Enhancing Social Protection in the Apparel and Footwear Industry

This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, Cornell University, pertaining to the effects of globalization on the workplace worldwide.  Special emphasis is placed on labor rights, working conditions, labor market changes, and union organizing.FLA_ASEPROLA_Enhancing_Social_Protection.pdf: 371 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020

Blowing the Whistle

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.Anti-trust, leniency, immunity, amnesty, blow the whistle, cartels,price competition, Bertrand model, experiment, communication

Blowing the Whistle

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.Anti-trust; leniency; immunity; amnesty; blow the whistle; cartels; price competition; Bertrand model; experiment; communication

Behavioral Economics and Agency Problems: Empirical Studies

This thesis focuses on the effects of behavioral phenomena in the context of agency problems. It comprises four research studies based on laboratory experiments and field data. The first study investigates the interaction between trust, efficiency and economic development (chapter 2). Chapters 3 and 4 present two research projects about the impact of social preferences and loss aversion on the functioning of incentive schemes in organizations. Finally, the study described in chapter 5 explores how social preferences influence the performance of group lending contracts in microfinance programs

China Employment Law Update - February 2016

In This Issue Significant Changes to China’s Family Planning Law will Impact Employee Leave Entitlements New Regulations on Residence Permits for PRC-Nationals Take Effect Supreme People’s Court Clarifies Issues Relating to Crimes of Jeopardizing Work Safety Highest Court in Shenzhen Issues Clarification on Labor Dispute Matters Highest Court in Nanjing Finds Labor Dispatch Arrangement Invalid Court Dismisses Employee’s Claim for Compensation Due to Delayed Income Tax Beijing Court Ruled Employer Cannot Deem Team Outing as Annual Leave Beijing Court Rules Against Employee’s Claim After Signing Settlement Agreement Court Ruled Termination Unlawful Even in Office Shut Down Situatio

Voluntary Disclosure and Political Sensitivity: The Case of Executive Remuneration

This study investigates the relation between firm political sensitivity and the quality and quantity of voluntary disclosures, with special reference to the case of executive remuneration disclosures. I study the relation between firm political sensitivity and the quality and quantity of annual bonus plan disclosures, applying two competing (but not mutually exclusive) theories: political cost theory and managerial power theory. Political sensitivity is proxied using the magnitude of the annual bonus rather than firm size, which while popular in existing literature, is not a perfect proxy for political sensitivity (Ball and Foster, 1982, Meek et al, 1995; Cormier et al, 2005). Results reveal a significant positive relation between disclosure quantity and political sensitivity measures, and a significant negative relation between disclosure quality and political sensitivity proxies. This indicates that managers who are more susceptible to political sanctions related to their remuneration tend to disclose higher volumes of lower quality information. Consistent with earlier studies, the results confirm that firm size is related to voluntary disclosure, and the results also reveal that the use of remuneration consultants have a significant positive effect on disclosure quantity but no impact on disclosure quality

PAY-AS-YOU-SPEED: AN ECONOMIC FIELD-EXPERIMENT

We report a vehicle-fleet experiment with an economic incentive given to car drivers for keeping within speed limits. A pay-as-you-speed traffic insurance scheme was simulated with a monthly participation bonus that was reduced by a non-linear speeding penalty. Actual speed was monitored by a GPS in-vehicle device. Participating drivers were randomly assigned into two-by two treatment groups, with different participation-bonus and penalty levels, and two control groups (high and low participation bonus, but no penalty). A third control group consists of drivers with the same technical equipment who did not participate but whose driving could be monitored. We evaluate changes in behaviour from twelve-month differences in proportion of driving time per month that the car was exceeding the maximum allowed speed on the road. We find that the participating drivers significantly reduced severe speeding violations during the first experiment month, while in the second experiment month, after having received feedback reports with an account of earned payments, only those participating subjects that were given a speeding penalty reduced severe speed violations. We find no significant effects from the size of the participation bonus (high vs. low), or the size of the penalty (high vs. low rate).Traffic insurance; traffic safety; Intelligent Transport Systems; ITS; Intelligent Speed Adaptation; ISA

Bonus Payments, Hierarchy Levels and Tenure: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence

Using data on executive compensation for the German chemical industry, we investigate the relevance of two theoretical approaches that focus on bonuses as part of a long term wage policy of a firm. The first approach argues that explicit bonuses serve as substitutes for implicit career concerns. The second approach claims that bonuses are used as complements to an executive's internal career. Our data show that bonus payments are mostly prevalent among senior executives at higher hierarchy levels and rather for management jobs than for jobs in research and development. This is true for the whole chemical sector as well as for single large corporations. The findings indicate that the two theoretical views are not mutually exclusive, but are both relevant in practice.bonus payments, chemical sector, hierarchy, tenure, wage policy