On Coloring Resilient Graphs

We introduce a new notion of resilience for constraint satisfaction problems, with the goal of more precisely determining the boundary between NP-hardness and the existence of efficient algorithms for resilient instances. In particular, we study $r$-resiliently $k$-colorable graphs, which are those $k$-colorable graphs that remain $k$-colorable even after the addition of any $r$ new edges. We prove lower bounds on the NP-hardness of coloring resiliently colorable graphs, and provide an algorithm that colors sufficiently resilient graphs. We also analyze the corresponding notion of resilience for $k$-SAT. This notion of resilience suggests an array of open questions for graph coloring and other combinatorial problems.Comment: Appearing in MFCS 201

Coalition Resilient Outcomes in Max k-Cut Games

We investigate strong Nash equilibria in the \emph{max $k$-cut game}, where we are given an undirected edge-weighted graph together with a set $\{1,\ldots, k\}$ of $k$ colors. Nodes represent players and edges capture their mutual interests. The strategy set of each player $v$ consists of the $k$ colors. When players select a color they induce a $k$-coloring or simply a coloring. Given a coloring, the \emph{utility} (or \emph{payoff}) of a player $u$ is the sum of the weights of the edges $\{u,v\}$ incident to $u$, such that the color chosen by $u$ is different from the one chosen by $v$. Such games form some of the basic payoff structures in game theory, model lots of real-world scenarios with selfish agents and extend or are related to several fundamental classes of games. Very little is known about the existence of strong equilibria in max $k$-cut games. In this paper we make some steps forward in the comprehension of it. We first show that improving deviations performed by minimal coalitions can cycle, and thus answering negatively the open problem proposed in \cite{DBLP:conf/tamc/GourvesM10}. Next, we turn our attention to unweighted graphs. We first show that any optimal coloring is a 5-SE in this case. Then, we introduce $x$-local strong equilibria, namely colorings that are resilient to deviations by coalitions such that the maximum distance between every pair of nodes in the coalition is at most $x$. We prove that $1$-local strong equilibria always exist. Finally, we show the existence of strong Nash equilibria in several interesting specific scenarios.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper will appear in the proceedings of the 45th International Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science (SOFSEM'19

Courtesy as a Means to Coordinate

We investigate the problem of multi-agent coordination under rationality constraints. Specifically, role allocation, task assignment, resource allocation, etc. Inspired by human behavior, we propose a framework (CA^3NONY) that enables fast convergence to efficient and fair allocations based on a simple convention of courtesy. We prove that following such convention induces a strategy which constitutes an $\epsilon$-subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated allocation game with discounting. Simulation results highlight the effectiveness of CA^3NONY as compared to state-of-the-art bandit algorithms, since it achieves more than two orders of magnitude faster convergence, higher efficiency, fairness, and average payoff.Comment: Accepted at AAMAS 2019 (International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Stabilization Bounds for Influence Propagation from a Random Initial State

We study the stabilization time of two common types of influence propagation. In majority processes, nodes in a graph want to switch to the most frequent state in their neighborhood, while in minority processes, nodes want to switch to the least frequent state in their neighborhood. We consider the sequential model of these processes, and assume that every node starts out from a uniform random state. We first show that if nodes change their state for any small improvement in the process, then stabilization can last for up to $\Theta(n^2)$ steps in both cases. Furthermore, we also study the proportional switching case, when nodes only decide to change their state if they are in conflict with a $\frac{1+\lambda}{2}$ fraction of their neighbors, for some parameter $\lambda \in (0,1)$. In this case, we show that if $\lambda < \frac{1}{3}$, then there is a construction where stabilization can indeed last for $\Omega(n^{1+c})$ steps for some constant $c>0$. On the other hand, if $\lambda > \frac{1}{2}$, we prove that the stabilization time of the processes is upper-bounded by $O(n \cdot \log{n})$

Stabilization Time in Weighted Minority Processes

A minority process in a weighted graph is a dynamically changing coloring. Each node repeatedly changes its color in order to minimize the sum of weighted conflicts with its neighbors. We study the number of steps until such a process stabilizes. Our main contribution is an exponential lower bound on stabilization time. We first present a construction showing this bound in the adversarial sequential model, and then we show how to extend the construction to establish the same bound in the benevolent sequential model, as well as in any reasonable concurrent model. Furthermore, we show that the stabilization time of our construction remains exponential even for very strict switching conditions, namely, if a node only changes color when almost all (i.e., any specific fraction) of its neighbors have the same color. Our lower bound works in a wide range of settings, both for node-weighted and edge-weighted graphs, or if we restrict minority processes to the class of sparse graphs