Constitutional Rules

This paper proposes a normative theory of constitutional rules. The first-best cannot be achieved whenever constitutional rules cannot be made contingent on information about the costs and benefits of policy reforms. We characterize and welfare rank four classes of second best constitutions: constitutions that specify one rule for all types of decisions; constitutions that provide incentives for information about costs and benefits to be revealed; constitutions that allow for vetoes from interested parties and constitutions that specify different rules for different policy areas. In addition, we provide conditions for the existence of amendment rules that allow for changes to the original constitutional rules after the constitutional stage. Finally, we provide a new rationale for the existence of checks and balances.constitutions, social contracts, majority rules, bill of rights, vetoes, referenda, amendments, checks and balances

Constitute: The world’s constitutions to read, search, and compare

Constitutional design and redesign is constant. Over the last 200 years, countries have replaced their constitutions an average of every 19 years and some have amended them almost yearly. A basic problem in the drafting of these documents is the search and analysis of model text deployed in other jurisdictions. Traditionally, this process has been ad hoc and the results suboptimal. As a result, drafters generally lack systematic information about the institutional options and choices available to them. In order to address this informational need, the investigators developed a web application, Constitute [online at http://www.constituteproject.org], with the use of semantic technologies. Constitute provides searchable access to the world’s constitutions using the conceptualization, texts, and data developed by the Comparative Constitutions Project. An OWL ontology represents 330 ‘‘topics’’ – e.g. right to health – with which the investigators have tagged relevant provisions of nearly all constitutions in force as of September of 2013. The tagged texts were then converted to an RDF representation using R2RML mappings and Capsenta’s Ultrawrap. The portal implements semantic search features to allow constitutional drafters to read, search, and compare the world’s constitutions. The goal of the project is to improve the efficiency and systemization of constitutional design and, thus, to support the independence and self-reliance of constitutional drafters.Governmen

Quintessential Elements of Meaningful Constitutions in Post-Conflict States

This examination compares several successful constitutions formulated to govern countries just formed from the conclusion of armed conflicts (including the U.S.). Some of the most important elements gleaned from these successful constitutions include an independent court before which one may appeal to the new constitution because such a constitution adequately secures the integrity of the court itself

Viable tax constitutions

Taxation is only sustainable if the general public complies with it. This observation is uncontroversial with tax practitioners but has been ignored by the public finance tradition, which has interpreted tax constitutions as binding contracts by which the power to tax is irretrievably conferred by individuals to government, which can then levy any tax it chooses. However, in the absence of an outside party enforcing contracts between members of a group, no arrangement within groups can be considered to be a binding contract, and therefore the power of tax must be sanctioned by individuals on an ongoing basis. In this paper we offer, for the first time, a theoretical analysis of this fundamental compliance problem associated with taxation, obtaining predictions that in some cases point to a re-interptretation of the theoretical constructions of the public finance tradition while in others call them into question

Endogenous Constitutions

We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in a n unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader spectrum of social groups but also have a larger government and a higher level of taxation. A consensual system turns out to be preferred by the society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively high. Moreover, we obtain that consensual democracies should be expected to be ruled more often by center-left coalitions. Finally, our model also provides a new rationale, based on the endogeneity of the political system, of the positive or absent (rather than negative) association between equality and redistribution transpiring from the cross-sectional evidence of developed countries presented in some recent studies. Some historical and empirical evidence supporting our results is provided.Endogenous Constitutions; Consensual Democracy; Majoritarian Democracy; Inequality; Heterogeneity; Redistribution

The Political Economy of Intergenerational Cooperation

The paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that facilitate this cooperation. After establishing a normative framework, we examine the properties of the laissez-faire solution in a pure market economy, and in one where reproductive decisions and intergenerational transfers are governed by self-enforcing family constitutions. We then show that first and second-best policies include a pension and a child benefit scheme. Finally, we look at the possibility that intergenerational redistribution might be supported by either a constitution, or some kind of voting equilibrium.intergenerational cooperation, family, fertility, saving, private transfers, education, child benefits, pensions, self-enforcing constitutions, direct democracy, representative democracy, constitutions

Constitutions for the 21st Century: Emerging Patterns-The EU, Iraq, Afghanistan…

Professor Mallat delivered the Third Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law in 2004 and this article is based on his remarks. The article is included in the inaugural volume of CICLOPs that collects the first six Bernstein lectures. Strong moments in constitution-making often result from traumas; the breakthroughs by the European Union and constitutional achievements by both Iraq and Afghanistan stand as modern examples. The traumas of Europe, Afghanistan, and Iraq have been typified by violent conflict over the past century, including two World Wars, the Cold War, and the ‘war on terrorism’. Efforts and successes at constructing 21st Century constitutions can largely be seen as a response to these 20th Century traumas. Looking beyond the black-letter law of the European, Afghani, and Iraqi constitutions, emerging patterns in constitution making are to be found, including the recent international drive behind constitutions and the classical Montesquieuian separation of powers. Though these are two major driving forces in constitutional design, three ‘acid tests’ are not only heavily considered in the creation of these constitutions, but they are also heavily determinative in the success of any given constitution: religion, federalism, and, most importantly, the presidency. By analyzing these considerations and the acid tests in the context of the European Union, Iraq, and Afghanistan, their overwhelming importance and the difficulties in negotiating each within varied political climates becomes apparent. The hope is that these attempts and successes at constitutional design can serve as examples for other regions suffering from intense and prolonged violent turmoil, such as the successful resolution of the Northern Ireland problem or the as yet resolved Arab-Israeli conflict concerning Palestine. Further, these shifts in constitutional design over the past century act as signposts, pointing in the direction of change as the process and needs of constitutional design evolves from old concerns of self-contained internal affairs to a new modern concern of internationalism and, eventually, to a state of depoliticisation of constitutions

An economic analysis of constitutional law

Perhaps, the 1990''''s will be the decade of constitution writing. With many European States gaining their independence or reshaping their contours, new constitutions will be drawn up. Recent advances in the economic analysis of law can help to make this difficult task more feasible. This essay starts by giving an introduction into the economic analysis of constitutional law. Part I contains an analysis of constitutional guarantees of basic (individual) rights and procedures, illustrated with three constitutions, the American constitution of 1789 as amended in 1792, the German Basic Law of 1949 and the Dutch Basic Law of 1983. Although constitutions are meant to be permanent, they continuously change without amendment. Part II offers an analysis of constitutional change without amendment. Whoever wants to draft a constitution needs to know how the basic guarantees work, how procedural rules interconnect basic guarantees and decision takers, and what chances there are that the meaning of a constitutional provision can be turned upside down. Economic analysis of constitutions speaks to these three problems.public economics ;

Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional Constraints

human rights, terrorism, 9/11, checks and balances, constitutions, constitutional courts