Artificial Neurons with Arbitrarily Complex Internal Structures

Artificial neurons with arbitrarily complex internal structure are introduced. The neurons can be described in terms of a set of internal variables, a set activation functions which describe the time evolution of these variables and a set of characteristic functions which control how the neurons interact with one another. The information capacity of attractor networks composed of these generalized neurons is shown to reach the maximum allowed bound. A simple example taken from the domain of pattern recognition demonstrates the increased computational power of these neurons. Furthermore, a specific class of generalized neurons gives rise to a simple transformation relating attractor networks of generalized neurons to standard three layer feed-forward networks. Given this correspondence, we conjecture that the maximum information capacity of a three layer feed-forward network is 2 bits per weight.Comment: 22 pages, 2 figure

Brain-inspired conscious computing architecture

What type of artificial systems will claim to be conscious and will claim to experience qualia? The ability to comment upon physical states of a brain-like dynamical system coupled with its environment seems to be sufficient to make claims. The flow of internal states in such system, guided and limited by associative memory, is similar to the stream of consciousness. Minimal requirements for an artificial system that will claim to be conscious were given in form of specific architecture named articon. Nonverbal discrimination of the working memory states of the articon gives it the ability to experience different qualities of internal states. Analysis of the inner state flows of such a system during typical behavioral process shows that qualia are inseparable from perception and action. The role of consciousness in learning of skills, when conscious information processing is replaced by subconscious, is elucidated. Arguments confirming that phenomenal experience is a result of cognitive processes are presented. Possible philosophical objections based on the Chinese room and other arguments are discussed, but they are insufficient to refute claims articon’s claims. Conditions for genuine understanding that go beyond the Turing test are presented. Articons may fulfill such conditions and in principle the structure of their experiences may be arbitrarily close to human

Optimal modularity and memory capacity of neural reservoirs

The neural network is a powerful computing framework that has been exploited by biological evolution and by humans for solving diverse problems. Although the computational capabilities of neural networks are determined by their structure, the current understanding of the relationships between a neural network's architecture and function is still primitive. Here we reveal that neural network's modular architecture plays a vital role in determining the neural dynamics and memory performance of the network of threshold neurons. In particular, we demonstrate that there exists an optimal modularity for memory performance, where a balance between local cohesion and global connectivity is established, allowing optimally modular networks to remember longer. Our results suggest that insights from dynamical analysis of neural networks and information spreading processes can be leveraged to better design neural networks and may shed light on the brain's modular organization

Emerging Consciousness as a Result of Complex-Dynamical Interaction Process

A quite general interaction process within a multi-component system is analysed by the extended effective potential method, liberated from usual limitations of perturbation theory or integrable model. The obtained causally complete solution of the many-body problem reveals the phenomenon of dynamic multivaluedness, or redundance, of emerging, incompatible system realisations and dynamic entanglement of system components within each realisation. The ensuing concept of dynamic complexity (and related intrinsic chaoticity) is absolutely universal and can be applied to the problem of consciousness that emerges now as a high enough, properly specified level of unreduced complexity of a suitable interaction process. This complexity level can be identified with the appearance of bound, permanently localised states in the multivalued brain dynamics from strongly chaotic states of unconscious intelligence, by analogy with classical behaviour emergence from quantum states at much lower levels of world dynamics. We show that the main properties of this dynamically emerging consciousness (and intelligence, at the preceding complexity level) correspond to empirically derived properties of natural versions and obtain causally substantiated conclusions about their artificial realisation, including the fundamentally justified paradigm of genuine machine consciousness. This rigorously defined machine consciousness is different from both natural consciousness and any mechanistic, dynamically single-valued imitation of the latter. We use then the same, truly universal concept of complexity to derive equally rigorous conclusions about mental and social implications of the machine consciousness paradigm, demonstrating its indispensable role in the next stage of civilisation development

Models of Cognition: Neurological possibility does not indicate neurological plausibility

Many activities in Cognitive Science involve complex computer models and simulations of both theoretical and real entities. Artificial Intelligence and the study of artificial neural nets in particular, are seen as major contributors in the quest for understanding the human mind. Computational models serve as objects of experimentation, and results from these virtual experiments are tacitly included in the framework of empirical science. Cognitive functions, like learning to speak, or discovering syntactical structures in language, have been modeled and these models are the basis for many claims about human cognitive capacities. Artificial neural nets (ANNs) have had some successes in the field of Artificial Intelligence, but the results from experiments with simple ANNs may have little value in explaining cognitive functions. The problem seems to be in relating cognitive concepts that belong in the `top-down' approach to models grounded in the `bottom-up' connectionist methodology. Merging the two fundamentally different paradigms within a single model can obfuscate what is really modeled. When the tools (simple artificial neural networks) to solve the problems (explaining aspects of higher cognitive functions) are mismatched, models with little value in terms of explaining functions of the human mind are produced. The ability to learn functions from data-points makes ANNs very attractive analytical tools. These tools can be developed into valuable models, if the data is adequate and a meaningful interpretation of the data is possible. The problem is, that with appropriate data and labels that fit the desired level of description, almost any function can be modeled. It is my argument that small networks offer a universal framework for modeling any conceivable cognitive theory, so that neurological possibility can be demonstrated easily with relatively simple models. However, a model demonstrating the possibility of implementation of a cognitive function using a distributed methodology, does not necessarily add support to any claims or assumptions that the cognitive function in question, is neurologically plausible

The evolution of representation in simple cognitive networks

Representations are internal models of the environment that can provide guidance to a behaving agent, even in the absence of sensory information. It is not clear how representations are developed and whether or not they are necessary or even essential for intelligent behavior. We argue here that the ability to represent relevant features of the environment is the expected consequence of an adaptive process, give a formal definition of representation based on information theory, and quantify it with a measure R. To measure how R changes over time, we evolve two types of networks---an artificial neural network and a network of hidden Markov gates---to solve a categorization task using a genetic algorithm. We find that the capacity to represent increases during evolutionary adaptation, and that agents form representations of their environment during their lifetime. This ability allows the agents to act on sensorial inputs in the context of their acquired representations and enables complex and context-dependent behavior. We examine which concepts (features of the environment) our networks are representing, how the representations are logically encoded in the networks, and how they form as an agent behaves to solve a task. We conclude that R should be able to quantify the representations within any cognitive system, and should be predictive of an agent's long-term adaptive success.Comment: 36 pages, 10 figures, one Tabl

New Ideas for Brain Modelling

This paper describes some biologically-inspired processes that could be used to build the sort of networks that we associate with the human brain. New to this paper, a 'refined' neuron will be proposed. This is a group of neurons that by joining together can produce a more analogue system, but with the same level of control and reliability that a binary neuron would have. With this new structure, it will be possible to think of an essentially binary system in terms of a more variable set of values. The paper also shows how recent research associated with the new model, can be combined with established theories, to produce a more complete picture. The propositions are largely in line with conventional thinking, but possibly with one or two more radical suggestions. An earlier cognitive model can be filled in with more specific details, based on the new research results, where the components appear to fit together almost seamlessly. The intention of the research has been to describe plausible 'mechanical' processes that can produce the appropriate brain structures and mechanisms, but that could be used without the magical 'intelligence' part that is still not fully understood. There are also some important updates from an earlier version of this paper

Computational physics of the mind

In the XIX century and earlier such physicists as Newton, Mayer, Hooke, Helmholtz and Mach were actively engaged in the research on psychophysics, trying to relate psychological sensations to intensities of physical stimuli. Computational physics allows to simulate complex neural processes giving a chance to answer not only the original psychophysical questions but also to create models of mind. In this paper several approaches relevant to modeling of mind are outlined. Since direct modeling of the brain functions is rather limited due to the complexity of such models a number of approximations is introduced. The path from the brain, or computational neurosciences, to the mind, or cognitive sciences, is sketched, with emphasis on higher cognitive functions such as memory and consciousness. No fundamental problems in understanding of the mind seem to arise. From computational point of view realistic models require massively parallel architectures