Learning from the Chilcot Report: Propaganda, Deception and the 'War on Terror'

The 2016 Iraq Inquiry Report (the Chilcot report) was highly critical of the British government and its involvement in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent occupation. Drawing upon the authoritative material in the report, this article provides the most comprehensive and conceptually grounded post-Chilcot assessment of the empirical evidence now available regarding whether deception and propaganda were used to mobilize support for the invasion of Iraq. Employing a conceptual framework designed to identify deceptive organized persuasive communication (OPC), it is argued that the Chilcot report supports the thesis that, through distortions and omissions, deceptive OPC campaigns presented a misleading impression of both the threat posed by Iraqi WMD and Britain’s commitment to a peaceful resolution via the ‘UN route’. Moreover, based upon UK-US communications in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Chilcot report also provides suggestive but highly significant evidence of a broader and covert geo-strategic policy, including action against Syria and Iran, and which was underpinned by a ‘close knit propaganda campaign’. In light of this, it is argued that a major expansion of scholarly inquiry is necessary involving sustained analysis of the establishing phase of the ‘War on Terror’, the role that deception and propaganda might have played with respect to its enablement, and, more broadly, the implications of this for our understanding of propaganda and deception in liberal democratic states

Lessons from Iraq and Chilcot

The UK’s Chilcot Report into the 2003 invasion of Iraq, has some essential lessons for all Ministries of Defence to take on board when it comes to ensuring troops have the equipment and support they need, before the next major military operation starts

The Chilcot Report: some thoughts on international law and legal advice

The Report of the Iraq (Chilcot) Inquiry was finally published, 7 years after the Inquiry’s creation, on 6 July 2016. The scope of the Inquiry’s work was vast, and this was reflected in the enormous size of its final Report. The publication of the Report thus raises a multitude of questions requiring further analysis. In this short article, we aim to contribute some initial thoughts, immediately following the Report’s publication, in just two (interrelated) areas. First, we comment on the role of international law in the Chilcot Inquiry. To what extent was international law considered and how was it presented in the Report? We also ask whether the Report reaches any implicit substantive legal conclusions, despite formally refraining from determinations of law. Secondly, we review the Inquiry’s findings concerning international legal advice and legal advisers. In particular, we contribute some thoughts on the Report’s treatment of questions relating to the appropriate recipients of legal advice and its transparency, the timeliness of advice, the perception and treatment of law and legal advice by the Government, and the independence and quality of that advice

The Chilcot report and the law

Questions of law permeate the Chilcot Report. All are shrouded in uncertainty. From the constitutional relationship between Prime Minister, his Cabinet and Parliament to the legality of going to war, the Inquiry presided over by Sir John Chilcot touched upon many controversial legal issues. It resolved none. But then, it was not a court of law or a judicial inquiry and never pretended to be. No one could have reasonably expected it to pronounce with conviction any judgement on the lawfulness of acts and decisions made by those who took the UK to war in Iraq. Instead, the Report provides information useful for those who wish to reach such judgements. Lawyers are already searching the vast document to inspire possible litigation, though that was not the concern of the Inquiry. It was supposed to determine what happened and learn lessons. Those were its very broad terms of reference. But did the Inquiry deal effectively or properly with the legal issues which framed many of the decisions and actions it examined? In this article I look briefly at two key areas where law had particular relevance but, it is argued, received insufficient attention: the legal basis for going to war; and the conduct of the occupation after the initial hostilities were concluded. Both involve the application of international legal standards, a slippery subject for those seeking exactitude but valuable for judging the political and military leaders nonetheless

The ministerial power to set up a public inquiry: issues of transparency and accountability

The Independent Panel Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse was left in crisis following intense pressure from survivors and their families, the public and media. Two senior legal figures, Baroness Butler-Sloss and Fiona Woolf, both resigned from the position of chair to the inquiry following concerns over their links with the establishment. Questions were raised over the independence of a process convened by the Home Secretary, to investigate apparent failures on the part of institutions, which would include scrutinising the actions of a former Home Secretary in handling allegations of child sexual abuse in the past. Demands for an inquiry with greater statutory powers, including the power to compel the giving of evidence on oath, ultimately resulted in the Independent Panel being disbanded and a new public inquiry, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, being convened. Against the background of this and other inquiries, this article examines the serious questions raised about the powers of a minister to set up a public inquiry, the lack of open and transparent decision-making processes and the extent to which those ministerial decisions are open to public scrutiny and accountability

Book review: Defending the realm? The politics of Britain’s small wars since 1945

Britain is often revered for its extensive experience of waging ‘small wars’. Its long imperial history is littered with high profile counter-insurgency campaigns, thus marking it out as the world’s most seasoned practitioner of this type of warfare. In Defending the Realm? Aaron Edwards details the tactical and operational dynamics of Britain’s small wars, arguing that the military’s use of force was more heavily constrained by wider strategic and political considerations than previously admitted. Andrew Holt finds a concise, readable text that should be of interest to students and scholars of British foreign policy, international relations, and security studies

Blair at Chilcot: 'the Superbowl of self-justification'

Tony Blair’s resolute, unchanging, self-affirming appearance at the impotent Chilcot Inquiry reminded us of the Politician’s Virility Dilemma. If they change their minds or admit fault then they are seen as weak. If they stick to their guns they are seen as strong but wrong. We in the media and the public can enjoy 20-20 hindsight while those who make history are doomed to live in it

The doctrine of humanitarian intervention: lessons from the Chilcot Report

In the midst of what can only be described as the tumultuous climate that defines Britain’s current political scene, the release of The Chilcot Report should not be forgotten as one of the most significant moments in the country’s recent history. While many agonize over an uncertain future, Chilcot reminds us of a not so distant past which some people – most of all, former Prime Minister Tony Blair – would rather forget