adäquate Konzepte zur Bestimmung sozialer Gruppen. Neben theoretischen Bestimmungen unterschiedlicher Gruppentypen, geht es dem Autor in erster Linie um die Operationalisierbarkeit der Gruppenkonzeptionen für die empirischen Untersuchungen des sozialen Netzwerks. Zur Analyse der unterschiedlichen Außen- und Innenbeziehungen von Gruppen werden Graph-theoretische Cluster- Konzepte verwandt. Die unterschiedlichen Cluster-Konzepte zur Analyse von Clubs, Cliquen und Clans werden vorgestellt, und ihre Beziehung untereinander wird untersucht. (BG

Competitive pricing in socially networked economies

In the context of a socially networked economy, this paper demon-strates an Edgeworth equivalence between the set of competitive allocations and the core. Each participant in the economy may have multiple links with other participants and the equilibrium network may be as large as the entire set of participants. A clique is a group of people who are all connected with each other. Large cliques, possibly as large as the entire population, are permitted; this is important since we wish to include in our analysis large, world-wide organizations such as workers in multi-national firms and members of world-wide environmental organizations, for example, as well as small cliques, such as two-person partnerships. A special case of our model is equivalent to a club economy where clubs may be large and individuals may belong to multiple clubs. The features of our model that cliques within a networked economy may be as large as the entire population and individuals may belong to multiple cliques thus allow us to extend the extant decentralisation literature on competitive pricing in economies with clubs and multiple memberships (where club sizes are uniformly bounded, independent of the size of the economy)

'A Game of Pain': Youth Marginalisation and the Gangs of Freetown

Within two decades, Sierra Leone’s ‘cliques’ have transformed from peripheral social clubs to warring Crips, Bloods, and Black street gangs at the heart of criminal and political violence. Nevertheless, they remain severely under-studied, with scholarship on Sierra Leonean youth marginality heavily focused on ex-combatants. Drawing on extended fieldwork with Freetown’s cliques as they played the ‘game’ – the daily hustle to survive and resist the ‘system’ – this article offers two main contributions. First, it addresses the knowledge gap by charting the origins, evolution, and contemporary organisation of these new urban players. Second, it argues that although this history reveals continuity in perennial forms of youth marginalisation, it also shows that the game itself has changed. Cycles of escalating violence and growth are hardwired into this new game. Exacerbated by a political system that sustains and exploits them, cliques present a far greater challenge to everyday peace than has hitherto been recognised