3 research outputs found
Automatic verification of secrecy properties for linear logic specifications of cryptographic protocols
none2In this paper we investigate the applicability of a bottom-up evaluation strategy for a first-order
fragment of affine linear logic that we introduced in Theory Prac. Log. Program. 4 (2004) 1 for the
purposes of automated verification of secrecy in cryptographic protocols. Following the Proceedings
of the 12th Computer Security Foundations Workshop (1999) 55, we use multi-conclusion clauses to
represent the behaviour of agents in a protocol session, and we adopt the Dolev–Yao intruder model.
In addition, universal quantification provides a formal and declarative way to express creation of
nonces. Our approach is well suited to verifying properties which can be specified by means of
minimal conditions. Unlike traditional approaches based on model checking, we can reason about
parametric, infinite-state systems; thus we do not pose any limitation on the number of parallel runs
of a protocol. Furthermore, our approach can be used both to find attacks and to verify secrecy for
a protocol. We apply our method to analyse several classical examples of authentication protocols.
Among them we consider the ffgg protocol (Proceedings of the Workshop on Formal Methods and
Security Protocols (1999)). This protocol is a challenging case study in that it is free from sequential
attacks, whereas it suffers from parallel attacks that occur only when at least two sessions are run
in parallel. The other case studies are of the Otway–Rees protocol and several formulations of the
Needham–Schroeder protocol.G. DELZANNO; BOZZANO MDelzanno, Giorgio; Bozzano, M
Logical concepts in cryptography
This thesis is about a breadth-first exploration of logical concepts in cryptography and their linguistic abstraction and model-theoretic combination in a comprehensive logical system, called CPL (for Cryptographic Protocol Logic). We focus on two fundamental aspects of cryptography. Namely, the security of communication (as opposed to security of storage) and cryptographic protocols (as opposed to cryptographic operators). The primary logical concepts explored are the following: the modal concepts of belief, knowledge, norms, provability, space, and time. The distinguishing feature of CPL is that it unifies and refines a variety of existing approaches. This feature is the result of our wholistic conception of property-based (modal logics) and model-based (process algebra) formalisms