The Effect Of Buyer Governance Structures On Performance: Contextual Effects Of Interfirm Benevolence

Researchers identify two types of organizational governance: unilateral governance and bilateral governance. Although interfirm governance is at the core of interfirm relationships, little research exists on mechanisms that strengthen the weak spots in the dynamics of interfirm governance and multiple governance structures. This study introduces the concept of interfirm benevolence, and attempts to enhance our understanding of the conditions under which buyers rely on interfirm governance. The results indicate that the interfirm governance practices of a buyer tend to produce higher levels of supplier performance when a supplier trusts in the benevolence of the buyer. Also, this study shows that when a benevolent buyer uses both unilateral and bilateral governance simultaneously, suppliers perform positively.

Governance of the Agri-food Chains as a Vector of Credibility for Quality Signalization in Europe

For many agricultural products, the quality of the final products strongly depends on different stages of the productive chain. This stresses the importance of relationships between quality signal owners and suppliers in the vertical chain. Based on a New Institutional Economics analysis, the goal of this paper is twofold: (i) to design a framework to study the links between quality signaling, coordination in the supply chains and the institutional environment, (ii) to conduct a comparative analysis to identify, compare and explain the modes of organization implemented for the governance of different quality signs. The general hypothesis is that, in order to assure the credibility of a quality signal, there must be an efficient alignment between quality characteristics and governance of the supply chain. To test this general hypothesis, we have conducted a comparative analysis of 42 case studies in 3 sectors (processed meat, cheese, fruit and vegetable sectors) from 7 European countries. This diversity allows us to compare the organizations designed to govern different quality signals in different institutional environments and to test the matching between quality signals and governance structures.alignment, credibility, governance structures, quality signals, Agribusiness, L14, L15, L22,

Understanding the Barriers to the Assimilation of Interorganizational Technologies in Channel Relationships

Organizations are increasingly focusing on their value chain activities in an effort to improve their performance, especially in the recent economic times. Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of their channel activities has become a focal point for many organizations. Interorganizational systems (IOS’s) have played an important part in this effort. While in theory, IOS’s have the ability to enhance the degree of cooperation and coordination between two channel partners, often the results obtained are not what is expected. Hence, it becomes very important to understand the barriers to the assimilation of these technologies. Drawing upon theoretical perspectives of governance, including transaction cost analysis (TCA), control theory and agency theory, we develop an integrative model that examines the factors that influence an organizations assimilation process. The model identifies and examines three stages of assimilation: technological, exploitive and explorative assimilation that add value to an organization. The model features asset specificity, technological uncertainty, performance documentation, agent orientation and bilateral governance mechanisms as antecedents to assimilation. It also examines the moderating effects of bilateral mechanisms. Our results suggest that theories of governance provide an additional lens to examine assimilation phenomena. In specific, our empirical analysis leads to several key findings: (1) channel partners who are locked in to the relationship with high levels of asset specificity are more likely to assimilate the technology; (2) bilateral governance mechanisms are a key force in the assimilation process, with both direct and moderated effects; (3) organizations that view the channel partner as an agent of the firm are less likely to adopt the technology, especially when the relationship exhibits low levels of bilateral governance mechanisms. Together these findings provide new insights into barriers to the assimilation of IOS’s in channel relationships

Sugar Supply Chains and Regional Development

The coastal Queensland regions are heavily dependent upon the sugar industry and are likely to remain so. The interplay between sugar industry and regional development is little understood beyond the historical record. Yet current reform proposals place great store on regional initiatives to rejuvenate both sugar and its host communities. Such proposals are at best naïve as will be seen in this paper. A key feature of sugar and like industries is a high degree of supply chain interdependence which is embedded in place and time. Reflecting this, sugar regions have a more diverse skills mix and a more advanced manufacturing and services capability than many other agriculturally-oriented regions, notably broadacre grain and beef. Central to the emergence of such a regional industrial structure are inter-industry transactions. These will be considered in both an input-output framework and from a transactions cost basis. Associated insights point to the inadequacy and likely failure of initiatives based on current “efficiency/productivity‿ thinking. Alternative ways to view the industry are discussed along with a recommendation that those involved with sugar regionally revisit current plans

Competence, specificity and outsourcing: impact on the complexity of the contract

This paper focuses on the link between the three types of specificity and the complexity of outsourcing contracts because specificity is generally considered as the most important transaction cost attribute. It also integrates external uncertainty in the model. External uncertainty is a multidimensional concept that reflects the lack of knowledge about events that may take place in the environmentoutsourcing; transaction cost economics; resource-based view; contracts; partial least squares

Bilateral, Collective, or Both? Formal Governance and Performance in Multisourcing

While multisourcing offers benefits such as access to best-of-breed resources and enhanced competition, it also presents clients with a new governance challenge, namely the need to ensure that vendors not only deliver their individual contributions but also collaborate to produce a coherent joint outcome. Clients may address this challenge by combining bilateral governance focused on each vendor’s individual performance with collective governance aimed at the vendors’ joint performance. However, it is unclear how the simultaneous application of bilateral and collective governance affects multisourcing performance. Indeed, the literature falls short in systematically differentiating these governance mechanisms and empirically examining their interplay. Drawing on existing work on multisourcing and on the outsourcing governance literature, we argue that bilateral and collective governance direct efforts towards different performance dimensions (individual vs. joint), invoke different metaphors (market vs. team), and promote conflicting norms (competitive vs. cooperative), which can result in trade-offs when bilateral and collective governance mechanisms are combined. Results from a survey of 189 multisourcing arrangements support our expectation that bilateral and collective governance promote different performance dimensions. Notably, one collective governance mechanism, conflict management procedures, contributes to both individual and joint performance. We find substitutional effects between bilateral and collective governance in relation to joint performance but not individual performance, indicating that the benefits of collective governance for joint performance are more easily compromised than the benefits of bilateral governance for individual performance. We also observe complementary effects within collective governance mechanisms. Our key contribution lies in theorizing and empirically examining the effects and interplay of bilateral and collective governance in multisourcing

Bilateral, Collective, or Both? Formal Governance and Performance in Multisourcing

While multisourcing offers benefits such as access to best-of-breed resources and enhanced competition, it also presents clients with a new governance challenge, namely the need to ensure that vendors not only deliver their individual contributions but also collaborate to produce a coherent joint outcome. Clients can address this challenge by combining bilateral governance focused on each vendor’s individual performance with collective governance aimed at the vendors’ joint performance. However, it is unclear how the simultaneous application of bilateral and collective governance affects multisourcing performance. Indeed, the literature falls short in systematically differentiating these governance mechanisms and empirically examining their interplay. Drawing on existing work on multisourcing and on the outsourcing governance literature, we argue that bilateral and collective governance direct efforts toward different performance dimensions (individual vs. joint), invoke different metaphors (market vs. team), and promote conflicting norms (competitive vs. cooperative), which can result in trade-offs when bilateral and collective governance mechanisms are combined. Results from a survey of 189 multisourcing arrangements support our expectation that bilateral and collective governance promote different performance dimensions. Notably, one collective governance mechanism, conflict management procedures, contributes to both individual and joint performance. We find substitutional effects between bilateral and collective governance in relation to joint performance but not individual performance, indicating that the benefits of collective governance for joint performance are more easily compromised than the benefits of bilateral governance for individual performance. We also observe complementary effects within collective governance mechanisms. Our key contribution lies in theorizing and empirically examining the effects and interplay of bilateral and collective governance in multisourcing

Dynamic Co-Existence of Company-Owned and Franchised Outlets Within a Company: A Framework of the Franchisor\u27s Perspective

Why and how do company-owned and franchised outlets simultaneously exist within the same organization? The purpose of this article is to integrate a variety of theories on this interesting retail phenomenon into a broader theoretical framework based on the political-economy paradigm. This paper attempts to integrate the perspectives of several theories that previously have been considered competing models of a single reality--the access-to-capital viewpoint, transaction cost analysis, the population ecology perspective, and power-dependence-conflict arguments--into a broader perspective that utilizes intra-firmfactors and the internal and external economies and polities of the political-economy paradigm. A model depicting this integration is set forth and nineteen research propositions stemming from this model are proposed