Centralized or decentralized financing of local governments? Consequences for efficiency and inequality of service provision

Compared with most countries the Norwegian system of financing local governments is highly centralized. Grants make up a substantial part of revenues and local taxes are highly regulated by the center. The development of the system was motivated by a desire to equalize service provision throughout the country. The purpose of this paper is to analyze possible consequences of more decentralized financing with local tax discretion. Contrary to the conventional wisdom the analysis indicates that decentralized financing is likely to give more equal provision of local public services. In addition, substantial efficiency gains can be obtained.Centralized financing; Decentralized financing; Tax discretion; Efficiency gains; Equalization

Governance arrangements for state owned enterprises

The aim of this paper is to shed new light on key challenges in governance arrangements for state owned enterprises in infrastructure sectors. The paper provides guidelines on how to classify the fuzzy and sometimes conflicting development goals of infrastructure and the governance arrangements needed to reach such goals. Three policy recommendations emerge. First, some of the structures implied by internationally adopted principles of corporate governance for state owned enterprises favoring a centralized ownership function versus a decentralized or dual structure have not yet been sufficiently"tested"in practice and may not suit all developing countries. Second, general corporate governance guidelines (and policy recommendations) need to be carefully adapted to infrastructure sectors, particularly in the natural monopoly segments. Because the market structure and regulatory arrangements in which state owned enterprises operate matters, governments may want to distinguish the state owned enterprises operating in potentially competitive sectors from the ones under a natural monopoly structure. Competition provides not only formidable benefits, but also unique opportunities for benchmarking, increasing transparency and accountability. Third, governments may want to avoid partial fixes, by tackling both the internal and external governance factors. Focusing only on one of the governance dimensions is unlikely to improve SOE performance in a sustainable way.National Governance,Banks&Banking Reform,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Debt Markets,Public Sector Expenditure Analysis&Management

Public Budget Composition, Fiscal(De)Centralization, and Welfare

We present a dynamic two-region model with overlapping generations. There are two types of public expenditure, education and infrastructure funding, and governments decide optimally on budget size (tax rate) and its allocation across the two outlays. Productivity of government infrastructure spending can differ across regions. This assumption follows well established empirical evidence, and highlights regional heterogeneity in a previously unexplored dimension. We study the implications of three different fiscal regimes for capital accumulation and aggregate national welfare. Full centralization of revenue and expenditure decisions is the optimal fiscal arrangement for the country when infrastructure spending productivity is similar across regions. When regional differences exist but are not too large, the partial centralization regime is optimal where the federal government sets a common tax rate, but allows the regional governments to decide on the budget composition. Only when the differences are sufficiently large does full decentralization become the optimal regime. National steady state output is instead highest when the economy is decentralized. This result is consistent with the “Oates conjecture” that fiscal decentralization increases capital accumulation. However, in terms of welfare this result can be reversed.fiscal federalism, capital accumulation, infrastructure, public education

(WP 2005-03) Openness, Centralized Wage Bargaining, and Inflation

This paper develops a model of an open economy containing both sectors in which wages are market-determined and sectors with wage-setting arrangements. A portion of the latter group of sectors coordinate their wages, taking into account that their collective actions influence the equilibrium inflation outcome in an environment in which the central bank engages in discretionary monetary policymaking. Key predictions forthcoming from this model are (1) increased centralization of wage setting initially causes inflation to increase at low degrees of wage centralization but then, as wage centralization increases, results in an inflation dropoff; (2) a greater degree of centralized wage setting reduces the inflation-restraining effect of greater central bank independence; and (3) increased openness is more likely to reduce inflation in nations with less centralized wage bargaining. Analysis of data for seventeen nations for the period 1970-1999 provides generally strong and robust empirical support for all three of these predictions

Decentralized structures for providing roads : a cross-country comparison

Minimizing costs is often cited as essential for optimizing service delivery. Roads are the oldest, most important infrastructure services provided by governments. They require construction, rehabilitation, maintenance, and administration. Various institutional arrangements affect the degree to which costs can be minimized. Drawing on analyses of experiences with decentralized road provision in eight countries, a longitudinal change analysis of Korea, and vertical and horizontal analysis across states and local governments in Germany, the authors found that the impact of decentralization varies depending on which aspect one is considering: the efficiency of producing road services or the impact on road users. Resources costs are concave, increasing first and decreasing at later stages of decentralization. Preference costs are downward sloping, suggesting that road conditions improve as decentralization advances. In short, decentralization entails initial costs, mostly as losses in economies of scale. But those losses can be outweighed by increases in efficiency when the locus of roadwork is closer to the people. The advantages or limitations of decentralization are function-specific: a) maintenance functions are best provided locally; b) to minimize resource costs, construction should be either completely centralized or completely decentralized; and c) administrative activities are more efficiently provided by local units similar to local maintenance units.Decentralization,Municipal Financial Management,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,National Governance,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Regional Rural Development,National Governance

Rent-sharing under different bargaining regimes : Evidence from linked employer-employee data

In many European countries, the majority of workers have their wage rates determined directly by industry-level agreements. For some workers, industry agreements are supplemented by firm-specific agreements. Yet, the relative importance of individual company and industry agreements (in other words, the degree of centralisation) differs drastically across industries. The authors of this paper use unique linked employer-employee data from a 2003 survey in Belgium to examine how these bargaining features affect the extent of rent-sharing. Their results show that there is substantially more rent-sharing in decentralised than in centralised industries, even when controlling for the endogeneity of profits, for heterogeneity among workers and firms and for differences in characteristics between bargaining regimes. Moreover, in centralised industries, rent-sharing is found only for workers that are covered by a company agreement. The findings of this paper finally suggest that, within decentralised industries, both firm-specific and industry-wide bargaining generate rent-sharing to the same extent.Rent-sharing, collective bargaining, propensity score matching.

The Impact of Different Power Structures on The Cross-Boder e-Retail Supply Chain With An O2O Dual- Channel

In this paper, considering a cross-border e-retail supply chain composed by a foreign supplier and a cross-border e-retailer, we study the impact of different power structures on the supply chain members’ pricing and profits by establishing foreign supplier Stackelberg (FSS), cross-border e-retailer Stackelberg (CES) and vertical Nash (VN) game model on the basis of discussing O2O dual-channel retail mode and pricing decision. The results show that: i) the cross-border e-retailer prefer to choose the centralized pricing mode and will gain more profit than that in the decentralized pricing mode under the condition of O2O dual-channel retailing. ii) The impact of Stackelberg game on dual channel pricing of the cross-border e-retailer is identical, but the impact of three games on foreign supplier’s pricing is significant, (i.e., the wholesale price of the foreign supplier becomes smaller with the game dominance decreased gradually). iii) The impact of three games on cross-border electronic supply chain members’ profits is significant (i.e., members’ profits become smaller with the game dominance decreased gradually. In addition, the impact of Stackelberg game on supply chain total profits is identical. However, the supply chain total profits under Vertical Nash game are more than Stackelberg game

The emergence of markets in the natural gas industry

As countries have deregulated prices and lowered entry barriers in the natural gas industry, many new participants have emerged, promoting competition in the newly created markets. The increased competition has benefited everyone through more efficient pricing and greater choice among natural gas contracts. Four distinctstructural models have emerged in the industry's restructuring. The traditional model (a vertically integrated industry) has been increasingly replaced by models that decentralize the industry along horizontal and vertical lines. With increasing decentralization, regulation of the industry focuses on the pipeline transportation and distribution, the industry segments with natural monopoly characteristics. Regulation aims to protect both end users and participants in the deregulated segments from the market power of companies operating in the monopolistic segments. As a result of deregulation, two major markets emerge: the natural gas market (which facilitates the trading of natural gas as a commodity) and the transportation market (which enables market participants to trade the services needed to ship natural gas through pipelines). Competition and open entry are crucial for these two markets to function efficiently. The transportation market is affected by the market power of pipeline companies, but resale of transportation contracts brings competition to this market and facilitates the efficient allocation of contracts. Intermediaries and spot markets promote efficient pricing and minimize transaction costs. Markets have become more complex with deregulation, and trading mechanisms are needed to ensure the simultaneous clearing of natural gas and transportation markets at minimum cost to the industry. Two main trading models guide transactions: the bilateral trading model (which relies on decentralized bilateral negotiated between market participants) and the poolco model (which relies on a centralized entity to coordinate transactions). Properly applied, both models lead to the same outcome. The bilateral trading model has dominated because of its simplicity of implementation, but the poolco model has great potential once problems of sharing and processing information are addressed.Environmental Economics&Policies,Water and Industry,Economic Theory&Research,Markets and Market Access,Oil&Gas,Water and Industry,Oil Refining&Gas Industry,Markets and Market Access,Access to Markets,Oil&Gas

The cost and benefits of collective bargaining : a survey

Collective bargaining and dispute resolution mechanisms facilitate coordination. Coordination is increasingly seen as an influential determinant of labor market and macroeconomic performance. This paper provides a systematic review of the relevant literature with a specific focus on the role that collective bargaining plays in shaping macroeconomic performance. We focus on comparative studies of labor market institutions in the OECD area that try to disentangle the impact of different institutional approaches to collective bargaining from other determinants of macroeconomic performance.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Labor Management and Relations,Social Protections&Assistance,Labor Standards