Welfare Maximization Entices Participation

We consider randomized mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that every welfare-maximizing mechanism entices participation and that the converse holds under additional assumptions. Two important corollaries of our results are characterizations of an attractive randomized voting rule that satisfies Condorcet-consistency and entices participation. This stands in contrast to a well-known result by Moulin (1988), who proves that no deterministic voting rule can satisfy both properties simultaneously

Mass Displacement Networks

Despite the large improvements in performance attained by using deep learning in computer vision, one can often further improve results with some additional post-processing that exploits the geometric nature of the underlying task. This commonly involves displacing the posterior distribution of a CNN in a way that makes it more appropriate for the task at hand, e.g. better aligned with local image features, or more compact. In this work we integrate this geometric post-processing within a deep architecture, introducing a differentiable and probabilistically sound counterpart to the common geometric voting technique used for evidence accumulation in vision. We refer to the resulting neural models as Mass Displacement Networks (MDNs), and apply them to human pose estimation in two distinct setups: (a) landmark localization, where we collapse a distribution to a point, allowing for precise localization of body keypoints and (b) communication across body parts, where we transfer evidence from one part to the other, allowing for a globally consistent pose estimate. We evaluate on large-scale pose estimation benchmarks, such as MPII Human Pose and COCO datasets, and report systematic improvements when compared to strong baselines.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figure

Privacy-Preserving Electronic Ticket Scheme with Attribute-based Credentials

Electronic tickets (e-tickets) are electronic versions of paper tickets, which enable users to access intended services and improve services' efficiency. However, privacy may be a concern of e-ticket users. In this paper, a privacy-preserving electronic ticket scheme with attribute-based credentials is proposed to protect users' privacy and facilitate ticketing based on a user's attributes. Our proposed scheme makes the following contributions: (1) users can buy different tickets from ticket sellers without releasing their exact attributes; (2) two tickets of the same user cannot be linked; (3) a ticket cannot be transferred to another user; (4) a ticket cannot be double spent; (5) the security of the proposed scheme is formally proven and reduced to well known (q-strong Diffie-Hellman) complexity assumption; (6) the scheme has been implemented and its performance empirically evaluated. To the best of our knowledge, our privacy-preserving attribute-based e-ticket scheme is the first one providing these five features. Application areas of our scheme include event or transport tickets where users must convince ticket sellers that their attributes (e.g. age, profession, location) satisfy the ticket price policies to buy discounted tickets. More generally, our scheme can be used in any system where access to services is only dependent on a user's attributes (or entitlements) but not their identities.Comment: 18pages, 6 figures, 2 table