Physical Adversarial Attack meets Computer Vision: A Decade Survey

Although Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have achieved impressive results in computer vision, their exposed vulnerability to adversarial attacks remains a serious concern. A series of works has shown that by adding elaborate perturbations to images, DNNs could have catastrophic degradation in performance metrics. And this phenomenon does not only exist in the digital space but also in the physical space. Therefore, estimating the security of these DNNs-based systems is critical for safely deploying them in the real world, especially for security-critical applications, e.g., autonomous cars, video surveillance, and medical diagnosis. In this paper, we focus on physical adversarial attacks and provide a comprehensive survey of over 150 existing papers. We first clarify the concept of the physical adversarial attack and analyze its characteristics. Then, we define the adversarial medium, essential to perform attacks in the physical world. Next, we present the physical adversarial attack methods in task order: classification, detection, and re-identification, and introduce their performance in solving the trilemma: effectiveness, stealthiness, and robustness. In the end, we discuss the current challenges and potential future directions.Comment: 32 pages. Under Revie

Adversarial Examples in the Physical World: A Survey

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated high vulnerability to adversarial examples. Besides the attacks in the digital world, the practical implications of adversarial examples in the physical world present significant challenges and safety concerns. However, current research on physical adversarial examples (PAEs) lacks a comprehensive understanding of their unique characteristics, leading to limited significance and understanding. In this paper, we address this gap by thoroughly examining the characteristics of PAEs within a practical workflow encompassing training, manufacturing, and re-sampling processes. By analyzing the links between physical adversarial attacks, we identify manufacturing and re-sampling as the primary sources of distinct attributes and particularities in PAEs. Leveraging this knowledge, we develop a comprehensive analysis and classification framework for PAEs based on their specific characteristics, covering over 100 studies on physical-world adversarial examples. Furthermore, we investigate defense strategies against PAEs and identify open challenges and opportunities for future research. We aim to provide a fresh, thorough, and systematic understanding of PAEs, thereby promoting the development of robust adversarial learning and its application in open-world scenarios.Comment: Adversarial examples, physical-world scenarios, attacks and defense

Towards Generic and Controllable Attacks Against Object Detection

Existing adversarial attacks against Object Detectors (ODs) suffer from two inherent limitations. Firstly, ODs have complicated meta-structure designs, hence most advanced attacks for ODs concentrate on attacking specific detector-intrinsic structures, which makes it hard for them to work on other detectors and motivates us to design a generic attack against ODs. Secondly, most works against ODs make Adversarial Examples (AEs) by generalizing image-level attacks from classification to detection, which brings redundant computations and perturbations in semantically meaningless areas (e.g., backgrounds) and leads to an emergency for seeking controllable attacks for ODs. To this end, we propose a generic white-box attack, LGP (local perturbations with adaptively global attacks), to blind mainstream object detectors with controllable perturbations. For a detector-agnostic attack, LGP tracks high-quality proposals and optimizes three heterogeneous losses simultaneously. In this way, we can fool the crucial components of ODs with a part of their outputs without the limitations of specific structures. Regarding controllability, we establish an object-wise constraint that exploits foreground-background separation adaptively to induce the attachment of perturbations to foregrounds. Experimentally, the proposed LGP successfully attacked sixteen state-of-the-art object detectors on MS-COCO and DOTA datasets, with promising imperceptibility and transferability obtained. Codes are publicly released in https://github.com/liguopeng0923/LGP.gi

Physical Adversarial Attacks for Surveillance: A Survey

Modern automated surveillance techniques are heavily reliant on deep learning methods. Despite the superior performance, these learning systems are inherently vulnerable to adversarial attacks - maliciously crafted inputs that are designed to mislead, or trick, models into making incorrect predictions. An adversary can physically change their appearance by wearing adversarial t-shirts, glasses, or hats or by specific behavior, to potentially avoid various forms of detection, tracking and recognition of surveillance systems; and obtain unauthorized access to secure properties and assets. This poses a severe threat to the security and safety of modern surveillance systems. This paper reviews recent attempts and findings in learning and designing physical adversarial attacks for surveillance applications. In particular, we propose a framework to analyze physical adversarial attacks and provide a comprehensive survey of physical adversarial attacks on four key surveillance tasks: detection, identification, tracking, and action recognition under this framework. Furthermore, we review and analyze strategies to defend against the physical adversarial attacks and the methods for evaluating the strengths of the defense. The insights in this paper present an important step in building resilience within surveillance systems to physical adversarial attacks

TransCAB: Transferable Clean-Annotation Backdoor to Object Detection with Natural Trigger in Real-World

Object detection is the foundation of various critical computer-vision tasks such as segmentation, object tracking, and event detection. To train an object detector with satisfactory accuracy, a large amount of data is required. However, due to the intensive workforce involved with annotating large datasets, such a data curation task is often outsourced to a third party or relied on volunteers. This work reveals severe vulnerabilities of such data curation pipeline. We propose MACAB that crafts clean-annotated images to stealthily implant the backdoor into the object detectors trained on them even when the data curator can manually audit the images. We observe that the backdoor effect of both misclassification and the cloaking are robustly achieved in the wild when the backdoor is activated with inconspicuously natural physical triggers. Backdooring non-classification object detection with clean-annotation is challenging compared to backdooring existing image classification tasks with clean-label, owing to the complexity of having multiple objects within each frame, including victim and non-victim objects. The efficacy of the MACAB is ensured by constructively i abusing the image-scaling function used by the deep learning framework, ii incorporating the proposed adversarial clean image replica technique, and iii combining poison data selection criteria given constrained attacking budget. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MACAB exhibits more than 90% attack success rate under various real-world scenes. This includes both cloaking and misclassification backdoor effect even restricted with a small attack budget. The poisoned samples cannot be effectively identified by state-of-the-art detection techniques.The comprehensive video demo is at https://youtu.be/MA7L_LpXkp4, which is based on a poison rate of 0.14% for YOLOv4 cloaking backdoor and Faster R-CNN misclassification backdoor

Visually Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in the Physical World: A Survey

Although Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been widely applied in various real-world scenarios, they are vulnerable to adversarial examples. The current adversarial attacks in computer vision can be divided into digital attacks and physical attacks according to their different attack forms. Compared with digital attacks, which generate perturbations in the digital pixels, physical attacks are more practical in the real world. Owing to the serious security problem caused by physically adversarial examples, many works have been proposed to evaluate the physically adversarial robustness of DNNs in the past years. In this paper, we summarize a survey versus the current physically adversarial attacks and physically adversarial defenses in computer vision. To establish a taxonomy, we organize the current physical attacks from attack tasks, attack forms, and attack methods, respectively. Thus, readers can have a systematic knowledge of this topic from different aspects. For the physical defenses, we establish the taxonomy from pre-processing, in-processing, and post-processing for the DNN models to achieve full coverage of the adversarial defenses. Based on the above survey, we finally discuss the challenges of this research field and further outlook on the future direction