Régiók, határok és hálózatok [=Regions, Borders and Networks]

Regons, Borders and Networks The title of the conference "Borders and Regions" was considered by the majority of the lecturers as problems of a region at the border of a larger region (country, European Union). This lecture deals rather with the relation of a region to its own border: sets out the main functions of the frontiers of a region and concludes how certain networks can help to fulfil the same tasks. Nowadays both in strict sense and figuratively there is a shift from using sharp administrative borders towards creating indistinct frontiers. Sharp spatial borders become concentration of tension rather then solving problems (iron curtain, US—Mexican border etc.). As an analogy we can also refer to the general shift from regulation with sharp administrative limits towards market-type regulation with softer frontiers (in economy, environmental protection etc.). Over the roles supplied by a frontier zone (buffer, filter and barrier) it is a characteristic spatial structure within the region that has a chance to select the external effects arriving to the region. The physical networks that are spatial imprints of the existing relation systems have four possible roles as internal provision, external accessibility, to assure through-cut and of avoiding a region. The condition of the good operation of a region is the good local provision, that is the existence of appropriate internal networks. Out of its existence the pattern of the structure is also determining: creating appropriate internal transport network in a region it is an important target to built out multilateral net structures so, that a similar provisional position be able to decrease (and not increase) the differences originated from the position of there different localities. The measure of good accessibility is the multilaterality and multidirectionality of relations. There are two important levels of accessibility links to be distinguished: the direct main, large-scale axes and the transborder extension of the subordinated internal provision networks. In case of similarly developed linked regions, we can expect that the advantages due to the improvement of the relation will also be symmetrical between the regions. Improving accessibility between developed and less developed regions, it is not so clear, that the result is similar: we also have to take into account whether the internal structure in the underdeveloped side able to develop at a measure needed by externally controlled changes. In order to defend and develop the internal structure, the through traffic crossing the region has to be led with minimised harmfulness and with minimised troubling of internal relations. We have to learn, that it is impossible to eliminate through traffic, but on the other side it is not at all an aim to attract more of it into the region. With the metaphors Island, Basin and Crossroad we try to describe the relation between a region and its environs. The Island represents the isolated region without external relations. A Basin disposes with clearly interpretable frontiers, while there are gates along this frontier that are able to both let and filter the inflow. In the same time the internal structure is also able to select: there are incoming elemen[ easily melting into the structure, while other elements are not. The Crossroad is a part of the space where the internal structures have no role or importance; everything serves those arriving, everything is determined by external structures. By forming the transport network we can influence the endowments of a region. In connection with that task now in Hungary (and in Eastern Central Europe) we just have to strengthen the Basin-characteristics and as we are able we have to decrease the danger to be involved into a Crossroad role. Understanding such role of the networks gives us a possibility that the networks, in frame of a conscious development policy be ready to take over a part from the role of the frontiers and by that development a functional harmony could be created between the tasks of the frontiers and the internal structures

On sharing NATO defence burdens in the 1990s and beyond

This article investigates NATO burden sharing in the 1990s in light of strategic, technological, political and membership changes. Both an ability-to-pay and a benefits-received analysis of burden sharing are conducted. During 1990-99, there is no evidence of disproportionate burden sharing, where the large allies shoulder the burdens of the small. Nevertheless, the theoretical model predicts that this disproportionality will plague NATO in the near future. Thus far, there is still a significant concordance between benefits received and defence burdens carried. When alternative expansion scenarios are studied, the extent of disproportionality of burden sharing increases as NATO grows in size. A broader security burden-sharing measure is devised and tested; based on this broader measure, there is still no disproportionality evident in the recent past.

A global battlefield?: Drones and the geographical scope of armed conflict

The ever-increasing use of drones in the pursuit of the 'war on terror' has given rise to concerns over the emergence of a global battlefield whereby the entire planet is subject to the application of the laws of armed conflict. These concerns stem from drone strikes frequently occurring outside the 'active battlefields' of Afghanistan and into the border regions of Pakistan and expanding further afield into Yemen and Somalia. In response to emerging practice, a significant body of academic literature has emerged on the legal classification of transnational armed violence. Less attention however, has been given to the geographical scope of the concept of armed conflict itself. This article provides a detailed analysis of the geographical scope of non-international armed conflict under international humanitarian law, and in the context of drone strikes. In particular, it focuses upon the legal implications of the geographical disjunction between the location of drone strikes and primary battlefields from the point-of-view of the application of international humanitarian law

Are We Defended? Conflicting Representations of War in Pre-War France

This article examines contradictions in the way that war was represented to the French population in the interwar period. It argues that an ‘official’ representation of war gave an impression of France as a secure nation; people were discouraged from questioning the dominant military doctrine of defensive warfare, and were denied access to information to stifle potential criticism. ‘Unofficial’ representations, on the other hand, combined to create an image of a country whose security was increasingly threatened, particularly by a powerful eastern neighbour. During the 1930s, a feeling of imminent catastrophe was in the air, not only as a result of representations of war in film, press and advertising, but also fuelled by the ‘official’ literature of civil defence. The article draws on archival material from the towns of Boulogne-Billancourt and Brest to show that conflicting representations of war led to such confusion when war broke out in 1939 that people were unprepared, psychologically and physically, despite a near obsession with war over the past twenty years. Further, the strength of the representation of war as imminent catastrophe contributed to the state of mind which caused between eight and ten million citizens to flee the invading German army in panic in the summer of 1940

EU cybersecurity capacity building in the Mediterranean and the Middle East

Cyberthreats on the Rise The 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy included “cybersecurity” for the first time among the priorities of the EU’s external action, stating that: “modern economies are heavily reliant on critical infrastructure including transport, communication and power supplies, but also the Internet.” If the EU Strategy for a Secure Information Society, adopted two years before, already addressed “cybercrime,” the proliferation of cyber-attacks “against private or government IT systems” gave the spread of cyber-capabilities a “new dimension, as a potential new economic, political and military weapon.” An EU Cybersecurity Strategy was adopted in 20132 followed, in 2016, by a first EU “Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems,” known as the “NIS Directive,” which harmonized the EU Member States’ legislations