Voluntary Euthanasia and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Critical Analysis of the Seales v Attorney-General Decision

The recent decision of Seales v Attorney-General clarified the law surrounding voluntary euthanasia in New Zealand. In addition to seeking declaratory judgment from the High Court as to the proper interpretation of certain provisions of the Crimes Act 1961, Lecretia Seales sought two declarations regarding sections 8 and 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Specifically, that insofar as certain provisions of the Crimes Act restrict a person with a terminal and incurable illness from seeking life-ending medical assistance, the Crimes Act is inconsistent with a person’s rights not to be deprived of life and not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment. This paper critiques Justice Collins’ conclusions that sections 8 and 9 of the Bill of Rights Act were not breached in Ms Seales’ tragic circumstances. Further, it argues that sections 8 and 9 of the Bill of Rights Act should extend to circumstances where people are suffering from terminal and incurable illnesses and recognise a right to seek life-ending medical assistance. Finally, the paper critiques the methodology used by the courts in New Zealand when assessing whether rights-infringing legislation is justified pursuant to section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, and ultimately concludes that the courts should always query whether rights-infringing legislation serves a purpose sufficiently important to justify infringement of human rights. Further, the paper argues that the courts should exercise extreme caution in ascertaining the purpose of rights-infringing legislation, particularly statutes enacted prior to the Bill of Rights Act

Section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990: A Case for a Parliamentary Responsibility for Human Rights and Freedoms

The author addresses the role of the Courts in considering whether delegated legislation is ultra vires by reason of breaching the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  He suggests that such review should not consider whether the limitation in any such regulation is justifiable in a free and democratic society, but ought to only consider if it infringes rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights Act.  In his view, not only would such an approach result in much delegated legislation being held to be ultra vires, but that it would force Parliament to take responsibility for the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights Act by closely considering them when enacting provisions which permit delegated legislation.&nbsp

H.R. 3605, Patients’ Bill of Rights Act of 1998

H.R. 3605, Patients’ Bill of Rights Act of 1998

A comparative perspective on reforming the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act

This model grants to legislatures ultimate responsibility for the resolution of controversial rights issues while at the same time seeking to improve the rights sensitivity of the legislative process and increasing the rights protective powers of courts as compared with the traditional institutional form of parliamentary supremacy. Summary As an academic comparative constitutional lawyer, I come to the recent Constitutional Advisory Panel report and the issue of whether and how the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) should be reformed from a particular – perhaps idiosyncratic – perspective. This is viewing the NZBORA as an influential version of a new general model of constitutionalism. This model grants to legislatures ultimate responsibility for the resolution of controversial rights issues while at the same time seeking to improve the rights sensitivity of the legislative process and increasing the rights protective powers of courts as compared with the traditional institutional form of parliamentary supremacy. At least in theory and aspiration, this general model provides an alternative to both the latter, venerable form of constitutional arrangement and its conventional rival, the model of constitutional supremacy, involving a fully constitutionalised regime of supreme, entrenched law enforced by the power of one or more courts to invalidate inconsistent statutes. As an experiment, this new model seeks to create greater balance between courts and legislatures on the resolution of contested rights issues than the traditional alternatives, whilst also providing an effective regime of rights protection. &nbsp

Protests and the Chinese President - an Index of Freedom

In 1999, the police disrupted several protests aimed at Jiang Zemin, President of the Peoples' Republic of China, during the APEC Leaders Summit held in New Zealand. In this article, the author considers whether the protesters' rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 were infringed by police actions. In doing so, the author traverses relevant international and domestic jurisprudence on freedom of speech, movement and association, including the recent decision of the High Court in Police v Beggs. After concluding that the rights of the protesters were prima facie infringed, the author goes on to consider whether the infringements were justified in a free and democratic society in terms of section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act

Judicial infringement of the right to internet access by the imposition of special sentencing conditions

Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act extends to protect internet access within New Zealand as a means of expression. Judicial restriction of internet access via the imposition of special conditions during sentencing is therefore an infringement of s 14. This interpretation of s 14 is consistent with its purpose, legislative history, and the broad approach afforded to human rights generally, as well as international case law and statutes. Any imposition of special conditions restricting internet access must be a demonstrably justifiable limit per s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act to be legitimate. The practical considerations of such a technological limit also warrant judicial consideration before it is imposed. As yet, New Zealand has no explicit protection of internet access but growing acceptance of its importance indicates that reform or judicial acknowledgement are, or soon will be, required

The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: going beyond declarations

The process of capturing and entrenching fundamental rights remains very much a live one in both New Zealand and the United Kingdom. In both countries there is pressure to move on from the current bill of rights legislation: the UK Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). While the two jurisdictions are subject to quite different political and cultural pressures, there remains a great deal of scope for exchange of ideas and experiences