Formal Verification of Security Protocol Implementations: A Survey

Automated formal verification of security protocols has been mostly focused on analyzing high-level abstract models which, however, are significantly different from real protocol implementations written in programming languages. Recently, some researchers have started investigating techniques that bring automated formal proofs closer to real implementations. This paper surveys these attempts, focusing on approaches that target the application code that implements protocol logic, rather than the libraries that implement cryptography. According to these approaches, libraries are assumed to correctly implement some models. The aim is to derive formal proofs that, under this assumption, give assurance about the application code that implements the protocol logic. The two main approaches of model extraction and code generation are presented, along with the main techniques adopted for each approac

Kickstarting Choreographic Programming

We present an overview of some recent efforts aimed at the development of Choreographic Programming, a programming paradigm for the production of concurrent software that is guaranteed to be correct by construction from global descriptions of communication behaviour

Applying Formal Methods to Networking: Theory, Techniques and Applications

Despite its great importance, modern network infrastructure is remarkable for the lack of rigor in its engineering. The Internet which began as a research experiment was never designed to handle the users and applications it hosts today. The lack of formalization of the Internet architecture meant limited abstractions and modularity, especially for the control and management planes, thus requiring for every new need a new protocol built from scratch. This led to an unwieldy ossified Internet architecture resistant to any attempts at formal verification, and an Internet culture where expediency and pragmatism are favored over formal correctness. Fortunately, recent work in the space of clean slate Internet design---especially, the software defined networking (SDN) paradigm---offers the Internet community another chance to develop the right kind of architecture and abstractions. This has also led to a great resurgence in interest of applying formal methods to specification, verification, and synthesis of networking protocols and applications. In this paper, we present a self-contained tutorial of the formidable amount of work that has been done in formal methods, and present a survey of its applications to networking.Comment: 30 pages, submitted to IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorial

Transforming ASN.1 Specifications into CafeOBJ to assist with Property Checking

The adoption of algebraic specification/formal method techniques by the networks' research community is happening slowly but steadily. We work towards a software environment that can translate a protocol's specification, from Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1 - a very popular specification language with many applications), into the powerful algebraic specification language CafeOBJ. The resulting code can be used to check, validate and falsify critical properties of systems, at the pre-coding stage of development. In this paper, we introduce some key elements of ASN.1 and CafeOBJ and sketch some first steps towards the implementation of such a tool including a case study.Comment: 8 pages, 12 figure

Benefits of Session Types for software Development

Session types are a formalism used to specify and check the correctness of communication based systems. Within their scope, they can guarantee the absence of communication errors such as deadlock, sending an unexpected message or failing to handle an incoming message. Introduced over two decades ago, they have developed into a significant theme in programming languages. In this paper we examine the beliefs that drive research into this area and make it popular. We look at the claims and motivation behind session types throughout the literature. We identify the hypotheses upon which session types have been designed and implemented, and attempt to clarify and formulate them in a more suitable manner for testing

A Program Logic for Verifying Secure Routing Protocols

The Internet, as it stands today, is highly vulnerable to attacks. However, little has been done to understand and verify the formal security guarantees of proposed secure inter-domain routing protocols, such as Secure BGP (S-BGP). In this paper, we develop a sound program logic for SANDLog-a declarative specification language for secure routing protocols for verifying properties of these protocols. We prove invariant properties of SANDLog programs that run in an adversarial environment. As a step towards automated verification, we implement a verification condition generator (VCGen) to automatically extract proof obligations. VCGen is integrated into a compiler for SANDLog that can generate executable protocol implementations; and thus, both verification and empirical evaluation of secure routing protocols can be carried out in this unified framework. To validate our framework, we encoded several proposed secure routing mechanisms in SANDLog, verified variants of path authenticity properties by manually discharging the generated verification conditions in Coq, and generated executable code based on SANDLog specification and ran the code in simulation