3 research outputs found
Bargaining for coalition structure formation
Many multiagent settings require a collection of agents
to partition themselves into coalitions. In such cases, the agents may
have conflicting preferences over the possible coalition structures
that may form. We investigate a noncooperative bargaining game to
allow the agents to resolve such conflicts and partition themselves
into non-overlapping coalitions. The game has a finite horizon and
is played over discrete time periods. The bargaining agenda is de-
fined exogenously. An important element of the game is a parameter
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 that represents the probability that bargaining ends
in a given round. Thus, δ is a measure of the degree of democracy
(ranging from democracy for δ = 0, through increasing levels of
authoritarianism as δ approaches 1, to dictatorship for δ = 1). For
this game, we focus on the question of how a player’s position on the
agenda affects his power. We also analyse the relation between the
distribution of the power of individual players, the level of democracy,
and the welfare efficiency of the game. Surprisingly, we find
that purely democratic games are welfare inefficient due to an uneven
distribution of power among the individual players. Interestingly,
introducing a degree of authoritarianism into the game makes
the distribution of power more equitable and maximizes welfare
Power and welfare in bargaining for coalition structure formation
We investigate a noncooperative bargaining game for partitioning n agents into non-overlapping coalitions. The game has n time periods during which the players are called according to an exogenous agenda to propose offers. With probability δ, the game ends during any time period t< n. If it does, the first t players on the agenda get a chance to propose but the others do not. Thus, δ is a measure of the degree of democracy within the game (ranging from democracy for δ= 0 , through increasing levels of authoritarianism as δ approaches 1, to dictatorship for δ= 1). We determine the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and study how a player’s position on the agenda affects his bargaining power. We analyze the relation between the distribution of power of individual players, the level of democracy, and the welfare efficiency of the game. We find that purely democratic games are welfare inefficient and that introducing a degree of authoritarianism into the game makes the distribution of power more equitable and also maximizes welfare. These results remain invariant under two types of player preferences: one where each player’s preference is a total order on the space of possible coalition structures and the other where each player either likes or dislikes a coalition structure. Finally, we show that the SPE partition may or may not be core stable
Power and welfare in bargaining for coalition structure formation
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-015-9310-8.We investigate a noncooperative bargaining game for partitioning n agents into non-overlapping coalitions. The game has n time periods during which the players are called according to an exogenous agenda to propose offers. With probability δ, the game ends during any time period t< n. If it does, the first t players on the agenda get a chance to propose but the others do not. Thus, δ is a measure of the degree of democracy within the game (ranging from democracy for δ= 0 , through increasing levels of authoritarianism as δ approaches 1, to dictatorship for δ= 1). We determine the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and study how a player’s position on the agenda affects his bargaining power. We analyze the relation between the distribution of power of individual players, the level of democracy, and the welfare efficiency of the game. We find that purely democratic games are welfare inefficient and that introducing a degree of authoritarianism into the game makes the distribution of power more equitable and also maximizes welfare. These results remain invariant under two types of player preferences: one where each player’s preference is a total order on the space of possible coalition structures and the other where each player either likes or dislikes a coalition structure. Finally, we show that the SPE partition may or may not be core stable