710 research outputs found
On Linear Congestion Games with Altruistic Social Context
We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in
linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in the spirit of the
model recently proposed by de Keijzer {\em et al.} \cite{DSAB13}. In such a
framework, given a real matrix specifying a particular
social context, each player aims at optimizing a linear combination of the
payoffs of all the players in the game, where, for each player , the
multiplicative coefficient is given by the value . We give a broad
characterization of the social contexts for which pure Nash equilibria are
always guaranteed to exist and provide tight or almost tight bounds on their
prices of anarchy and stability. In some of the considered cases, our
achievements either improve or extend results previously known in the
literature
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A Tracing Method for Pricing Inter-Area Electricity Trades
In the context of liberalisation of electricity markets world wide, the need for agreed protocols for electricity trades between systems with different charges poses a special challenge. System operators need to know how much a given trade uses the network, in order to allocate an appropriate portion of their costs to that trade. This paper discusses a technique, tracing, for determining how much each of a number of trades uses different parts of the electricity network. The scheme is based on the assumption that at any network node, inflows are shared proportionally between outflows (and vice versa). The paper outlines the technique and shows how it could be applied to the problem of charging cross-border trades. The paper goes on to demonstrate that the technique has a game theoretic rationale, in that it produces the Shapley value solution to a game equivalent to this allocation problem
The Quality of Equilibria for Set Packing Games
We introduce set packing games as an abstraction of situations in which
selfish players select subsets of a finite set of indivisible items, and
analyze the quality of several equilibria for this class of games. Assuming
that players are able to approximately play equilibrium strategies, we show
that the total quality of the resulting equilibrium solutions is only
moderately suboptimal. Our results are tight bounds on the price of anarchy for
three equilibrium concepts, namely Nash equilibria, subgame perfect equilibria,
and an equilibrium concept that we refer to as -collusion Nash equilibrium
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