Verifying Data Secure Flow in AUTOSAR Models by Static Analysis

This paper presents a method to check data secure flow in security annotated AUTOSAR models. The approach is based on information flow analysis and abstract interpretation. The analysis computes the lowest security level of data sent on a communication, according to the annotations in the model and the code of runnables. An abstract interpreter executes runnables on abstract domains that abstract from real values and consider only data dependency levels. Data secure flow is verified if data sent on a communication always satisfy the security annotation in the model. The work has been developed in the EU project Safure, where modeling extensions to AUTOSAR have been proposed to improve security in automotive communications

Checking secure information flow in Java bytecode by code transformation and standard bytecode verification

A method is presented for checking secure information flow in Java bytecode, assuming a multilevel security policy that assigns security levels to the objects. The method exploits the type-level abstract interpretation of standard bytecode verification to detect illegal information flows. We define an algorithm transforming the original code into another code in such a way that a typing error detected by the Verifier on the transformed code corresponds to a possible illicit information How in the original code. We present a prototype tool that implements the method and we show an example of application. Copyright (C) 2004 John Wiley Sons, Ltd

Checking secure information flow in java bytecode by code transformation and standard bytecode verification

A method is presented for checking secure information flow in Java bytecode, assuming a multilevel security policy that assigns security levels to the objects. The method exploits the type-level abstract interpretation of standard bytecode verification to detect illegal information flows. We define an algorithm transforming the original code into another code in such a way that a typing error detected by the Verifier on the transformed code corresponds to a possible illicit information flow in the original code. We present a prototype tool that implements the code transformation and we show an example of application of the method