1,689 research outputs found
The Case for Liberal Spectrum Licenses: A Technical and Economic Perspective
The traditional system of radio spectrum allocation has inefficiently restricted wireless services. Alternatively, liberal licenses ceding de facto spectrum ownership rights yield incentives for operators to maximize airwave value. These authorizations have been widely used for mobile services in the U.S. and internationally, leading to the development of highly productive services and waves of innovation in technology, applications and business models. Serious challenges to the efficacy of such a spectrum regime have arisen, however. Seeing the widespread adoption of such devices as cordless phones and wi-fi radios using bands set aside for unlicensed use, some scholars and policy makers posit that spectrum sharing technologies have become cheap and easy to deploy, mitigating airwave scarcity and, therefore, the utility of exclusive rights. This paper evaluates such claims technically and economically. We demonstrate that spectrum scarcity is alive and well. Costly conflicts over airwave use not only continue, but have intensified with scientific advances that dramatically improve the functionality of wireless devices and so increase demand for spectrum access. Exclusive ownership rights help direct spectrum inputs to where they deliver the highest social gains, making exclusive property rules relatively more socially valuable. Liberal licenses efficiently accommodate rival business models (including those commonly associated with unlicensed spectrum allocations) while mitigating the constraints levied on spectrum use by regulators imposing restrictions in traditional licenses or via use rules and technology standards in unlicensed spectrum allocations.
Mobile Telephony: Economic and Social Impact
The ubiquitous cell phone is often portrayed as the scourge of civilized society: rude callers on streets, in malls and offices, disturbing those around them with loud talking, school kids constantly texting in class, drivers whose attention has wandered during a cell phone conversation causing accidents, “crackberry” addicts who check their e-mail during real-world conversations, the list goes on. Is this an invention whose result has been to make us all worse off, like Internet spam and phishing attacks? In this paper, I informally survey the rise and impact of cellular technology, both in the US and the world. I find that the reach and the speed of its worldwide diffusion has exceeded even that of the Internet, and certainly with far more reach and speed than the personal computer. Mobile’s economic and social impact has been unprecedented, especially in the developing world where it has been a boon to economic development. While many in the US focus on expanding the diffusion of the PC both domestically and worldwide, as well as expanding the availability of broadband connectivity, I argue that while PC-broadband architecture will continue to be important, the terminal device of choice for most people on this planet will be the mobile, accessing information services over a wireless connection. Mobile telephony is, I believe, the highest impact communications technology of the last 50 years, rivaled only by the Internet.
Complementarities and Collusion in an FCC Spectrum Auction
We empirically study bidding in the C Block of the US mobile phone spectrum auctions. Spectrum auctions are conducted using a simultaneous ascending auction design that allows bidders to assemble packages of licenses with geographic complementarities. While this auction design allows the market to find complementarities, the auction might also result in an inefficient equilibrium. In addition, these auctions have equilibria where implicit collusion is sustained through threats of bidding wars. We estimate a structural model in order to test for the presence of complementarities and implicit collusion. The estimation strategy is valid under a wide variety of alternative assumptions about equilibrium in these auctions and is robust to potentially important forms of unobserved heterogeneity. We make suggestions about the design of future spectrum auctions.Technology and Industry
Telecommunications Technologies: Deployment in Developing Countries
This paper examines some policies pursued in developing countries for the provision of telecommunications services in rural areas. These policies significantly differ from those typically implemented in developed countries in their fundamental objectives, the technological strategies deployed and the market and institutional environments they rest on. A review of some representative experiences suggests that thinking about public utility reforms in this part of the world is quite a challenging exercise. We point out some economic and institutional characteristics of these countries that we believe normative analysis of the reforms should explicitly take into accountTelecommunications; Developing Countries; Universal Access
Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges
Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of
smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously
possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the
users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is
paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation.
In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for
participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing
incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently
discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally,
we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in
participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201
Consolidation in the Wireless Phone Industry
The initial wireless phone industry in the United States had many
competitors, but due to mergers and acquisitions the industry has become
highly consolidated. This paper documents the history of the
consolidation. More importantly, I use the geographic path of
consolidation to distinguish whether consolidation has been motived by
retail market power or efficiency explanations. One efficiency
explanation is that consumers prefer national coverage areas. I use data
on roaming agreements in the early cellular industry to analyze whether
contracts can substitute for roaming agreements. Finally, in joint work
with Patrick Bajari and Stephen Ryan we estimate the consumer valuation
for national coverage areas using plan demand data
Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity OF Ronald Coase.
In the Federal Communications Commission, Ronald Coase (1959) exposed deep foundations via normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation. The government controlled scarce frequencies, issuing sharply limited use rights. Spillovers were said to be otherwise endemic. Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners perform an analogous function via the "price system." The government solution was inefficient unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower. Coase augured that the price system would outperform the administrative allocation system. His spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications policy experts, opposed by industry interests, and ridiculed by policy makers. Hence, it took until July 25, 1994 for FCC license sales to commence. Today, some 73 U.S. auctions have been held, 27,484 licenses sold, and 17 billion in U.S. welfare losses have been averted. Not bad for the first 50 years of this, or any, Article appearing in Volume II of the Journal of Law & Economics.
Using Laboratory Experiments For Policy Making: An Example From The Georgia Irrigation Reduction Auction
In April 2000, the Georgia legislature passed a law requiring that the state use an unspecified "auction-like process" to pay some farmers to suspend irrigation in declared drought years. In response, we conducted a series of laboratory and field experiments to test a variety of auction procedures. This paper reports the results of these experiments, and how they were used by the policy makers who determined the auction procedures. Experimental results are compared with farmers' bidding behavior in the state-run irrigation auction conducted in March 2001. Working Paper # 2002-00
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