11,602 research outputs found

    Ranking and Selection under Input Uncertainty: Fixed Confidence and Fixed Budget

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    In stochastic simulation, input uncertainty (IU) is caused by the error in estimating the input distributions using finite real-world data. When it comes to simulation-based Ranking and Selection (R&S), ignoring IU could lead to the failure of many existing selection procedures. In this paper, we study R&S under IU by allowing the possibility of acquiring additional data. Two classical R&S formulations are extended to account for IU: (i) for fixed confidence, we consider when data arrive sequentially so that IU can be reduced over time; (ii) for fixed budget, a joint budget is assumed to be available for both collecting input data and running simulations. New procedures are proposed for each formulation using the frameworks of Sequential Elimination and Optimal Computing Budget Allocation, with theoretical guarantees provided accordingly (e.g., upper bound on the expected running time and finite-sample bound on the probability of false selection). Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of our procedures through a multi-stage production-inventory problem

    Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian

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    Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions where the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer(auctioneer) aims to maximize a social valuation function on subsets of items, under the budget constraint on the total payment. One of the most important questions in the field is "which valuation domains admit truthful budget feasible mechanisms with `small' approximations (compared to the social optimum)?" Singer showed that additive and submodular functions have such constant approximations. Recently, Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer gave an O(log^2 n)-approximation mechanism for subadditive functions; they also remarked that: "A fundamental question is whether, regardless of computational constraints, a constant-factor budget feasible mechanism exists for subadditive functions." We address this question from two viewpoints: prior-free worst case analysis and Bayesian analysis. For the prior-free framework, we use an LP that describes the fractional cover of the valuation function; it is also connected to the concept of approximate core in cooperative game theory. We provide an O(I)-approximation mechanism for subadditive functions, via the worst case integrality gap I of LP. This implies an O(log n)-approximation for subadditive valuations, O(1)-approximation for XOS valuations, and for valuations with a constant I. XOS valuations are an important class of functions that lie between submodular and subadditive classes. We give another polynomial time O(log n/loglog n) sub-logarithmic approximation mechanism for subadditive valuations. For the Bayesian framework, we provide a constant approximation mechanism for all subadditive functions, using the above prior-free mechanism for XOS valuations as a subroutine. Our mechanism allows correlations in the distribution of private information and is universally truthful.Comment: to appear in STOC 201

    Discovering Valuable Items from Massive Data

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    Suppose there is a large collection of items, each with an associated cost and an inherent utility that is revealed only once we commit to selecting it. Given a budget on the cumulative cost of the selected items, how can we pick a subset of maximal value? This task generalizes several important problems such as multi-arm bandits, active search and the knapsack problem. We present an algorithm, GP-Select, which utilizes prior knowledge about similarity be- tween items, expressed as a kernel function. GP-Select uses Gaussian process prediction to balance exploration (estimating the unknown value of items) and exploitation (selecting items of high value). We extend GP-Select to be able to discover sets that simultaneously have high utility and are diverse. Our preference for diversity can be specified as an arbitrary monotone submodular function that quantifies the diminishing returns obtained when selecting similar items. Furthermore, we exploit the structure of the model updates to achieve an order of magnitude (up to 40X) speedup in our experiments without resorting to approximations. We provide strong guarantees on the performance of GP-Select and apply it to three real-world case studies of industrial relevance: (1) Refreshing a repository of prices in a Global Distribution System for the travel industry, (2) Identifying diverse, binding-affine peptides in a vaccine de- sign task and (3) Maximizing clicks in a web-scale recommender system by recommending items to users
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