Bad Universal Priors and Notions of Optimality

A big open question of algorithmic information theory is the choice of the universal Turing machine (UTM). For Kolmogorov complexity and Solomonoff induction we have invariance theorems: the choice of the UTM changes bounds only by a constant. For the universally intelligent agent AIXI (Hutter, 2005) no invariance theorem is known. Our results are entirely negative: we discuss cases in which unlucky or adversarial choices of the UTM cause AIXI to misbehave drastically. We show that Legg-Hutter intelligence and thus balanced Pareto optimality is entirely subjective, and that every policy is Pareto optimal in the class of all computable environments. This undermines all existing optimality properties for AIXI. While it may still serve as a gold standard for AI, our results imply that AIXI is a relative theory, dependent on the choice of the UTM.Comment: COLT 201

On the Computability of Solomonoff Induction and Knowledge-Seeking

Solomonoff induction is held as a gold standard for learning, but it is known to be incomputable. We quantify its incomputability by placing various flavors of Solomonoff's prior M in the arithmetical hierarchy. We also derive computability bounds for knowledge-seeking agents, and give a limit-computable weakly asymptotically optimal reinforcement learning agent.Comment: ALT 201

Universal Reinforcement Learning Algorithms: Survey and Experiments

Many state-of-the-art reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms typically assume that the environment is an ergodic Markov Decision Process (MDP). In contrast, the field of universal reinforcement learning (URL) is concerned with algorithms that make as few assumptions as possible about the environment. The universal Bayesian agent AIXI and a family of related URL algorithms have been developed in this setting. While numerous theoretical optimality results have been proven for these agents, there has been no empirical investigation of their behavior to date. We present a short and accessible survey of these URL algorithms under a unified notation and framework, along with results of some experiments that qualitatively illustrate some properties of the resulting policies, and their relative performance on partially-observable gridworld environments. We also present an open-source reference implementation of the algorithms which we hope will facilitate further understanding of, and experimentation with, these ideas.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figures, Twenty-sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-17

Self-Modification of Policy and Utility Function in Rational Agents

Any agent that is part of the environment it interacts with and has versatile actuators (such as arms and fingers), will in principle have the ability to self-modify -- for example by changing its own source code. As we continue to create more and more intelligent agents, chances increase that they will learn about this ability. The question is: will they want to use it? For example, highly intelligent systems may find ways to change their goals to something more easily achievable, thereby `escaping' the control of their designers. In an important paper, Omohundro (2008) argued that goal preservation is a fundamental drive of any intelligent system, since a goal is more likely to be achieved if future versions of the agent strive towards the same goal. In this paper, we formalise this argument in general reinforcement learning, and explore situations where it fails. Our conclusion is that the self-modification possibility is harmless if and only if the value function of the agent anticipates the consequences of self-modifications and use the current utility function when evaluating the future.Comment: Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) 201

Intelligence via ultrafilters: structural properties of some intelligence comparators of deterministic Legg-Hutter agents

Legg and Hutter, as well as subsequent authors, considered intelligent agents through the lens of interaction with reward-giving environments, attempting to assign numeric intelligence measures to such agents, with the guiding principle that a more intelligent agent should gain higher rewards from environments in some aggregate sense. In this paper, we consider a related question: rather than measure numeric intelligence of one Legg- Hutter agent, how can we compare the relative intelligence of two Legg-Hutter agents? We propose an elegant answer based on the following insight: we can view Legg-Hutter agents as candidates in an election, whose voters are environments, letting each environment vote (via its rewards) which agent (if either) is more intelligent. This leads to an abstract family of comparators simple enough that we can prove some structural theorems about them. It is an open question whether these structural theorems apply to more practical intelligence measures

Extended subdomains: a solution to a problem of Hernández-Orallo and Dowe

This is a paper about the general theory of measuring or estimating social intelligence via benchmarks. Hernández-Orallo and Dowe described a problem with certain proposed intelligence measures. The problem suggests that those intelligence measures might not accurately capture social intelligence. We argue that Hernández-Orallo and Dowe's problem is even more general than how they stated it, applying to many subdomains of AGI, not just the one subdomain in which they stated it. We then propose a solution. In our solution, instead of using test-cases within the given AGI subdomain to estimate an AI's intelligence, one would use test-cases in an extended subdomain where test-cases have the ability to simulate the AI being tested. Surprisingly, AIs only designed for the original subdomain can be tested with test-cases in the extended subdomain anyway. By extending the subdomain in this way, we might avoid Hernández-Orallo and Dowe's problem