Unraveling Reduces the Scope of an Entry Level Labor Market: Gastroenterology With and Without a Centralized Match

From 1986 through 1997 the entry-level market for American gastroenterologists was organized by a centralized clearinghouse. Before, and since, it has been conducted via a decentralized market in which appointment dates have unraveled to well over a year before the start of employment. The career paths of gastroenterologists therefore offer a unique opportunity to examine the difference between the market when appointments are decentralized and early, versus when they are made later via a centralized clearinghouse. (Most centralized clearinghouses remain in use once established, and so there is no way to separate changes due to the clearinghouse from other changes that may have taken place over time.) We find that, both before and after the years in which the centralized clearinghouse was used, gastroenterologists are less mobile, and more likely to be employed at the same hospital in which they were internal medicine residents, than when the clearinghouse was in use. This suggests that the clearinghouse serves not only to coordinate the timing of appointments, but that it also increases the scope of the market, compared to decentralized markets with early appointments and exploding offers. This has implications for theories of market failure due to unraveling over time.

Opportunity cost and prudentiality : an analysis of futures clearinghouse behavior

Margin deposits, which serve as collateral to protect the clearinghouse, are typically the most important tool for risk management. The authors develop a model that explains how creating a futures clearinghouse may allow traders simultaneously to reduce both the risk of default and the total amount of margin that members post. Optimal margin levels are determined by the need to balance the deadweight costs of default against the opportunity cost of holding additional margin. Both costs are a consequence of market participants'imperfect access to capital markets. The simultaneous reduction in default risk and in the opportunity cost of margin deposits is possible because the creation of the clearinghouse facilitates multilateral netting. The authors characterize the conditions under which multilateral netting will dominate bilateral netting. They also show that it is credible for the clearinghouse to expel members who default, further reducing the risk of default. Finally, they show that it may (but need not) be optimal for the clearinghouse to monitor the financial condition of its members. If monitoring occurs, it will reduce the amount of margin required, but need not affect the probability of default. The empirical tests run by the authors indicate that the opportunity cost of margin plays an important role in determining margin. The relationship between volatility and margins indicates that participants face an upward-sloping opportunity cost for margin, which appears to more than offset the effects that monitoring and expulsion would be expected to have on margin setting.Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Theory&Research,Insurance&Risk Mitigation

Liquidity creation without a lender of last resort: clearinghouse loan certificates in the Banking Panic of 1907

We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearinghouse loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks were crucial providers of temporary liquidity during the Panic of 1907. Clearinghouse loan certificates were essentially "bridge loans" arranged between clearinghouse members that enabled and were issued in anticipation of monetary gold imports, which took a few weeks to arrive. The large New York City national banks acted as private liquidity providers by requesting (and the New York clearinghouse issuing) a volume of clearinghouse loan certificates beyond their own immediate liquidity needs. While loan certificates were a temporary solution at best to the liquidity crisis in 1907, their issuance allowed the New York banks to serve their role as central reserve city banks in the national banking system.

Space market model development project, phase 2

The results of the prototype operations of the Space Business Information Center are presented. A clearinghouse for space business information for members of the U.S. space industry composed of public, private, and academic sectors was conducted. Behavioral and evaluation statistics were recorded from the clearinghouse and the conclusions from these statistics are presented. Business guidebooks on major markets in space business are discussed. Proprietary research and briefings for firms and agencies in the space industry are also discussed

The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices

New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990's, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match, by observing the differences in the outcomes and organization of the market when a match was operating, and when it was not. After the GI match ended, the market unraveled. Contracts were signed earlier each year, at diffuse times, often with exploding offers. The market became less national, more local. This allows us to discern the effect of the clearinghouse: it coordinated the timing of the market, in a way that increased its thickness and scope. The clearinghouse does not seem to have had an effect on wages. As this became known among gastroenterologists, an opportunity arose to reorganize the market to once again use a centralized clearinghouse. However it proved necessary to adopt policies that would allow employers to safely delay hiring and coordinate on using the clearinghouse. The market for gastroenterologists provides a case study of market failures, the way a centralized clearinghouse can fix them, and the effects on market outcomes. In the conclusion we discuss aspects of the experience of the gastroenterology labor market that seem to generalize fairly widely.

Fetal alcohol spectrum disorders: a review of interventions for prevention and management in Indigenous communities

This resource sheet provides estimates on the prevalence of fetal alcohol spectrum disorders in the general and Indigenous populations of Australia, and reviews the local and international evidence on the effectiveness of programs that aim to prevent or alleviate this group of disorders. Introduction This resource sheet defines fetal alcohol spectrum disorders and provides currently available estimates of their prevalence in the overall Australian population and in the Indigenous population. The current recommendation of the National Health and Medical Research Council on the consumption of alcohol during pregnancy is also provided. Where appropriate, comparisons are made with other countries. The resource sheet reviews the Australian and international literature published since 1990 on the effectiveness of programs that aim to prevent fetal alcohol spectrum disorders or to alleviate its effects. Evidence on the effectiveness of Australian and Indigenous specific programs is also assessed, including those programs that have been developed and implemented in partnership with Indigenous Australians

Liquidity creation without a lender of last resort: Clearinghouse loan certificates in the banking panic of 1907

We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearinghouse loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks were crucial providers of temporary liquidity during the Panic of 1907. Clearinghouse loan certificates were essentially bridge loans arranged between clearinghouse members that enabled and were issued in anticipation of monetary gold imports, which took a few weeks to arrive. The large New York City national banks acted as private liquidity providers by requesting (and the New York clearinghouse issuing) a volume of clearinghouse loan certificates beyond their own immediate liquidity needs. While loan certificates were a temporary solution at best to the liquidity crisis in 1907, their issuance allowed the New York banks to serve their role as central reserve city banks in the national banking system

Clearinghouse Overconfidence

Regulatory reaction to the 2008-2009 financial crisis focused on complex financial instruments that deepened the crisis. A consensus emerged that these risky financial instruments should move through safe, strong clearinghouses, which would be bulwarks against systemic risk, and that the destructive impact of the failures during the crisis of AIG, Lehman Brothers, and the Reserve Primary Fund could have been softened or eliminated had strong clearing-houses been in place. Via the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, Congress instructed regulators to construct clearinghouses through which these risky financial instruments would trade and settle. Clearinghouses could cut financial risk, reduce contagion, and halt a local financial problem before it becomes an economy-wide crisis. But clearinghouses are weaker bulwarks against financial contagion, financial panic, and systemic risk than is commonly thought. They may well be unable to defend the economy against financial stress such as that of the 2008-2009 crisis. Although they are efficient financial platforms in ordinary times, they do little to reduce systemic risk in crisis times. They generally do not reduce the core risk targeted-that the failure of a financial firm will cause other firms to fail-but rather transfer that risk of loss to others. The major reduction in risk among the inside-the-clearinghouse traders is largely achieved by pushing that risk elsewhere, often to a systemically dangerous spot. Financial contagion can thus side-step the clearinghouse fortress and bring down other core financial institutions. Worse, clearinghouses could not have readily handled the major stresses that afflicted the economy in 2008-2009, could well have transmitted and magnified them, and can only weakly affect the type of financial stress that Congress targeted with Dodd-Frank. When we add in the other weaknesses of the new clearinghouses-as too-big-to-fail institutions, as institutions whose members' incentives to contain clearinghouse riskiness are weaker than the public's, and as institutions that will not be easy to regulate-even the direction of clearinghouses' impact on systemic risk is uncertain. The stakes are high in correctly assessing the value of clearing-houses in containing systemic risk. Much like an overconfidence inspired by powerful military fortresses that an invading enemy can side-step, the reigning overconfidence in clearinghouses lulls regulators to be satisfied that they have done much to arrest problems of contagion and systemic risk by building up clearing-houses, when they have not

Intellectual Property Clearinghouses: The Effects of Reduced Transaction Costs in Licensing

We focus on downstream uses that combine multiple intellectual property rights and examine the effects of introducing an intellectual property clearinghouse that reduces transaction costs associated with licensing. We show that this causes equilibrium royalties to rise in some cases and may harm licensors because clearinghouse by itself does not eliminate the 'tragedy of the anticommons'. Downstream welfare effects may also be positive or negative and we characterise the effects on downstream manufacturers and final consumers. We also show that total welfare is most likely to increase following a transaction cost reduction when the number of intellectual property rights per downstream use is small, or if rights are relatively substitutable in downstream use, but it is also possible for welfare to decrease.Intellectual property, licensing, tragedy of the anticommons, clearinghouses

On-Line Resource Clearinghouse for Rapidly Growing Communities

According to the Environmental Protection Agency, sprawl is among the biggest environmental challenges facing New England, where more than 1,200 acres of open space are lost to development each week. New Hampshire is the fastest growing state in New England, and much of this growth is located within the 42 community coastal watershed served by the New Hampshire Estuaries Project. The Resource Clearinghouse for Rapidly Growing Communities project was created out of an interest in getting community decision makers the information and access to resources that they need to make informed decisions in this challenging time. The clearinghouse is designed to assist efforts to implement smart growth and other strategies to reduce growth impacts on the environment and quality of life. This project resulted from the 2003 Voices of Communities Experiencing Rapid Change Symposium held at the University of New Hampshire.A searchable database, or “resource clearinghouse,” focused on the top ten issues of rapidly growing communities in New Hampshire now exists on-line through a web interface at clearinghouse.unh.edu. This site is easy to use and offers users quick access to a variety of valuable information, including 1) mission and services, contact information, and website links for organizations and agencies that can assist communities with these issues, 2) direct access to ordering information or links to the text of publications and other tools (such as CD-ROMs, other clearinghouses, seminars, etc.), 3) background and contact information for experts on the top ten issues, including University of New Hampshire faculty, and 4) stories from communities that have implemented growth management or smart growth strategies, including process and outcome. This project was made possible through a partnership between the UNH Center for Integrative Regional Problem Solving and Cooperative Extension, in collaboration with the Nashua Regional Planning Commission, the Rockingham Planning Commission, New Hampshire Charitable Foundation, New Hampshire Office of Energy and Planning, Concord 20/20, GrowSmart Maine, the Southern Maine Regional Planning Commission, Wells National Estuarine Research Reserve, the UNH Library, and other departments and programs of the University of New Hampshire. We thank the New Hampshire Estuaries Project for their generous support of this project