68 research outputs found

    EE-ACML: Energy-Efficient Adiabatic CMOS/MTJ Logic for CPA-Resistant IoT Devices

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    Internet of Things (IoT) devices have strict energy constraints as they often operate on a battery supply. The cryptographic operations within IoT devices consume substantial energy and are vulnerable to a class of hardware attacks known as side-channel attacks. To reduce the energy consumption and defend against side-channel attacks, we propose combining adiabatic logic and Magnetic Tunnel Junctions to form our novel Energy Efficient-Adiabatic CMOS/MTJ Logic (EE-ACML). EE-ACML is shown to be both low energy and secure when compared to existing CMOS/MTJ architectures. EE-ACML reduces dynamic energy consumption with adiabatic logic, while MTJs reduce the leakage power of a circuit. To show practical functionality and energy savings, we designed one round of PRESENT-80 with the proposed EE-ACML integrated with an adiabatic clock generator. The proposed EE-ACML-based PRESENT-80 showed energy savings of 67.24% at 25 MHz and 86.5% at 100 MHz when compared with a previously proposed CMOS/MTJ circuit. Furthermore, we performed a CPA attack on our proposed design, and the key was kept secret

    Power efficient and power attacks resistant system design and analysis using aggressive scaling with timing speculation

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    Growing usage of smart and portable electronic devices demands embedded system designers to provide solutions with better performance and reduced power consumption. Due to the new development of IoT and embedded systems usage, not only power and performance of these devices but also security of them is becoming an important design constraint. In this work, a novel aggressive scaling based on timing speculation is proposed to overcome the drawbacks of traditional DVFS and provide security from power analysis attacks at the same time. Dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) is proven to be the most suitable technique for power efficiency in processor designs. Due to its promising benefits, the technique is still getting researchers attention to trade off power and performance of modern processor designs. The issues of traditional DVFS are: 1) Due to its pre-calculated operating points, the system is not able to suit to modern process variations. 2) Since Process Voltage and Temperature (PVT) variations are not considered, large timing margins are added to guarantee a safe operation in the presence of variations. The research work presented here addresses these issues by employing aggressive scaling mechanisms to achieve more power savings with increased performance. This approach uses in-situ timing error monitoring and recovering mechanisms to reduce extra timing margins and to account for process variations. A novel timing error detection and correction mechanism, to achieve more power savings or high performance, is presented. This novel technique has also been shown to improve security of processors against differential power analysis attacks technique. Differential power analysis attacks can extract secret information from embedded systems without knowing much details about the internal architecture of the device. Simulated and experimental data show that the novel technique can provide a performance improvement of 24% or power savings of 44% while occupying less area and power overhead. Overall, the proposed aggressive scaling technique provides an improvement in power consumption and performance while increasing the security of processors from power analysis attacks.N/

    Analysis of Software Countermeasures for Whitebox Encryption

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    Whitebox cryptography aims to ensure the security of cryptographic algorithms in the whitebox model where the adversary has full access to the execution environment. To attain security in this setting is a challenging problem: Indeed, all published whitebox implementations of standard symmetric-key algorithms such as AES to date have been practically broken. However, as far as we know, no whitebox implementation in real-world products has suffered from a key recovery attack. This is due to the fact that commercial products deploy additional software protection mechanisms on top of the whitebox implementation. This makes practical attacks much less feasible in real-world applications. There are numerous software protection mechanisms which protect against standard whitebox attacks. One such technique is control flow obfuscation which randomizes the order of table lookups for each execution of the whitebox encryption module. Another technique is randomizing the locations of the various Look up tables (LUTs) in the memory address space. In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of these countermeasures against two attack paradigms. The first known as Differential Computational Analysis (DCA) attack was developed by Bos, Hubain, Michiels and Teuwen in CHES 2016. The attack passively collects software execution traces for several plaintext encryptions and uses the collected data to perform an analysis similar to the well known differential power attacks (DPA) to recover the secret key. Since the software execution traces contain time demarcated physical addresses of memory locations being read/written into, they essentially leak the values of the inputs to the various LUTs accessed during the whitebox encryption operation, which as it turns out leaks sufficient information to perform the power attack. We found that if in addition to control flow obfuscation, one were to randomize the locations of the LUTs in the memory, then it is very difficult to perform the DCA on the resultant system using such table inputs and extract the secret key in reasonable time. As an alternative, we investigate the version of the DCA attack which uses the outputs of the tables instead of the inputs to mount the power analysis attack. This modified DCA is able to extract the secret key from the flow obfuscated and location randomized versions of several whitebox binaries available in crypto literature. We develop another attack called the Zero Difference Enumeration (ZDE) attack. The attack records software traces for several pairs of strategically selected plaintexts and performs a simple statistical test on the effective difference of the traces to extract the secret key. We show that ZDE is able to recover the keys of whitebox systems. Finally we propose a new countermeasure for protecting whitebox binaries based on insertion of random delays which aims to make both the ZDE and DCA attackspractically difficult by adding random noise in the information leaked to the attacker

    Side-channel attacks and countermeasures in the design of secure IC's devices for cryptographic applications

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    Abstract--- A lot of devices which are daily used have to guarantee the retention of sensible data. Sensible data are ciphered by a secure key by which only the key holder can get the data. For this reason, to protect the cipher key against possible attacks becomes a main issue. The research activities in hardware cryptography are involved in finding new countermeasures against various attack scenarios and, in the same time, in studying new attack methodologies. During the PhD, three different logic families to counteract Power Analysis were presented and a novel class of attacks was studied. Moreover, two different activities related to Random Numbers Generators have been addressed
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