18 research outputs found
Bad Universal Priors and Notions of Optimality
A big open question of algorithmic information theory is the choice of the
universal Turing machine (UTM). For Kolmogorov complexity and Solomonoff
induction we have invariance theorems: the choice of the UTM changes bounds
only by a constant. For the universally intelligent agent AIXI (Hutter, 2005)
no invariance theorem is known. Our results are entirely negative: we discuss
cases in which unlucky or adversarial choices of the UTM cause AIXI to
misbehave drastically. We show that Legg-Hutter intelligence and thus balanced
Pareto optimality is entirely subjective, and that every policy is Pareto
optimal in the class of all computable environments. This undermines all
existing optimality properties for AIXI. While it may still serve as a gold
standard for AI, our results imply that AIXI is a relative theory, dependent on
the choice of the UTM.Comment: COLT 201
On the Computability of Solomonoff Induction and Knowledge-Seeking
Solomonoff induction is held as a gold standard for learning, but it is known
to be incomputable. We quantify its incomputability by placing various flavors
of Solomonoff's prior M in the arithmetical hierarchy. We also derive
computability bounds for knowledge-seeking agents, and give a limit-computable
weakly asymptotically optimal reinforcement learning agent.Comment: ALT 201
Universal Reinforcement Learning Algorithms: Survey and Experiments
Many state-of-the-art reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms typically assume
that the environment is an ergodic Markov Decision Process (MDP). In contrast,
the field of universal reinforcement learning (URL) is concerned with
algorithms that make as few assumptions as possible about the environment. The
universal Bayesian agent AIXI and a family of related URL algorithms have been
developed in this setting. While numerous theoretical optimality results have
been proven for these agents, there has been no empirical investigation of
their behavior to date. We present a short and accessible survey of these URL
algorithms under a unified notation and framework, along with results of some
experiments that qualitatively illustrate some properties of the resulting
policies, and their relative performance on partially-observable gridworld
environments. We also present an open-source reference implementation of the
algorithms which we hope will facilitate further understanding of, and
experimentation with, these ideas.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figures, Twenty-sixth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-17
Self-Modification of Policy and Utility Function in Rational Agents
Any agent that is part of the environment it interacts with and has versatile
actuators (such as arms and fingers), will in principle have the ability to
self-modify -- for example by changing its own source code. As we continue to
create more and more intelligent agents, chances increase that they will learn
about this ability. The question is: will they want to use it? For example,
highly intelligent systems may find ways to change their goals to something
more easily achievable, thereby `escaping' the control of their designers. In
an important paper, Omohundro (2008) argued that goal preservation is a
fundamental drive of any intelligent system, since a goal is more likely to be
achieved if future versions of the agent strive towards the same goal. In this
paper, we formalise this argument in general reinforcement learning, and
explore situations where it fails. Our conclusion is that the self-modification
possibility is harmless if and only if the value function of the agent
anticipates the consequences of self-modifications and use the current utility
function when evaluating the future.Comment: Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) 201
Intelligence via ultrafilters: structural properties of some intelligence comparators of deterministic Legg-Hutter agents
Legg and Hutter, as well as subsequent authors, considered intelligent agents through the lens of interaction with reward-giving environments, attempting to assign numeric intelligence measures to such agents, with the guiding principle that a more intelligent agent should gain higher rewards from environments in some aggregate sense. In this paper, we consider a related question: rather than measure numeric intelligence of one Legg- Hutter agent, how can we compare the relative intelligence of two Legg-Hutter agents? We propose an elegant answer based on the following insight: we can view Legg-Hutter agents as candidates in an election, whose voters are environments, letting each environment vote (via its rewards) which agent (if either) is more intelligent. This leads to an abstract family of comparators simple enough that we can prove some structural theorems about them. It is an open question whether these structural theorems apply to more practical intelligence measures
Extended subdomains: a solution to a problem of Hernández-Orallo and Dowe
This is a paper about the general theory of measuring or estimating social intelligence via benchmarks. Hernández-Orallo and Dowe described a problem with certain proposed intelligence measures. The problem suggests that those intelligence measures might not accurately capture social intelligence. We argue that Hernández-Orallo and Dowe's problem is even more general than how they stated it, applying to many subdomains of AGI, not just the one subdomain in which they stated it. We then propose a solution. In our solution, instead of using test-cases within the given AGI subdomain to estimate an AI's intelligence, one would use test-cases in an extended subdomain where test-cases have the ability to simulate the AI being tested. Surprisingly, AIs only designed for the original subdomain can be tested with test-cases in the extended subdomain anyway. By extending the subdomain in this way, we might avoid Hernández-Orallo and Dowe's problem