2 research outputs found
Designing the Game to Play: Optimizing Payoff Structure in Security Games
Effective game-theoretic modeling of defender-attacker behavior is becoming
increasingly important. In many domains, the defender functions not only as a
player but also the designer of the game's payoff structure. We study
Stackelberg Security Games where the defender, in addition to allocating
defensive resources to protect targets from the attacker, can strategically
manipulate the attacker's payoff under budget constraints in weighted L^p-norm
form regarding the amount of change. Focusing on problems with weighted
L^1-norm form constraint, we present (i) a mixed integer linear program-based
algorithm with approximation guarantee; (ii) a branch-and-bound based algorithm
with improved efficiency achieved by effective pruning; (iii) a polynomial time
approximation scheme for a special but practical class of problems. In
addition, we show that problems under budget constraints in L^0-norm form and
weighted L^\infty-norm form can be solved in polynomial time. We provide an
extensive experimental evaluation of our proposed algorithms