29,332 research outputs found
Automated Dynamic Firmware Analysis at Scale: A Case Study on Embedded Web Interfaces
Embedded devices are becoming more widespread, interconnected, and
web-enabled than ever. However, recent studies showed that these devices are
far from being secure. Moreover, many embedded systems rely on web interfaces
for user interaction or administration. Unfortunately, web security is known to
be difficult, and therefore the web interfaces of embedded systems represent a
considerable attack surface.
In this paper, we present the first fully automated framework that applies
dynamic firmware analysis techniques to achieve, in a scalable manner,
automated vulnerability discovery within embedded firmware images. We apply our
framework to study the security of embedded web interfaces running in
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) embedded devices, such as routers, DSL/cable
modems, VoIP phones, IP/CCTV cameras. We introduce a methodology and implement
a scalable framework for discovery of vulnerabilities in embedded web
interfaces regardless of the vendor, device, or architecture. To achieve this
goal, our framework performs full system emulation to achieve the execution of
firmware images in a software-only environment, i.e., without involving any
physical embedded devices. Then, we analyze the web interfaces within the
firmware using both static and dynamic tools. We also present some interesting
case-studies, and discuss the main challenges associated with the dynamic
analysis of firmware images and their web interfaces and network services. The
observations we make in this paper shed light on an important aspect of
embedded devices which was not previously studied at a large scale.
We validate our framework by testing it on 1925 firmware images from 54
different vendors. We discover important vulnerabilities in 185 firmware
images, affecting nearly a quarter of vendors in our dataset. These
experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach
Do not trust me: Using malicious IdPs for analyzing and attacking Single Sign-On
Single Sign-On (SSO) systems simplify login procedures by using an an
Identity Provider (IdP) to issue authentication tokens which can be consumed by
Service Providers (SPs). Traditionally, IdPs are modeled as trusted third
parties. This is reasonable for SSO systems like Kerberos, MS Passport and
SAML, where each SP explicitely specifies which IdP he trusts. However, in open
systems like OpenID and OpenID Connect, each user may set up his own IdP, and a
discovery phase is added to the protocol flow. Thus it is easy for an attacker
to set up its own IdP. In this paper we use a novel approach for analyzing SSO
authentication schemes by introducing a malicious IdP. With this approach we
evaluate one of the most popular and widely deployed SSO protocols - OpenID. We
found four novel attack classes on OpenID, which were not covered by previous
research, and show their applicability to real-life implementations. As a
result, we were able to compromise 11 out of 16 existing OpenID implementations
like Sourceforge, Drupal and ownCloud. We automated discovery of these attacks
in a open source tool OpenID Attacker, which additionally allows fine-granular
testing of all parameters in OpenID implementations. Our research helps to
better understand the message flow in the OpenID protocol, trust assumptions in
the different components of the system, and implementation issues in OpenID
components. It is applicable to other SSO systems like OpenID Connect and SAML.
All OpenID implementations have been informed about their vulnerabilities and
we supported them in fixing the issues
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