Increasing Returns in a Standard Tax Competition Model

The standard tax competition literature predicts a race to the bottom in capital tax rates as capital mobility increases. Recently, the very different modeling framework of the new economic geography literature has produced the contrasting result that economic integration leads to agglomeration rents to capital which can be taxed away, in turn leading to higher corporate taxation. This paper incorporates increasing returns directly into the standard tax competition modeling framework to identify the origin of this disparity of results. The model illustrates that increasing returns reduce traditional tax competition pressures as capital mobility increases, and that changes in preferences for the public good, combined with increasing cross-border ownership of capital, and thus taxexporting incentives, are the main factors driving tax rates higher. Tax exporting has not previously been linked endogenously to capital mobility in standard tax competition models or new economic geography models.Tax competition; Capital mobility; Economic Geography; Increasing Returns; Tax Exporting.

Are Corporate Tax Burdens Racing to the Bottom in the European Union?

This paper tests the central predictions of the theoretical tax competition literature for capital tax rates for a panel of European Union countries, notably a race to the bottom in corporate tax burdens. In contrast to the previous empirical literature, empirical support for increasing capital mobility to be resulting in a reduction in corporate tax burdens is found. The results also suggest that other factors driving the corporate tax burden should not be neglected and may provide substantial counterweight to tax competition forcesTax competition; Capital taxation; Corporate tax burden; European financial integration; Capital mobility

The role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition

In this paper, we analyse the role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition. Our primary result is that increasing ‘relocation’ mobility of firms leads to increasing ‘net’ tax revenues under fairly weak conditions. While enhanced relocation mobility intensifies tax competition, it weakens subsidy competition. The resulting fall in the governments’ subsidy payments overcompensates the decline in tax revenues, leading to a rise in net tax revenues. We derive this conclusion in a model in which two governments are first engaged in subsidy competition and thereafter in tax competition, and firms locate and potentially relocate in response to the two political choices.Tax competition, subsidy competition, capital and firm mobility,foreign direct investment

Competing for capital when labor is heterogeneous

This paper investigates the impacts of capital mobility and tax competition in a setting with imperfect matching between firms and workers. The small country always gains and the large country always loses from tax competition, thus implying tax competition leads to redistribution from the large to the small country. These results imply that our model encapsulates both the “importance of being small” as well as the “importance of being large”. We also show that tax harmonization leads to redistribution from the large to the small countryfiscal competition; local labor markets; capital mobility

What do Theories of Tax Competition Predict for Capital Taxes in EU Countries? A Review of the Tax Competition Literature

The paper reviews the theoretical literature on capital tax competition relevant for capital taxation in the European Union. The basic tax competition model a la Zodrow and Mierzkowski (1986) is presented, and the arguments of the literature are subsequently integrated into the framework of the basic tax competition model. The review includes models of tax competition where countries are assumed large, asymmetric, when there are more than one tax instrument, where there are more than one tax base, when government is assumed self-serving, and where democratic elections and political equilibrium are allowed for. Moreover, the consequences of agglomeration economies for tax competition pressures are reviewed and incorporated into the standard tax competition model.Tax Competition; Capital Taxation; Capital Mobility; European Integration; Agglomeration

Capital mobility, tax competition, and lobbying for redistributive capital taxation

This paper analyzes the impact of international capital mobility on redistributive capital taxation and on lobbying activities by interest groups. It employs a model where different capital endowments lead to a conflict between households concerning their most preferred capital tax rate. Three main results are derived: First, redistributive source based capital taxes or subsidies decline as international tax competition intensifies. Second, lobbying activities of certain interest groups may explain international differences in the capital tax rate. Third, capital mobility may lead to declining lobbying activities of interest groups and thus may be welfare increasing for all households.Tax competition,interest groups,redistribution

Public Debt Asymmetries and Tax Competition.

The paper investigates the effect of asymmetric debt and debt servicing obligations on taxes and primary spending in a standard tax competition model, assuming public debts are pre-determined and in their steady state. The impact of increasing financial market integration and capital mobility on tax and spending asymmetries is then investigated, and the results are tested empirically for EU countries. The model predicts that cross country asymmetries in debt servicing obligations lead to cross-country asymmetries in taxes and spending, and these predictions are supported by the data, with high-debt EU countries having lower expenditures and higher taxes than low-debt countries. Moreover, as the impact of increasing capital mobility on tax asymmetries is theoretically ambiguous and empirically insignificant, increasing capital mobility is found to amplify debt-induced tax distortion asymmetries. Finally, higher capital mobility is found to amplify public spending asymmetries theoretically as well as empirically across EU member countries.public debt; tax competition; European integration

International Tax Coordination: Regionalism Versus Globalism

Tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor. I study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem, using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature. The model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination. With high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world, the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination, even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy.Tax competition, tax coordination, capital income taxation

Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: A Survey

This paper surveys the literature on the implications of international capital mobility for national tax policies. Our main issue for consideration in this survey is whether taxation of income, specifically capital income will survive, how border crossing investment is taxed relative to domestic investment and whether welfare gains can be achieved through international tax coordination. We develop a a “working horse model” of multinational investment which allows to derive many of the key results from the literature on international taxation in a unified framework. Moreover, we put special emphasis on the problem of tax competition and financial arbitrage.tax competition, capital mobility, tax policy

Why Do Most Countries Set High Tax Rates on Capital?

We consider tax competition in a world with tax bases exhibiting different degrees of mobility, modeled as mobile and immobile capital. An agreement among countries not to give preferential treatment to mobile capital results in an equilibrium where mobile capital is nevertheless taxed relatively lightly. In particular, one or two of the smallest countries, measured by their stocks of immobile capital, choose relatively low tax rates, thereby attracting mobile capital away from the other countries, which are then left to set revenue maximizing taxes on their immobile capital. This conclusion holds regardless of whether countries choose their tax policies sequentially or simultaneously. In contrast, unrestricted competition for mobile capital results in the preferential treatment of mobile capital by all countries, without cross-country differences in the taxation of mobile capital. Nevertheless our main result is that the non-preferential regime generates larger global tax revenue, despite the sizable revenue loss from the emergence of low-tax countries. By extending the analysis to include cross-country differences in productivities, we are able to resurrect a case for preferential regimes, but only if the productivity differences are sufficiently large.Tax Competition, Capital Mobility