4,542 research outputs found
A Study of Truck Platooning Incentives Using a Congestion Game
We introduce an atomic congestion game with two types of agents, cars and
trucks, to model the traffic flow on a road over various time intervals of the
day. Cars maximize their utility by finding a trade-off between the time they
choose to use the road, the average velocity of the flow at that time, and the
dynamic congestion tax that they pay for using the road. In addition to these
terms, the trucks have an incentive for using the road at the same time as
their peers because they have platooning capabilities, which allow them to save
fuel. The dynamics and equilibria of this game-theoretic model for the
interaction between car traffic and truck platooning incentives are
investigated. We use traffic data from Stockholm to validate parts of the
modeling assumptions and extract reasonable parameters for the simulations. We
use joint strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play to
learn a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. We perform a comprehensive
simulation study to understand the influence of various factors, such as the
drivers' value of time and the percentage of the trucks that are equipped with
platooning devices, on the properties of the Nash equilibrium.Comment: Updated Introduction; Improved Literature Revie
Joint strategy fictitious play with inertia for potential games
We consider multi-player repeated games involving a large number of players with large strategy spaces and enmeshed utility structures. In these ldquolarge-scalerdquo games, players are inherently faced with limitations in both their observational and computational capabilities. Accordingly, players in large-scale games need to make their decisions using algorithms that accommodate limitations in information gathering and processing. This disqualifies some of the well known decision making models such as ldquoFictitious Playrdquo (FP), in which each player must monitor the individual actions of every other player and must optimize over a high dimensional probability space. We will show that Joint Strategy Fictitious Play (JSFP), a close variant of FP, alleviates both the informational and computational burden of FP. Furthermore, we introduce JSFP with inertia, i.e., a probabilistic reluctance to change strategies, and establish the convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium in all generalized ordinal potential games in both cases of averaged or exponentially discounted historical data. We illustrate JSFP with inertia on the specific class of congestion games, a subset of generalized ordinal potential games. In particular, we illustrate the main results on a distributed traffic routing problem and derive tolling procedures that can lead to optimized total traffic congestion
Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures
This document collects the lecture notes from my mini-course "Complexity
Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," taught at the Bellairs Research Institute
of McGill University, Holetown, Barbados, February 19--23, 2017, as the 29th
McGill Invitational Workshop on Computational Complexity.
The goal of this mini-course is twofold: (i) to explain how complexity theory
has helped illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory; and (ii)
to illustrate how game-theoretic questions have led to new and interesting
complexity theory, including recent several breakthroughs. It consists of two
five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and
computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures,
focusing on applications of complexity theory in game theory and economics. No
background in game theory is assumed.Comment: Revised v2 from December 2019 corrects some errors in and adds some
recent citations to v1 Revised v3 corrects a few typos in v
Sports attendance: A survey of the Literature 1973-2007
Introduction – 1. Theoretical aspects – 2. Demand definition, data andempirical model – 3. Determinants of attendance (I): Economical aspects – 4.Determinants of attendance (II): Expected quality – 5. Determinants of attendance(III): Uncertainty of outcome – 6. Determinants of attendance (IV): Opportunity cost and other factors – Conclusions – Abstract In this paper, we show a review of the empirical analysis literature about the factors that explain attendance to the stadiums on different sports, mainly in the case of professional sports. Apart from the traditional economic determinants of demand (attendance), the sports events in which the performers have more quality and in those which exists uncertainty of outcome of the match or the championship, have a larger number of spectators. On the other hand, these are not the only factors that explain attendance. Variables that capture the opportunity cost of going to the stadium and other determinants, like unobservable factors associated to the contender teams, also have relevance at the time of analyzing this side of the demand related to professional teams of sports eventsAttendance, elasticity, quality, uncertainty of outcome
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