Bank regulation, property prices and early warning systems for banking crises in OECD countries

Early warning systems (EWS) for banking crises generally omit bank capital, bank liquidity and property prices. Most work on EWS has been for global samples dominated by emerging market crises where time series data on bank capital adequacy and property prices are typically absent. We estimate logit crisis models for OECD countries, finding strong effects from capital adequacy and liquidity ratios as well as property prices, and can exclude traditional variables. Higher capital adequacy and liquidity ratios have a marked effect on the crisis probabilities, implying long run benefits to offset some of the costs that such regulations may impose

Credit rating and bank behavior in India: Possible implications of the new Basel accord

The paper examines the impact of credit rating on capital adequacy ratios of Indian state-owned banks using quarterly data for the period 1997:1 to 2002:4. To this end, a multinomial logit model with multi credit rating indicators as dependent variable is estimated. The variables that can impinge upon capital adequacy ratio have been used as explanatory variables. Two separate models — one for long-term credit rating and another for short-term credit rating—have been estimated. The paper concludes that, both for short-term as well as for long-term ratings, capital adequacy ratios are an important factor impinging on credit rating of Indian state-owned banks.banknig; capital adequacy; credit rating; multinomial logit model; India

The Effect of the Basel Accord on Bank Lending in Japan

This study investigates the hypothesis that stricter capital adequacy requirements introduced under the 1988 Basel Accord caused Japanese banks to restrict loan growth. Using a panel of Japanese bank balance sheets for fiscal years 1982-1999, this study finds that the 1988 Basel Accord regulation requiring international banks to hold a BIS (Bank for International Settlements) capital to risk-weighted asset ratio of at least 8% increased the sensitivity of total loan growth to capitalization for international banks in Japan. A similar, but quantitatively smaller, finding is reported for a group of "switcher" banks that initially pursued the 8% BIS capital adequacy requirement following the signing of the Basel Accord in 1988, but then later switched to pursue a domestic 4% MOF (Ministry of Finance) capital adequacy requirement. Domestic banks, which were subject to the 4% MOF capital adequacy requirement for the entire post-Basel period, show no evidence of increased sensitivity of lending to capitalization in the post-Basel period.Japanese Banks, Capital Adequacy, Basel Accord, Credit Crunch

Bank Capital, Liquidity and Systemic Risk

We analyze the impact of capital adequacy regulation on bank insolvency and aggregate investment. We develop a model of the banking system that is characterized by the interaction of many heterogeneous banks with the real sector, interbank credit relations as a consequence of bank liquidity management and an insolvency mechanism. This allows us to study the impact of capital adequacy regulation on systemic risk. In particular we can analyze the impact of regulation on contagious defaults arising from mutual credit relations. We show that the impact of capital adequacy on systemic stability is ambiguous and that systemic risk might actually increase as a consequence of imposing capital constraints on banks. Furthermore we analyze the indirect consequences of capital adequacy regulation that are transmitted to the real economy by their impact on equilibrium interbank rates and thus the opportunity costs of liquidity within the banking system.

"'Enforced Indebtedness' and Capital Adequacy Requirements"

The capital adequacy requirements for banks, enshrined in international banking regulations, are based on a fallacy of composition--namely, the notion that an individual firm can choose the structure of its financial liabilities without affecting the financial liabilities of other firms. In practice, says author Jan Toporowski, capital adequacy regulations for banks are a way of forcing nonfinancial companies into debt. "Enforced indebtedness" then reduces the quality of credit in the economy. In an international context, the present system of capital adequacy regulation reinforces this indebtedness. Proposals for "dynamic provisioning" to increase capital requirements during an economic boom would simply accelerate the boom's collapse. Contingent commitments to lend to governments in the event of private-sector lending withdrawals, alongside lending to foreign private-sector borrowers, are a much more viable alternative.

Bank capital adequacy : perspectives and prospects

An abstract for this article is not availableBanks and banking

The new bank capital adequacy standards

Bank capital ; Banks and banking

Bank capital adequacy : perspectives and prospects

An abstract for this article is not availableBanks and banking