Biparty Decision Theory for Dialogical Argumentation

Proposals for strategies for dialogical argumentation often focus on situations where one of the agents wins the dialogue and the other agent loses. Yet in real-world argumentation, it is common for agents to not involve such zero-sum situations. Rather, the agents may enter into a dialogue with divergent but not necessarily opposing views on what is important in the outcomes from the argumentation. In order to model this kind of situation, we investigate a decision-theoretic approach that allows different participants to have different utility evaluations of a dialogue, and for the proponent to model the opponent's utility evaluation in order to optimize the choice of move in the dialogue

Biparty decision theory for dialogical argumentation

Proposals for strategies for dialogical argumentation often focus on situations where one of the agents wins the dialogue and the other agent loses. Yet in real-world argumentation, it is common for agents to not involve such zero-sum situations. Rather, the agents may enter into a dialogue with divergent but not necessarily opposing views on what is important in the outcomes from the argumentation. In order to model this kind of situation, we investigate a decision-theoretic approach that allows different participants to have different utility evaluations of a dialogue, and for the proponent to model the opponent's utility evaluation in order to optimize the choice of move in the dialogue