(WP 2016-05) Hodgson, Cumulative Causation, and Reflexive Economic Agents

This paper examines Geoff Hodgson’s interpretation of Veblen in agency-structure terms, and argues it produces a conception of reflexive economic agents. It then sets out an account of cumulative causation processes using this reflexive agent conception, modeling them as a two-part causal process, one part involving a linear causal relation and one part involving a circular causal relation. The paper compares the reflexive agent conception to the standard expected utility conception of economic agents, and argues that on a cumulative causation view of the world the completeness assumption essential to the standard view of rationality cannot be applied. The final discussion addresses the nature of the choice behavior of reflexive economic agents, using the thinking of Amartya Sen and Herbert Simon to frame how agents might approach choice in regard to each of the two different parts of cumulative causal processes, and closing with brief comments on behavioral economics’ understanding of reference dependence and position adjustment

Successful Cessation Programs that Reduce Comorbidity May Explain Surprisingly Low Smoking Rates Among Hospitalized COVID-19 Patients

A recent, non-peer-reviewed meta-analysis suggests that smoking may reduce the risk of hospitalization with COVID-19 because the prevalence of smoking among hospitalized COVID-19 is less than that of the general population. However, there are alternative explanations for this phenomena based on (1) the failure to report, or accurately record, smoking history during emergency hospital admissions and (2) a pre-disposition to avoid smoking among COVID-19 patients with tobacco-related comorbidities (a type of “reverse” causation). For example, urine testing of hospitalized patients in Australia for cotinine showed that smokers were under-counted by 37% because incoming patients failed to inform staff about their smoking behavior. Face-to-face interviews can introduce bias into the responses to attitudinal and behavioral questions not present in the self-completion interviews typically used to measure smoking prevalence in the general population. Subjects in face-to-face interviews may be unwilling to admit socially undesirable behavior and attitudes under direct questioning. Reverse causation may also contribute to the difference between smoking prevalence in the COVID-19 and general population. Patients hospitalized with COVID-19 may be simply less prone to use tobacco than the general population. A potentially robust “reverse causation” hypothesis for reduced prevalence of smokers in the COVID-19 population is the enrichment of patients in that population with serious comorbidities that motivates them to quit smoking. We judge that this “smoking cessation” mechanism may account for a significant fraction of the reduced prevalence of smokers in the COVID-19 population. Testing this hypothesis will require a focused research program

Attribution of intentional causation influences the perception of observed movements: behavioral evidence and neural correlates

Recent research on human agency suggests that intentional causation is associated with a subjective compression in the temporal interval between actions and their effects. That is, intentional movements and their causal effects are perceived as closer together in time than equivalent unintentional movements and their causal effects. This so-called intentional binding effect is consistently found for one's own self-generated actions. It has also been suggested that intentional binding occurs when observing intentional movements of others. However, this evidence is undermined by limitations of the paradigm used. In the current study we aimed to overcome these limitations using a more rigorous design in combination with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to explore the neural underpinnings of intentional binding of observed movements. In particular, we aimed to identify brain areas sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causality attributed to the observed action. Our behavioral results confirmed the occurrence of intentional binding for observed movements using this more rigorous paradigm. Our fMRI results highlighted a collection of brain regions whose activity was sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causation. Intriguingly, these brain regions have previously been implicated in the sense of agency over one's own movements. We discuss the implications of these results for intentional binding specifically, and the sense of agency more generally

On Causal Relations between Mental Organizer, Action under Mental Processes, and Social Environment

The purpose of the research was to study the relationships between mental organizers, action under mental process, and social environment through observation. A category system for each behavior was constructed and data were analyzed with matrices to find out kinds of root causes in causal dynamic. Reliability, subjectivity, and validity of observation were assessed. The coefficient of reliability was 0.937. The observation had about 11% subjectivity, and the frequencies were in the categories where they should be, mainly. Results indicate that there occurs causal variety. The causes are not stable. As an entity, the results show that it is possible to tackle mind processes through the causation. Furthermore, the processes are in series but they drop by in a parallel mode when the task becomes more difficult. However, the mindamic seems to have the greatest possible number of the degrees of freedom, simultaneously

Measuring autonomy and emergence via Granger causality

Concepts of emergence and autonomy are central to artificial life and related cognitive and behavioral sciences. However, quantitative and easy-to-apply measures of these phenomena are mostly lacking. Here, I describe quantitative and practicable measures for both autonomy and emergence, based on the framework of multivariate autoregression and specifically Granger causality. G-autonomy measures the extent to which the knowing the past of a variable helps predict its future, as compared to predictions based on past states of external (environmental) variables. G-emergence measures the extent to which a process is both dependent upon and autonomous from its underlying causal factors. These measures are validated by application to agent-based models of predation (for autonomy) and flocking (for emergence). In the former, evolutionary adaptation enhances autonomy; the latter model illustrates not only emergence but also downward causation. I end with a discussion of relations among autonomy, emergence, and consciousness

Beliefs as inner causes: the (lack of) evidence

Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as patterns of living that contextualize behavior

Integration, Information Thresholds, and Arrangement in\ud Mindamic: A Probabilistic Causation Analysis

The objective of the research was to scrutinize probabilistic\ud causalities between integration, information thresholds, and\ud arrangement in mind dynamic. Data obtained from videotaped\ud sessions with structured observation. The participants had to\ud accomplish four tasks. The participants were 39 females, and 83\ud males. Reliability and validity assessed as probabilities. The\ud frequencies converted into probability matrices, and sampling\ud without replacement was necessary. Thereafter, a causal state\ud space originated, and maintained through Householder matrices.\ud The Bayes formula with joint distributions in a matrix form\ud applied to result in the start matrix for the causal dynamic.\ud The reduced start array matrix powered from 1 to 6. There are\ud the probabilistic causalities between the integration, the\ud thresholds, and the arrangement. Theoretic results show. It is\ud the entire mind of the persons strives to form patterns for the\ud causal functioning, continuously. Furthermore, the whole mind\ud conveys mental contents under the same patterns. The patterns\ud remain but the contents of the processes differ during the\ud mindamic