A game-theoretic analysis of baccara chemin de fer, II

In a previous paper, we considered several models of the parlor game baccara chemin de fer, including Model B2 (a $2\times2^{484}$ matrix game) and Model B3 (a $2^5\times2^{484}$ matrix game), both of which depend on a positive-integer parameter $d$, the number of decks. The key to solving the game under Model B2 was what we called Foster's algorithm, which applies to additive $2\times2^n$ matrix games. Here "additive" means that the payoffs are additive in the $n$ binary choices that comprise a player II pure strategy. In the present paper, we consider analogous models of the casino game baccara chemin de fer that take into account the $100\,\alpha$ percent commission on Banker (player II) wins, where $0\le\alpha\le1/10$. Thus, the game now depends not just on the discrete parameter $d$ but also on a continuous parameter $\alpha$. Moreover, the game is no longer zero sum. To find all Nash equilibria under Model B2, we generalize Foster's algorithm to additive $2\times2^n$ bimatrix games. We find that, with rare exceptions, the Nash equilibrium is unique. We also obtain a Nash equilibrium under Model B3, based on Model B2 results, but here we are unable to prove uniqueness.Comment: 32 pages, 2 figure

Teaching a University Course on the Mathematics of Gambling

Courses on the mathematics of gambling have been offered by a number of colleges and universities, and for a number of reasons. In the past 15 years, at least seven potential textbooks for such a course have been published. In this article we objectively compare these books for their probability content, their gambling content, and their mathematical level, to see which ones might be most suitable, depending on student interests and abilities. This is not a book review (e.g., none of the books is recommended over others) but rather an essay offering advice about which topics to include in a course on the mathematics of gambling