Open semantic service networks

Online service marketplaces will soon be part of the economy to scale the provision of specialized multi-party services through automation and standardization. Current research, such as the *-USDL service description language family, is already defining the basic building blocks to model the next generation of business services. Nonetheless, the developments being made do not target to interconnect services via service relationships. Without the concept of relationship, marketplaces will be seen as mere functional silos containing service descriptions. Yet, in real economies, all services are related and connected. Therefore, to address this gap we introduce the concept of open semantic service network (OSSN), concerned with the establishment of rich relationships between services. These networks will provide valuable knowledge on the global service economy, which can be exploited for many socio-economic and scientific purposes such as service network analysis, management, and control

Co-ordination and Lock-in: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects

Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in effciency, and gives vendors lucrative ex post market power-over the same buyer in the case of switching costs (or brand loyalty), or over others with network effects. Firms compete ex ante for this ex post power, using penetration pricing, introductory offers, and price wars. Such "competition for the market" or "life-cycle competition" can adequately replace ordinary compatible competition, and can even be fiercer than compatible competition by weakening differentiation. More often, however, incompatible competition not only involves direct effciency losses but also softens competition and magnifies incumbency advantages. With network effects, established firms have little incentive to offer better deals when buyers’ and complementors’ expectations hinge on non-effciency factors (especially history such as past market shares), and although competition between incompatible networks is initially unstable and sensitive to competitive offers and random events, it later "tips" to monopoly, after which entry is hard, often even too hard given incompatibility. And while switching costs can encourage small-scale entry, they discourage sellers from raiding one another’s existing customers, and s also discourage more aggressive entry. Because of these competitive effects, even ineffcient incompatible competition is often more profitable than compatible competition, especially for dominant rms with installed-base or expectational advantages. Thus firms probably seek incompatibility too often. We therefore favor thoughtfully pro-compatibility public policy.

Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1

This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing

Negotiating over Bundles and Prices Using Aggregate Knowledge

Combining two or more items and selling them as one good, a practice called bundling, can be a very effective strategy for reducing the costs of producing, marketing, and selling goods. In this paper, we consider a form of multi-issue negotiation where a shop negotiates both the contents and the price of bundles of goods with his customers. We present some key insights about, as well as a technique for, locating mutually beneficial alternatives to the bundle currently under negotiation. The essence of our approach lies in combining historical sales data, condensed into aggregate knowledge, with current data about the ongoing negotiation process, to exploit these insights. In particular, when negotiating a given bundle of goods with a customer, the shop analyzes the sequence of the customer's offers to determine the progress in the negotiation process. In addition, it uses aggregate knowledge concerning customers' valuations of goods in general. We show how the shop can use these two sources of data to locate promising alternatives to the current bundle. When the current negotiation's progress slows down, the shop may suggest the most promising of those alternatives and, depending on the customer's response, continue negotiating about the alternative bundle, or propose another alternative. Extensive computer simulation experiments show that our approach increases the speed with which deals are reached, as well as the number and quality of the deals reached, as compared to a benchmark. In addition, we show that the performance of our system is robust to a variety of changes in the negotiation strategies employed by the customers.Comment: 15 pages, 7 eps figures, Springer llncs documentclass. Extended version of the paper published in "E-Commerce and Web Technologies," Kurt Bauknecht, Martin Bichler and Birgit Pr\"{o}ll (eds.). Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 3182, Berlin: Springer, p. 218--22

A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS

The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing

Market Concentration Implications of Foundation Models

We analyze the structure of the market for foundation models, i.e., large AI models such as those that power ChatGPT and that are adaptable to downstream uses, and we examine the implications for competition policy and regulation. We observe that the most capable models will have a tendency towards natural monopoly and may have potentially vast markets. This calls for a two-pronged regulatory response: (i) Antitrust authorities need to ensure the contestability of the market by tackling strategic behavior, in particular by ensuring that monopolies do not propagate vertically to downstream uses, and (ii) given the diminished potential for market discipline, there is a role for regulators to ensure that the most capable models meet sufficient quality standards (including safety, privacy, non-discrimination, reliability and interoperability standards) to maximally contribute to social welfare. Regulators should also ensure a level regulatory playing field between AI and non-AI applications in all sectors of the economy. For models that are behind the frontier, we expect competition to be quite intense, implying a more limited role for competition policy, although a role for regulation remains.Comment: Working Pape

Challenges of transformation:Innovation, re-bundling and traditional manufacturing in Canada’s Technology Triangle

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Regional Studies on Oct 2011, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00343404.2011.602058This paper develops a perspective of regional re-bundling in overcoming economic crises. It does this by focusing on the effects of the recent global financial crisis on traditional manufacturing. It analyses the structure of innovation processes and their development over time in Canada's Technology Triangle – a region known for university-related spin-off processes and successful modernization. What is less well known is that this region has been strongly influenced by traditional manufacturing industries. It is shown that these industries have been well prepared to deal with the effects of the crisis due to ongoing innovation and diversification stimulated by prior economic crises

The prospects for smart energy prices: observations from 50 years of residential pricing for fixed line telecoms and electricity

This study focuses on how energy and communications have evolved over the last 50 years and what we can learn from history in order to examine the prospects for smart energy pricing by 2050. We begin by discussing the nature of energy and telecoms products and why price discrimination should be expected. We then review various business and pricing strategies that have evolved in the two industries. We find that business models for both the telecoms and energy sectors have changed from the traditional services business model (i.e., offering of calls and messages for telecoms, and utility supply services for energy) to more dynamic, integrated and complex business models. These new business models include the managed services provider model, the bundled services model, and the prosumer business model, among others. Similarly, several changes in pricing structure have evolved. There has been a reduction in the number of distanced-based and increasing time-based price differentiation in fixed line telecoms and the abolition of residential floor area-based differentiation in electricity pricing. We conclude with a discussion on how the rollout of the next generation of electricity meters (smart and advanced meters) may further shape electricity pricing in the future

E-COMMERCE IN AGRICULTURE: DEVELOPMENT, STRATEGY, AND MARKET IMPLICATIONS

Marketing,