Investing in Mobility: Freight Transport in the Hudson Region

Proposes a framework for assessing alternative investments in freight rail, highway, and transit capacity that would increase the ability to improve mobility and air quality in the New York metropolitan area

On the deleted squares of lens spaces

The configuration space $F_2 (M)$ of ordered pairs of distinct points in a manifold $M$, also known as the deleted square of $M$, is not a homotopy invariant of $M$: Longoni and Salvatore produced examples of homotopy equivalent lens spaces $M$ and $N$ of dimension three for which $F_2 (M)$ and $F_2 (N)$ are not homotopy equivalent. In this paper, we study the natural question whether two arbitrary $3$-dimensional lens spaces $M$ and $N$ must be homeomorphic in order for $F_2 (M)$ and $F_2 (N)$ to be homotopy equivalent. Among our tools are the Cheeger--Simons differential characters of deleted squares and the Massey products of their universal covers.Comment: 27 pages, 10 figure

The Control of Porting in Two-Sided Markets

A sizable literature has grown up in recent years focusing on two-sided markets in which economies of scale combined with complementarities between a platform and its associated ‘software’ or ‘services’ can generate indirect network effects (that is positive feedback between the number of consumers using that platform and the utility of an individual consumer). In this paper we introduce a model of ‘porting’ in such markets where porting denotes the conversion of ‘software’ or ‘services’ developed for one platform to run on another. Focusing on the case where a dominant platform exists we investigate the impact on equilibrium and the consequences for welfare of the ability to control porting. Specifically, we show that the welfare costs associated with the ‘control of porting’ may be more significant than those arising from pricing alone. This model and its associated results are of particular relevance because of the light they shed on debates about the motivations and effects of actions by a dominant platform owner. Recent examples of such debates include those about Microsoft’s behaviour both in relation to its operating system and its media player, Apple’s behaviour in relation to its DRM and iTunes platform, and Ebay’s use of the cyber-trespass doctrine to prevent access to its site

Agency Law in Cyberspace

This short article articulates and defends the proposition that basic doctrines within common-law agency apply readily to transactions and other encounters effected through the internet. In cyberspace, as in physical space, common-law agency specifies the circumstances under which an actor\u27s conduct should carry consequences for another person\u27s legal position unless a statute provides otherwise. Recent cases illustrate an easy translation into cyberspace of concepts that are well-developed elsewhere, including the test of whether a particular relationship amounts to one of agency and whether a person acted with actual or apparent authority to bind another

Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment

We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are sufficiently well-paid, difficult to bribe and corruption detection highly probable, we show that increasing policing or sanctions effectively deters crime. However, when bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment, and the rents from criminal activity relative to legal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. In particular, the relationship between the traditional instruments of deterrence, namely intensification of policing and increment of sanctions, and crime is nonmonotonic. Beyond a threshold, increases in expected punishment induce organized crime to corruption, and ensuing impunity leads too higher rather than lower crime.Deterrence; Organized Crime; Corruption; Oligopoly; Free Entry