5 research outputs found

    Belief Revision in Non-Monotonic Reasoning

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    this paper we first introduce the notion of a careful static expansion, a simple and yet powerful extension of the notion of a static expansion of belief theories, which enables us to incorporate belief revision into the framework of AEB. When applied to the above theory our approach results in two consistent careful static expansions. In one of them we believe that the battery is fine but possibly the tires are not, and, in the other we believe that the tires are fine but possibly the battery is dead. When taken together, the two expansion

    Belief Revision in Non-Monotonic Reasoning and Logic Programming

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    Belief Revision in Non-Monotonic Reasoning and Logic Programming

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    In order to be able to explicitly reason about beliefs, we've introduced a non-monotonic formalism, called the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs, AEB, obtained by augmenting classical propositional logic with a belief operator, B. For this language we've defined the static autoepistemic expansions semantics. The resulting nonmonotonic knowledge representation framework turned out to be rather simple and yet quite powerful. Moreover, it has some very natural properties which sharply contrast with those of Moore's AEL. While static expansions seem to provide a natural and intuitive semantics for many belief theories, and, in particular, for all affirmative belief theories (which include the class of all normal and disjunctive logic programs), they often can lead to inconsistent expansions for theories in which (subjective) beliefs clash with the known (objective) information or with some other beliefs. In particular, this applies to belief theories (and to logic programs) with strong or ..
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