Adaptive Complex Contagions and Threshold Dynamical Systems

A broad range of nonlinear processes over networks are governed by threshold dynamics. So far, existing mathematical theory characterizing the behavior of such systems has largely been concerned with the case where the thresholds are static. In this paper we extend current theory of finite dynamical systems to cover dynamic thresholds. Three classes of parallel and sequential dynamic threshold systems are introduced and analyzed. Our main result, which is a complete characterization of their attractor structures, show that sequential systems may only have fixed points as limit sets whereas parallel systems may only have period orbits of size at most two as limit sets. The attractor states are characterized for general graphs and enumerated in the special case of paths and cycle graphs; a computational algorithm is outlined for determining the number of fixed points over a tree. We expect our results to be relevant for modeling a broad class of biological, behavioral and socio-technical systems where adaptive behavior is central.Comment: Submitted for publicatio

Distributed Graph Automata and Verification of Distributed Algorithms

Combining ideas from distributed algorithms and alternating automata, we introduce a new class of finite graph automata that recognize precisely the languages of finite graphs definable in monadic second-order logic. By restricting transitions to be nondeterministic or deterministic, we also obtain two strictly weaker variants of our automata for which the emptiness problem is decidable. As an application, we suggest how suitable graph automata might be useful in formal verification of distributed algorithms, using Floyd-Hoare logic.Comment: 26 pages, 6 figures, includes a condensed version of the author's Master's thesis arXiv:1404.6503. (This version of the article (v2) is identical to the previous one (v1), except for minor changes in phrasing.

The Least-core and Nucleolus of Path Cooperative Games

Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it enables a path from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined on both directed and undirected network