Approximation Algorithms for Distributionally Robust Stochastic Optimization with Black-Box Distributions

Two-stage stochastic optimization is a framework for modeling uncertainty, where we have a probability distribution over possible realizations of the data, called scenarios, and decisions are taken in two stages: we make first-stage decisions knowing only the underlying distribution and before a scenario is realized, and may take additional second-stage recourse actions after a scenario is realized. The goal is typically to minimize the total expected cost. A criticism of this model is that the underlying probability distribution is itself often imprecise! To address this, a versatile approach that has been proposed is the {\em distributionally robust 2-stage model}: given a collection of probability distributions, our goal now is to minimize the maximum expected total cost with respect to a distribution in this collection. We provide a framework for designing approximation algorithms in such settings when the collection is a ball around a central distribution and the central distribution is accessed {\em only via a sampling black box}. We first show that one can utilize the {\em sample average approximation} (SAA) method to reduce the problem to the case where the central distribution has {\em polynomial-size} support. We then show how to approximately solve a fractional relaxation of the SAA (i.e., polynomial-scenario central-distribution) problem. By complementing this via LP-rounding algorithms that provide {\em local} (i.e., per-scenario) approximation guarantees, we obtain the {\em first} approximation algorithms for the distributionally robust versions of a variety of discrete-optimization problems including set cover, vertex cover, edge cover, facility location, and Steiner tree, with guarantees that are, except for set cover, within $O(1)$-factors of the guarantees known for the deterministic version of the problem

Nash Welfare and Facility Location

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare

Computing with strategic agents

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (p. 179-189).This dissertation studies mechanism design for various combinatorial problems in the presence of strategic agents. A mechanism is an algorithm for allocating a resource among a group of participants, each of which has a privately-known value for any particular allocation. A mechanism is truthful if it is in each participant's best interest to reveal his private information truthfully regardless of the strategies of the other participants. First, we explore a competitive auction framework for truthful mechanism design in the setting of multi-unit auctions, or auctions which sell multiple identical copies of a good. In this framework, the goal is to design a truthful auction whose revenue approximates that of an omniscient auction for any set of bids. We focus on two natural settings - the limited demand setting where bidders desire at most a fixed number of copies and the limited budget setting where bidders can spend at most a fixed amount of money. In the limit demand setting, all prior auctions employed the use of randomization in the computation of the allocation and prices.(cont.) Randomization in truthful mechanism design is undesirable because, in arguing the truthfulness of the mechanism, we employ an underlying assumption that the bidders trust the random coin flips of the auctioneer. Despite conjectures to the contrary, we are able to design a technique to derandomize any multi-unit auction in the limited demand case without losing much of the revenue guarantees. We then consider the limited budget case and provide the first competitive auction for this setting, although our auction is randomized. Next, we consider abandoning truthfulness in order to improve the revenue properties of procurement auctions, or auctions that are used to hire a team of agents to complete a task. We study first-price procurement auctions and their variants and argue that in certain settings the payment is never significantly more than, and sometimes much less than, truthful mechanisms. Then we consider the setting of cost-sharing auctions. In a cost-sharing auction, agents bid to receive some service, such as connectivity to the Internet. A subset of agents is then selected for service and charged prices to approximately recover the cost of servicing them.(cont.) We ask what can be achieved by cost -sharing auctions satisfying a strengthening of truthfulness called group-strategyproofness. Group-strategyproofness requires that even coalitions of agents do not have an incentive to report bids other than their true values in the absence of side-payments. For a particular class of such mechanisms, we develop a novel technique based on the probabilistic method for proving bounds on their revenue and use this technique to derive tight or nearly-tight bounds for several combinatorial optimization games. Our results are quite pessimistic, suggesting that for many problems group-strategyproofness is incompatible with revenue goals. Finally, we study centralized two-sided markets, or markets that form a matching between participants based on preference lists. We consider mechanisms that output matching which are stable with respect to the submitted preferences. A matching is stable if no two participants can jointly benefit by breaking away from the assigned matching to form a pair.(cont.) For such mechanisms, we are able to prove that in a certain probabilistic setting each participant's best strategy is truthfulness with high probability (assuming other participants are truthful as well) even though in such markets in general there are provably no truthful mechanisms.by Nicole Immorlica.Ph.D