Optimizing Your Online-Advertisement Asynchronously

We consider the problem of designing optimal online-ad investment strategies for a single advertiser, who invests at multiple sponsored search sites simultaneously, with the objective of maximizing his average revenue subject to the advertising budget constraint. A greedy online investment scheme is developed to achieve an average revenue that can be pushed to within $O(\epsilon)$ of the optimal, for any $\epsilon>0$, with a tradeoff that the temporal budget violation is $O(1/\epsilon)$. Different from many existing algorithms, our scheme allows the advertiser to \emph{asynchronously} update his investments on each search engine site, hence applies to systems where the timescales of action update intervals are heterogeneous for different sites. We also quantify the impact of inaccurate estimation of the system dynamics and show that the algorithm is robust against imperfect system knowledge

Multiplicative Bidding in Online Advertising

In this paper, we initiate the study of the multiplicative bidding language adopted by major Internet search companies. In multiplicative bidding, the effective bid on a particular search auction is the product of a base bid and bid adjustments that are dependent on features of the search (for example, the geographic location of the user, or the platform on which the search is conducted). We consider the task faced by the advertiser when setting these bid adjustments, and establish a foundational optimization problem that captures the core difficulty of bidding under this language. We give matching algorithmic and approximation hardness results for this problem; these results are against an information-theoretic bound, and thus have implications on the power of the multiplicative bidding language itself. Inspired by empirical studies of search engine price data, we then codify the relevant restrictions of the problem, and give further algorithmic and hardness results. Our main technical contribution is an $O(\log n)$-approximation for the case of multiplicative prices and monotone values. We also provide empirical validations of our problem restrictions, and test our algorithms on real data against natural benchmarks. Our experiments show that they perform favorably compared with the baseline.Comment: 25 pages; accepted to EC'1

Optimising Trade-offs Among Stakeholders in Ad Auctions

We examine trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctions. Our metrics are the revenue for the utility of the auctioneer, the number of clicks for the utility of the users and the welfare for the utility of the advertisers. We show how to optimize linear combinations of the stakeholder utilities, showing that these can be tackled through a GSP auction with a per-click reserve price. We then examine constrained optimization of stakeholder utilities. We use simulations and analysis of real-world sponsored search auction data to demonstrate the feasible trade-offs, examining the effect of changing the allowed number of ads on the utilities of the stakeholders. We investigate both short term effects, when the players do not have the time to modify their behavior, and long term equilibrium conditions. Finally, we examine a combinatorially richer constrained optimization problem, where there are several possible allowed configurations (templates) of ad formats. This model captures richer ad formats, which allow using the available screen real estate in various ways. We show that two natural generalizations of the GSP auction rules to this domain are poorly behaved, resulting in not having a symmetric Nash equilibrium or having one with poor welfare. We also provide positive results for restricted cases.Comment: 18 pages, 10 figures, ACM Conference on Economics and Computation 201

Online advertising: analysis of privacy threats and protection approaches

Online advertising, the pillar of the “free” content on the Web, has revolutionized the marketing business in recent years by creating a myriad of new opportunities for advertisers to reach potential customers. The current advertising model builds upon an intricate infrastructure composed of a variety of intermediary entities and technologies whose main aim is to deliver personalized ads. For this purpose, a wealth of user data is collected, aggregated, processed and traded behind the scenes at an unprecedented rate. Despite the enormous value of online advertising, however, the intrusiveness and ubiquity of these practices prompt serious privacy concerns. This article surveys the online advertising infrastructure and its supporting technologies, and presents a thorough overview of the underlying privacy risks and the solutions that may mitigate them. We first analyze the threats and potential privacy attackers in this scenario of online advertising. In particular, we examine the main components of the advertising infrastructure in terms of tracking capabilities, data collection, aggregation level and privacy risk, and overview the tracking and data-sharing technologies employed by these components. Then, we conduct a comprehensive survey of the most relevant privacy mechanisms, and classify and compare them on the basis of their privacy guarantees and impact on the Web.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft