Solving ill-posed bilevel programs

This paper deals with ill-posed bilevel programs, i.e., problems admitting multiple lower-level solutions for some upper-level parameters. Many publications have been devoted to the standard optimistic case of this problem, where the difficulty is essentially moved from the objective function to the feasible set. This new problem is simpler but there is no guaranty to obtain local optimal solutions for the original optimistic problem by this process. Considering the intrinsic non-convexity of bilevel programs, computing local optimal solutions is the best one can hope to get in most cases. To achieve this goal, we start by establishing an equivalence between the original optimistic problem an a certain set-valued optimization problem. Next, we develop optimality conditions for the latter problem and show that they generalize all the results currently known in the literature on optimistic bilevel optimization. Our approach is then extended to multiobjective bilevel optimization, and completely new results are derived for problems with vector-valued upper- and lower-level objective functions. Numerical implementations of the results of this paper are provided on some examples, in order to demonstrate how the original optimistic problem can be solved in practice, by means of a special set-valued optimization problem

Notes on the value function approach to multiobjective bilevel optimization

This paper is concerned with the value function approach to multiobjective bilevel optimization which exploits a lower level frontier-type mapping in order to replace the hierarchical model of two interdependent multiobjective optimization problems by a single-level multiobjective optimization problem. As a starting point, different value-function-type reformulations are suggested and their relations are discussed. Here, we focus on the situations where the lower level problem is solved up to efficiency or weak efficiency, and an intermediate solution concept is suggested as well. We study the graph-closedness of the associated efficiency-type and frontier-type mappings. These findings are then used for two purposes. First, we investigate existence results in multiobjective bilevel optimization. Second, for the derivation of necessary optimality conditions via the value function approach, it is inherent to differentiate frontier-type mappings in a generalized way. Here, we are concerned with the computation of upper coderivative estimates for the frontier-type mapping associated with the setting where the lower level problem is solved up to weak efficiency. We proceed in two ways, relying, on the one hand, on a weak domination property and, on the other hand, on a scalarization approach. Throughout the paper, illustrative examples visualize our findings, the necessity of crucial assumptions, and some flaws in the related literature.Comment: 30 page

Optimality Conditions for Semivectorial Bilevel Convex Optimal Control Problems

We present optimality conditions for bilevel optimal control problems where the upper level, to be solved by a leader, is a scalar optimal control problem and the lower level, to be solved by several followers, is a multiobjective convex optimal control problem. Multiobjective optimal control problems arise in many application areas where several conflicting objectives need to be considered. Minimize several objective functionals leads to solutions such that none of the objective functional values can be improved further without deteriorating another. The set of all such solutions is referred to as efficient (also called Pareto optimal, noninferior, or nondominated) set of solutions. The lower level of the semivectorial bilevel optimal control problems can be considered to be associated to a ”grande coalition” of a p-player cooperative differential game, every player having its own objective and control function. We consider situations in which these p-?players react as ”followers” to every decision imposed by a ”leader” (who acts at the so-called upper level). The best reply correspondence of the followers being in general non uniquely determined, the leader cannot predict the followers choice simply on the basis of his rational behavior. So, the choice of the best strategy from the leader point of view depends of how the followers choose a strategy among his best responses. In this paper, we will consider two (extreme) possibilities: (i) the optimistic situation, when for every decison of the leader, the followers will choose a strategy amongst the efficient controls which minimizes the (scalar) objective of the leader; in this case the leader will choose a strategy which minimizes the best he can obtain amongst all the best responses of the followers: (ii) the pessimistic situation, when the followers can choose amongst the efficient controls one which maximizes the (scalar) objective of the leader; in this case the leader will choose a strategy which minimizes the worst he could obtain amongst all the best responses of the followers. This paper continues the research initiated in [17] where existence results for these problems have been obtained.

A decision tool based on bilevel optimization for the allocation of water resources in a hierarchical system

This paper addresses the optimal allocation of water among competing stakeholders during a finite planning horizon. We focus on those water systems where there are two levels of decision making organized according to a hierarchical framework. At the upper level, a central authority allocates water to demand points having regard to environmental and sustainability issues as well as balancing water users' supply/demand. At the lower level of the hierarchy, demand point managers allocate water to users prioritizing economic strategies. On the other hand, when it comes to allocating limited resources that affect public welfare, the authority in charge can also use different political instruments such as fees to influence the decisions made at those levels of decision making that are not directly within its competence. We propose a multiobjective multifollower bilevel optimization problem that aims to fulfill the central authority goals while including the reaction of the demand point managers in terms of optimization problems as constraints. Using the well-known Karush–Kuhn–Tucker approach, we transform the bilevel model into an equivalent multiobjective mixed-integer single-level model for which we provide tight big-M values. For the purpose of showing the versatility of the model, extensive computational experiments on a set of instances have been carried out. The results show that the optimization problem can be solved to optimality in small computing times using off-the-shelf mixed-integer solvers even for complex water systems and long planning periods. In addition, they illustrate the effect of imposing fees on the achievement of the central authority's objectives

Necessary Conditions in Multiobjective Optimization With Equilibrium Constraints

In this paper we study multiobjective optimization problems with equilibrium constraints (MOECs) described by generalized equations in the form 0 is an element of the set G(x,y) + Q(x,y), where both mappings G and Q are set-valued. Such models particularly arise from certain optimization-related problems governed by variational inequalities and first-order optimality conditions in nondifferentiable programming. We establish verifiable necessary conditions for the general problems under consideration and for their important specifications using modern tools of variational analysis and generalized differentiation. The application of the obtained necessary optimality conditions is illustrated by a numerical example from bilevel programming with convex while nondifferentiable data