Appropriability in Services

Services constitute a major part of the economy, and, contrary to popular believe, service firms do innovate. In this paper I take a closer look at one aspect of innovation in services: appropriability. I discuss the different elements that are possibly of importance for appropriability, and discuss one element in more detail. Reputation has been argued to be decisive when service firms try to appropriate the benefits of their innovative activity. In this paper, some suggestions are brought forward that will be useful in thinking systematically about reputationshaping mechanisms

ASSESSMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY OF BULGARIAN FARMS

The New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics framework is incorporated to transitional Bulgarian agriculture, and level of sustainability of dominating subsistent farming, production cooperatives, small-scare commercial farms, and large agro-firms assessed. New framework for assessing sustainability of farms and for governing of sustainable development is suggested taking into account: role of specific institutional environment, comparative efficiency of various market, private, public and hybrid governing modes, transaction costs and critical factors (frequency, uncertainty, asset specificity, and appropriability) of farm transactions. Analysis of sustainability of different types of Bulgarian farms is made, and further domination of subsistence farming, cooperatives, large agro-firms, and some part of small commercial farms projected.assessment of sustainability of farms, governing of agrarian sustainability, sustainability of Bulgarian farms

Assessment of Sustainability of Bulgarian Farms

The New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics framework is incorporated to transitional Bulgarian agriculture, and level of sustainability of dominating subsistent farming, production cooperatives, small-scare commercial farms, and large agro-firms assessed. New framework for assessing sustainability of farms and for governing of sustainable development is suggested taking into account: role of specific institutional environment, comparative efficiency of various market, private, public and hybrid governing modes, transaction costs and critical factors (frequency, uncertainty, asset specificity, and appropriability) of farm transactions. Analysis of sustainability of different types of Bulgarian farms is made, and further domination of subsistence farming, cooperatives, large agrofirms, and some part of small commercial farms projected.Agribusiness,

The uninvited guest: patents on Wall Street

For at least the past twenty-five years, financial services industries have been creating innovative products and services without the help of patents. The 1998 State Street Bank case changed all this, making patents freely available in these industries. Will patents help or hurt financial services innovation in the long run? This article sheds some light on this issue. ; Before the advent of patents, several “appropriability” mechanisms protected financial services innovation: “first mover” advantages, complementary or “cospecific” assets, and trade secrecy. Evidence suggests that, in the immediate post-patent era, financial firms’ first order of business was to protect these traditional appropriability practices. This attitude explains the early push to secure a “prior use rights” defense to protect established firms against patent claims by upstart outsiders. From a historical perspective, this reaction to the “patent threat” tracks that of other industries: in particular, nineteenth-century railroads and the software industry of the 1980s. ; In the end, the author argues, patents are not likely to cause any real and lasting problems. Although patents may increase the costs of interchanging innovative ideas, they may bring some unintended benefits as well—by fostering spin-offs and facilitating entry by start-ups, for example. Like random shocks in the natural world, the new patent regime provides a shakeup that could bring some good but unpredictable consequences.Patents ; Financial services industry

Needs, Modes and Efficiency of Economic Organizations and Public Interventions in Agriculture

There has been a fundamental development in theory and understanding of market, private, collective and public organizations in recent years. This paper incorporates achievements of the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) and suggests a framework for assessing the needs and efficiency of economic organizations and public interventions in agriculture. Our new approach includes: study of farm and other agrarian organizations as a governing rather than production structure; assessment of comparative efficiency of alternative market, contract, internal, and hybrid modes of governance; analysis of level of transaction costs and their institutional (distribution and enforcement of de-facto rights between individuals, groups, organizations), behavioral (agents preferences, ability, bounded rationality, tendency for opportunism, risk aversion, trust), dimensional (frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity, and appropriability of transactions), natural, and technological factors; determination of effective horizontal and vertical boundaries of farms and other agrarian organizations; specification of the economic role of government and the needs for public interventions in agrarian sector; assessment of comparative of alternative forms of public involvement in agrarian sector (partnership, regulation, taxation, assistance, provision, in house organization, fundamental property rights modernization). The paper provides new powerful tools for understanding the agrarian organizations and their efficiency, and for improvement of public policies, collective actions, farming and business strategies, and academic analyses in that important sector of social life.market, private and public modes of governance, efficiency of farms and agrarian organizations, agricultural policies, transaction costs, New Institutional Economics

Understanding efficiency of agrarian organisation

In this paper we incorporate achievements of interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) into analysis of agrarian organizations and suggest a framework for evaluating efficiency of different governing structures in agriculture. This new approach includes: study of farm and other agrarian organizations as a governing rather than production structure; assessment of comparative efficiency of alternative (market, contract, internal, hybrid) modes of governance; analysis of level of transaction costs and their institutional, behavioral (agents preferences, bounded rationality, tendency for opportunism), dimensional (frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity, and appropriability of transactions), and technological factors; determination of effective horizontal and vertical boundaries of farms, and other agrarian organizations; the specification of the economic role of the government and the effective forms of public interventions in agrarian sector. The paper provides new effective tools for improvement of agrarian public policies, farming and business strategies, and academic analysis.agrarian governance, efficiency of farms and agrarian organizations, agrarian policies, transaction costs, new institutional and transaction costs economics

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALISIS OF AGRARIAN CONTRACTS

This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) and suggests a holistic framework for analysis of agrarian contracts. First, it specifies type and importance of different mechanisms of governance of agrarian activity. Second, it defines the essence, and classifies types and features of agrarian contracts. Next, it identifies technological, institutional, behavioral, dimensional, and transaction costs factors for contractual choice, and specifies effective modes for contractual arrangements in agriculture. Finally, it determines the effective boundaries and sustainability of farm and agrarian organizations.contract management, type of agrarian contracts, factor and efficiency of contractual choice, economic boundaries and sustainability of farm.

EFFICIECY OF AGRARIAN ORGANISATIONS

The goal of this paper is to incorporate achievements of the New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics to analysis of efficiency of agrarian organizations in transitional economies. That modern framework for analysis of agrarian organizations is based on their role to govern transactions between individual agents. Since governing (coordination, organization) of transactions is associated with significant costs (for finding best prices and partners, for negotiation and contracting, for monitoring and enforcement of contract terms, for adjustment and re-negotiation according to changed conditions of exchange, for dispute resolutions etc.), the economic efficiency of agrarian organizations has to assess not only their capacity to minimize the production costs, but their potential to economize transacting costs as well. Initially, main kinds of transactions of the managers of agrarian transactions (farms entrepreneurs) are clarified as land, labor, service, inputs, and finance supply; marketing; and collective actions. After that, the alternative market, non-market, and mixed modes for organization of different types of agrarian transitions are identified. Next, various types of costs associated with each form of transacting are determined. And then, the comparative efficiency of different governance structures is estimated according to (minimum) transacting costs criteria. One direction for evaluation of comparative efficiency of governing structures is based on direct assessment of items of costs for transaction in different organizations. However, that manner is often restricted since: difficulties (or impossibility) to measure absolute level of transaction costs; opposite dynamics of different items of costs in various organizations; great use of complex (and interlinked) rather than pure modes in transitional agriculture; and not existence (missing) of alternative form for organization (the base for comparison). Another direction is through comparative structural (qualitative) analysis of alternative governing forms. Firstly, critical factors of transactions in particular institutional environment are identified. These factors affect transaction costs variation, and they are associated: with behavioral characteristic of agrarian agents (bounded rationality, tendency for opportunism, building of reputation, risk aversion, level of trusts); and with economic dimensions of individual transactions (frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity and appropriability). Secondly, assessment is made on effective potential of alternative organizational modes to: minimize bounded rationality of agrarian agents and uncertainty associated with transacting; to appropriate and protect private investments from possible opportunism; to recover long-term investments for organizational development through high recurrence of transactions between same agents; to exploit economy of size and scale on specific for relationship with a particular partner capital etc. Third, principal matrix of generic organizational modes is build for effective governance of transactions with different combination of critical dimensions: free market mode if effective to carry out transactions with high appropriability and low assets specificity; the special contract form is appropriate for transactions with high frequency, and increased uncertainty and assets specificity; the internal integration can manage effectively repeated transactions with high capital dependency and big uncertainty; the hybrid and public modes are the most effective forms for occasional transactions with low appropriability and high assets specificity. Finally, effective horizontal and vertical boundaries of every specific form within each generic modes could be determined through comparison of their potential to explore economy of size (scale) on specific or (and) specialized assets, and their comparative efficiency to minimize bounded rationality and to control opportunism of counterparts.agrarian governance, efficiency of agrarian organizations, new institutional and transaction costs economics

Governing of agrarian sustainability

The new developing interdisciplinary methodology of the New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) is incorporated into agrarian sphere, and a framework for governing of agrarian sustainability suggested. It takes into account the role of the specific institutional environment (formal and informal property rights, and systems of their enforcement); and the behavioral characteristics of individuals (bounded rationality, tendency for opportunism, entrepreneurships, preferences, risk aversion etc.); and the transaction costs associated with protection and exchange of property rights; and the critical factors of each transaction (such as frequency, uncertainty, asset specificity, and appropriability); and the comparative efficiency of market, private, public, and hybrid governing modes. The discrete structural analysis is applied, and the principle forms for governing of transactions with specific critical dimensions specified. The cases of market and private sector failures are identified, and the needs for a third party (Government, international assistance etc.) intervention justified. The comparative advantages and disadvantages of different modes for public involvement (property rights modernization, regulations, taxes, assistance and support, public provision, hybrid modes) are assessed. The effective governance mix for public intervention in environmental transactions is presented.Agrarian Governance; Governing of Agrarian Sustainability; Efficiency of Market, Private, Public and Hybrid Modes; New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics

On IP and secrecy : The relevance of intellectual property rights to design-led start-up businesses

This paper will unveil how design-led start-up businesses can enhance their growth potential through securing exclusive access to intellectual property (IP). Many design-led start-up companies commonly see themselves confronted with a dilemma in that they need funds for the design development of their offerings, prototyping, field tests etc., as well as for overheads on the one hand, and for IP on the other. In their book, 'The Smart Entrepreneur', Clarysse and Kiefer claim that 'Patents are particularly important when your business is not close to market, because the exclusivity afforded by a solid patent can buy you some time by preventing competitors from encroaching on your idea while you develop applications.' (p.127) The UK Design Council on the other hand suggests to 'Approach patenting with caution. Multinational cover is expensive and premature filing can do more harm than good' (www.designcouncil.org.uk). Clarysse and Kiefer admit that '...a patent suit can cost $10-15 million and drag on for several years' (p.93). This beckons the question as to what is the best IP strategy for a design-led start-up. Is a patent an effective means for start-ups to overcome competition? In search for an answer, this paper will show a range of case studies of award winning British designs including the SEA Interface, a patent-pending platform technology for building pressure-sensitive touch interfaces, Cupris, a smartphone-enabled clinical device that transmits data between patients and healthcare practitioners, Yossarian Lives, a novel metaphor-based database search engine, and Arctica, a highly sustainable ventilation system. The inventors of these technologies will be interviewed in relation to their IP strategy, and in relation to their personal views on the international patenting system. The comparative study of interviews will identify the best approach to IP protection for design entrepreneurs whose funds are limited. Through reconciling the seemingly opposed views expressed by the Design Council Design Council on the one hand, and Clarysse and Kiefer on the other, this paper will discuss how designers can optimize the form and timing for IP protection for their start-up businesses. The author has previously received a business development award from NESTA (The National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts), and was subsequently involved in the Design London business incubator scheme, which was the birthplace of some of the ventures listed above. He is now studying for PhD at the Department for Service Design at the Royal College of Art in London, UK.Peer reviewedSubmitted Versio