Consignment auctions: A proposed optional channel for reverse logistics

This paper addresses the proposed utilization of the C.A.L.M. Method-The Consignment Auction Liquidation Marketing Method of Mass Product Distribution-as an optional secondary market channel for reverse logistics requirements. This nontraditional method of product distribution was initiated over twenty years ago and can provide business organizations a further option for reverse logistic needs. Consignment auctions depend on securing good sources of merchandise sold at their auctions. Many business organizations including retailers, wholesalers, manufacturers and entrepreneurs often have excess and returned merchandise and can benefit from additional secondary market channel options to meet their reverse logistics needs. A review of both reverse logistics and consignment auctions is followed by a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing consignment auctions for reverse logistics needs. The broad availability and placements of consignment auctions in the United States is presented. In addition, general guidelines for utilizing consignment auctions as an optional secondary market channel for reverse logistics needs are provided. Also, online auction options are compared to traditional consignment auctions. Finally, the concept of “multi-channel reverse logistics” is introduced and recommended

Consignment auction liquidation in Canada: A field study

This paper addresses an in-field experience utilizing the C.A.L.M. (The Consignment Auction Liquidation Marketing) Method of Mass Product Distribution in Canada. This form of mass product distribution is a nontraditional one, which was originally formally started in 1993 in the United States. This method of distribution targets various audiences distributing products including retailers, wholesalers, manufacturers and entrepreneurs. The “marketing mix”, the four primary areas of marketing include distribution, which continues to provide opportunities for growth. Utilizing consignment auctions as an additional channel of distribution may provide such opportunities. However, the utilization of consignment auctions as an additional channel of distribution has been largely ignored and very few publications related to consignment auctions exist. The results of utilizing Canadian consignment auctions for the liquidation of general merchandise consigned from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2015 are presented. The effectiveness of the utilization of Canadian consignment auctions was based on “consignment auction outlet profitability”, the dependent variable, in relationship to various independent variables including the type of merchandise consigned, consignment terms and shipping costs. Regardless of the variables, the utilization of Canadian consignment auctions for the liquidation and distribution of mass quantities of merchandise may offer an additional distribution opportunity. This field study offers the opportunity to gain further insight regarding the effectiveness of the method of distribution in Canada and adds to the somewhat limited amount of research found

PS-TRUST: Provably Secure Solution for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions

Truthful spectrum auctions have been extensively studied in recent years. Truthfulness makes bidders bid their true valuations, simplifying greatly the analysis of auctions. However, revealing one's true valuation causes severe privacy disclosure to the auctioneer and other bidders. To make things worse, previous work on secure spectrum auctions does not provide adequate security. In this paper, based on TRUST, we propose PS-TRUST, a provably secure solution for truthful double spectrum auctions. Besides maintaining the properties of truthfulness and special spectrum reuse of TRUST, PS-TRUST achieves provable security against semi-honest adversaries in the sense of cryptography. Specifically, PS-TRUST reveals nothing about the bids to anyone in the auction, except the auction result. To the best of our knowledge, PS-TRUST is the first provably secure solution for spectrum auctions. Furthermore, experimental results show that the computation and communication overhead of PS-TRUST is modest, and its practical applications are feasible.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures, submitted to Infocom 201

FlexAuc: Serving Dynamic Demands in a Spectrum Trading Market with Flexible Auction

In secondary spectrum trading markets, auctions are widely used by spectrum holders (SHs) to redistribute their unused channels to secondary wireless service providers (WSPs). As sellers, the SHs design proper auction schemes to stimulate more participants and maximize the revenue from the auction. As buyers, the WSPs determine the bidding strategies in the auction to better serve their end users. In this paper, we consider a three-layered spectrum trading market consisting of the SH, the WSPs and the end users. We jointly study the strategies of the three parties. The SH determines the auction scheme and spectrum supplies to optimize its revenue. The WSPs have flexible bidding strategies in terms of both demands and valuations considering the strategies of the end users. We design FlexAuc, a novel auction mechanism for this market to enable dynamic supplies and demands in the auction. We prove theoretically that FlexAuc not only maximizes the social welfare but also preserves other nice properties such as truthfulness and computational tractability.Comment: 11 pages, 7 figures, Preliminary version accepted in INFOCOM 201