leave a trace - A People Tracking System Meets Anomaly Detection

Video surveillance always had a negative connotation, among others because of the loss of privacy and because it may not automatically increase public safety. If it was able to detect atypical (i.e. dangerous) situations in real time, autonomously and anonymously, this could change. A prerequisite for this is a reliable automatic detection of possibly dangerous situations from video data. This is done classically by object extraction and tracking. From the derived trajectories, we then want to determine dangerous situations by detecting atypical trajectories. However, due to ethical considerations it is better to develop such a system on data without people being threatened or even harmed, plus with having them know that there is such a tracking system installed. Another important point is that these situations do not occur very often in real, public CCTV areas and may be captured properly even less. In the artistic project leave a trace the tracked objects, people in an atrium of a institutional building, become actor and thus part of the installation. Visualisation in real-time allows interaction by these actors, which in turn creates many atypical interaction situations on which we can develop our situation detection. The data set has evolved over three years and hence, is huge. In this article we describe the tracking system and several approaches for the detection of atypical trajectories

A system for learning statistical motion patterns

Analysis of motion patterns is an effective approach for anomaly detection and behavior prediction. Current approaches for the analysis of motion patterns depend on known scenes, where objects move in predefined ways. It is highly desirable to automatically construct object motion patterns which reflect the knowledge of the scene. In this paper, we present a system for automatically learning motion patterns for anomaly detection and behavior prediction based on a proposed algorithm for robustly tracking multiple objects. In the tracking algorithm, foreground pixels are clustered using a fast accurate fuzzy k-means algorithm. Growing and prediction of the cluster centroids of foreground pixels ensure that each cluster centroid is associated with a moving object in the scene. In the algorithm for learning motion patterns, trajectories are clustered hierarchically using spatial and temporal information and then each motion pattern is represented with a chain of Gaussian distributions. Based on the learned statistical motion patterns, statistical methods are used to detect anomalies and predict behaviors. Our system is tested using image sequences acquired, respectively, from a crowded real traffic scene and a model traffic scene. Experimental results show the robustness of the tracking algorithm, the efficiency of the algorithm for learning motion patterns, and the encouraging performance of algorithms for anomaly detection and behavior prediction

A system for learning statistical motion patterns

Analysis of motion patterns is an effective approach for anomaly detection and behavior prediction. Current approaches for the analysis of motion patterns depend on known scenes, where objects move in predefined ways. It is highly desirable to automatically construct object motion patterns which reflect the knowledge of the scene. In this paper, we present a system for automatically learning motion patterns for anomaly detection and behavior prediction based on a proposed algorithm for robustly tracking multiple objects. In the tracking algorithm, foreground pixels are clustered using a fast accurate fuzzy k-means algorithm. Growing and prediction of the cluster centroids of foreground pixels ensure that each cluster centroid is associated with a moving object in the scene. In the algorithm for learning motion patterns, trajectories are clustered hierarchically using spatial and temporal information and then each motion pattern is represented with a chain of Gaussian distributions. Based on the learned statistical motion patterns, statistical methods are used to detect anomalies and predict behaviors. Our system is tested using image sequences acquired, respectively, from a crowded real traffic scene and a model traffic scene. Experimental results show the robustness of the tracking algorithm, the efficiency of the algorithm for learning motion patterns, and the encouraging performance of algorithms for anomaly detection and behavior prediction

Stealthy Deception Attacks Against SCADA Systems

SCADA protocols for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are vulnerable to network attacks such as session hijacking. Hence, research focuses on network anomaly detection based on meta--data (message sizes, timing, command sequence), or on the state values of the physical process. In this work we present a class of semantic network-based attacks against SCADA systems that are undetectable by the above mentioned anomaly detection. After hijacking the communication channels between the Human Machine Interface (HMI) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), our attacks cause the HMI to present a fake view of the industrial process, deceiving the human operator into taking manual actions. Our most advanced attack also manipulates the messages generated by the operator's actions, reversing their semantic meaning while causing the HMI to present a view that is consistent with the attempted human actions. The attacks are totaly stealthy because the message sizes and timing, the command sequences, and the data values of the ICS's state all remain legitimate. We implemented and tested several attack scenarios in the test lab of our local electric company, against a real HMI and real PLCs, separated by a commercial-grade firewall. We developed a real-time security assessment tool, that can simultaneously manipulate the communication to multiple PLCs and cause the HMI to display a coherent system--wide fake view. Our tool is configured with message-manipulating rules written in an ICS Attack Markup Language (IAML) we designed, which may be of independent interest. Our semantic attacks all successfully fooled the operator and brought the system to states of blackout and possible equipment damage